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CHANGING CHANNELS 
A.~ analysis of the people and forces shaping 
the development oE New Zealand Broadcasting. 
A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in 
Geography at Massey University. 
Dale Cameron Bailey 
January 1985 
"When you. take stuff from one writer, it's plagarism: 
but when you take it from many writers, it's research." 
Wilson Mizner 
1876 -1933. 
AI3STRACT 
This thesis examines the people and forces shapLng the 
development of New Zealand Broadcasting. People and 
the structures they live with have proven to be important, 
both identifiable yet inseparable. By examining process, 
this thesis has brought the two together in social enquiry. 
The development of broadcasting from the first experience 
in Wireless Telegraphy to the present day has been a series 
of complex changes. Key individuals and certain structures 
have shaped that development. Each chapter that details this 
d~velopment.adoptsa different emphasis, thus providing insight' 
into the wide range of forces being brought to bear. Three 
aspects in particular are explored in detail. Changing 
technologies, the development or new conceptions of broad-
casting, and the altering nature of organisations have proved 
focal points for this thesis. These avenues of enquiry reveal 
more about the nature of Broadcasting and the society in which 
it resides. 
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CHAPTER 1 
'A PERSONAL FRAMEWORK' 
It is as unhelpful to separate a thesis from its author as it 
is to separate music from its composer. In the past, the character, 
ideals, hopes, values and aspirations of a researcher were seen 
as extraneous to his work, a distraction to his 'science'. Both, 
however, are interwoven, affecting each other. 
This short comment is intended to provide the reader with some 
background which has influenced the author's choice of topic and 
approach. 
Born in 1962, the author has lived and been educated within the 
confines of the Manawatu region. Attending a rural primary school, 
and later an urban boys' high school, he developed a taste for 
further educatioo. This led to enrolment in a Bachelor of Arts 
course, m.ajoring in Geography at Massey thiversity. This was 
later extended to a Masterate, £or which this thesis has been 
prepared. 
A committed anti-centralist, the author developed interests in 
both history and current events. The sensitivity to history 
was in part inspired by a long family association in the area. 
Politics has also dominated the author's interests, with a 
special interest in rural affairs. 
In Geography and Social Science studies, interests were pursued 
around the nature of people and the systems they create. In 
particular there has been a fascination with the structures, 
organisations and institutions created in society. This, 
combined with a desire to explain things more adequately has 
led the author to explore the development of knowledge in 
contextual terms, linking both human agency and social structure. 
To conclude it is important not to over-emphasise the impact 
of these ideas and experiences. But, on the other hand, to 
disregard them would be inappropriate. They have been 
acknowledged and should be recognised £or what they are. 
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"Reasoning Rules are intellectual tools by which 
we structure our thoughts and actions. My choice 
of reasoning mode is therefore analogous to the 
craftman's choice of trade tools; in both cases 
I am influenced by my subject matter, by my 
experiences I have accumulated in the past, by 
my present milieu and by my hopes and fears for 
the future" 
Gunnar Olsson, 1980. 
2 
CHAPTER 2 
"A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR A STUDY OF B~ASTING" 
As B. Wood (1982) contends 'a history of Broadcasting can 
only proceed by referring to what is~ Broadcasting' 
(Wood, 1982, 107). Broadcasting, and indeed any other 
activity, must be explained within its milieu. In the 
context of New Zealand, this means gaining an understanding 
of a capitalist society. This can really only be achieved 
through embracing social theory. 
Recent social theorists havesought to overcome the difficult 
dichotomy of structure and agency. Latterly there has been 
a recognition that both global processes and local events are 
often inseparable. Accounts need to be woven which capture 
both the specific local events, and the social structures 
prevalent in society. There needs to be an exploration of 
process. 
There has been some recent agreement that the examination of 
the reproduction and production of society is a necessary 
pre-requisite for the portrayal of processes. Yet such an 
examination requires a many-faceted discussion of reality 
through the use of categories that capture the changing 
relationships of structure a...~d agency. Social theorists often 
orient their discussion about the activities within capitalist 
... / 
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societies in terms of commodity relations. In this way 
activities are seen to be linked to the general extension of 
productive relations defining commodity production. Yet 
such an approach is too limited to adequately explore 
the emergence a.~d development of activities such as 
Broadcasting. 
Radio and television are too bound up in social praGtices 
to be satisfactorily e,cplained by reference to commodity 
relations alone. Broadcasting spans civil society and the 
State as well as the economy. Often people in broadcasting 
are acting deliberately against practices directly associated 
with commodity production. 
Nevertheless the important work of Harvey (1982) (among others) 
confirms the dominance of the capitalist form of produc~ion, 
in New Zealand and most other societies. Though hits work 
partly addresses issues of reproduction, he still centres on 
the economic functions of capitalism. With broadcasting it 
is crucial to consider wider non-commodity uses. Different 
movements of capital into broadcasting were made, for example, 
by, but often diametrially opposed, popular groups. Equally, 
the accommodation of antagonistic civil groups and various 
organisations of the State has usually been contingent. Yet 
despite such developments broadcasting is still tied to the 
evident necessities of profit realisation or revenue generation. 
In no way, however, should groups and individuals be regarded 
as always performing strictly according to the rules of capitalist 
... / 
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production. 
An explanation of the history of broadcasting places severe 
demands on available theory. Vith the interest of bridging 
structure and agency, in all three spheres, civil society, 
the State, and the economy, the theory must inform on 
organisational forms and functioning under the general 
umbrella of capitalist relations of production. It also 
has to cater for quite diverse arrangements in which the 
many different organisations of broadcasting have engaged· in. 
The way the economy, civil society and the State have or 
could have combined has special bearing on the degree of 
autonomy of broadcasting activities and the social meaning 
and functions attached to the organisations making up 
broadcasting. These are matters which can only be adequately 
handled in an analysis which highlights changing relationships. 
Although change is summarised by frequent reference to dates 
and well known events, it should be recognised that this type 
of summary only in part illustrates the key relationship 
defining organisations and activities. Thus rather than 
concentrating on events per se, this thesis attempts to thread 
an account of relationships which more adequately provides 
a sense of the diverse determining influences. It looks 
closely at the organisational arrangements and infrastructures 
and includes some evaluation of the personal contribution 
of decision makers and personalities. It reveals the magnitude 
and character of organisational change upon a succession of 
advances in radio and television. 
While this thesis will not be sited within the bounds of 
conventional geography it firmly recognises that physical 
and social constraints affect the practices of individuals 
and groups. But to consider these facets alone would severely 
limit understanding. Accordingly questions of location and 
spatial organisation are accorded appropriate emphasis in 
5 
relation to the particular practices which give meanings to 
the use of space. 
Reproducing Society 
Alla~ Fred (1982) has argued that Geographers need to address 
the dialectic between society and the individual (Pred, 1982, 
157). But as N. Thrift (1983) has pointed out, the traditional 
subject matter of geography has made it difficult: 
"It is very difficult to relate what are usually very 
abstract generalisations about space phenonema to 
the features of a particular place at a particular 
time and to the actions of individuals 'Within that 
place" 
(Thrift, 1983, 23) 
According to Thrift, the problem has been represented within 
human geography as a 'polarisation between social structure 
and human agency' (Thrift, 1983, 23). What is needed is an 
approach which transcends these difficulties: 
"I am looking for a theoretically structured approach 
to the 'real world of human beings• which is not 'held 
at a safe distance by the extr63Jne forms of the idealist 
abstraction' that are so chara~teristic of a substantial 
portion of Marxist traditions". (Thrift, 198} , 25) 
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Such a conception is a valid task for human geographers. A. Sayer, 
0983) also sees the need to resolve the artificial dichotomy of 
structure and agency: 
"Structuralist approaches tried to emphasise that action is 
structurally determined, even to the extent of virtually 
writing out agents. Behavioural geography had overlooked 
the fact that people do not just act as they please, in condit-
ions of their own choosing, whereas in structuralist 
approaches it appears that conditions did the acting • 
... / 
What was lacking was a mediation between structure 
(always exalted) and agency (always over emphasised)!' 
(Sayer, 1982 80-81). 
Fred (1982) adds that society is not a 'mass of separable 
events a~d sequences' nor a matter of momentary meanings 
which we attach to our physiological states' but is an 
agglomeration: 
"Instead for any given area over any given time society 
may be defined as the agglomeration of all existing 
institutions, the activities (practices or modes of 
behaviour) associated with the institutions, the people 
participating in the activities, and the structural 
relations occurring between people as individuals or 
collectives between such people and the institutions 
and between institutions" 
(Fred, 1982, 158). 
Proceeding from this he defines the reproduction of society: 
" ••• as that constantly ongoing process whereby, in a 
given area, the everyday performance of institutional 
activities••• results in the perpetuation in stable or 
altered form, crf the institutions themselves, of the 
knowledge necessary to repeat or create activities of 
already existing structural relationships and of the 
biological reproduction of the areas of population". 
(Fred, 1982, 158-9). 
Such a process is the core of the continued existence of any 
society. A. Touraine (1977) claims there is more to it than 
sinply reproducing and continuing the existing relationships: 
"Society is not just reproduction and adaptation: it 
is also creation, self production. It has the capacity 
to define itself and thus through knowledge and investment 
... / 
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it has achieved, to transform its relations with its 
environment, to constitute its milieu. Human society 
possesses a capacity of symbolic creation by means of 
which, between a 'situation and social conduct there 
occurs the formation of a meaning, a system of conduct". 
(Touraine, 1977, 4) 
Touraine•s analysis recognises that groups within society have the 
ability to reflect upon themselves and respond accordingly. It 
also allows a recognition of the social construction of value. 
A Need to Consider Process 
In order to resolve the dichotomy between agency and structure 
Philip Abrams (1982) suggests that 'process' might provide a 
link. He sees social action as 'both something we choose to do 
and something we have to do' 
" ••• whatever reality society has, is a historical 
reality - a reality in time. When we refer to the 
two sideness of society, we are referring to the ways 
which in time actions become institutions and institutions 
in turn are changed by action •• •" 
(Abrams, 1982, 2-3} 
Such a sense of process has been largely omitted by social theorists. 
Abrams looks at events to provide a useful approach to process: 
"The great events mark decisive conjunctions of action and 
structure: they are transparent moments of structuring 
at which human agency encounters social possibility and 
can be seen most clearly as simultaneously determined and 
determining. Time after time the analysis of the event 
reveals the meaning and the interweaving of the general 
and particular, of interests, states, cultures, rules and 
structured opportunity with individual understandings, 
motivations and more or less considered and deliberate 
action" 
(Abrams, 1982, 199). 
. .. / 
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Such an interpretation places events in come context, not 
isolated artifically. Anthdll.y Giddens (1981) advocates that 
a~y 'social enquiry should fashion lmowledge contextually': 
"Time and space have traditionally been seen not only as 
'boundaries' to social a~alysis but have also been in a 
certain sense separated from one another in a disciplinary 
fashion. History it is presumed, has as its special 
province the elapsing of time, while geography finds its 
identity in a pre-eminent concern with space". 
(Giddens, 1981, 30) 
Giddens sees it as important to 'grasp time and space in terms 
of the relations of things and eve.~ts•. He argues that time and 
space become "phenomena" as contrasted to the classical view that 
all that is real exists in time and space•. (Giddens, 1980, 30-1). 
9 
The conception of society too can affect the construction of lmowledge. 
Allen Scott sees lmowledge as reflecting the order of a society: 
" ••• lmowledge is in essence an effect of ensembles of concrete 
social problems and interests. These problems and interests 
are intrinsic to the prevailing mode of production, and they 
accordingly assume a very definite historical character and 
.form •• " (Scott, 1982, 15) 
Scott also sees two'breakdowns' which greatly influence our society 
and have led to the creation of separate bodies of lmowledge. The 
two breakdowns are: 
"a) Technical breakdowns in production and growth calling for 
positivistic lmowledge effects and scientifically 
programmed interventions in order to re-establish the 
economic order of late capitalism, 
b) Associated breakdowns of affective individual and social 
life which give rise to the need for empathetic research 
programmes and sociocultural management so as to maintain 
legitimation, smooth reproduction and cultural continuity." 
(Scott, 1982, 151.2) 
... / 
Such breakdowns in knowledge are central to the reproduction 
of capitalist societies. 
According to D. Harvey (1982), 'we live in a world of commodity 
production - all goods are produced for excha~ge in the market' 
(Harvey, 1982, 9). Development has become so dominant in our 
society that 'we have arrived at the point where we can see that 
the conditions of general commodity exchange make the capitalist 
form of circulation socially necessary•. He sees the existence of 
'a social space' in which 'the operations of the capitalist become 
necessary in order to stabilise exchange relations•. (Harvey, 1982, 13). 
On the other hand organisations and institutions can be set up which 
appear to directly contradict the commodity relations. It is useful 
to conceive of structure and agency within a frame that accommodates 
this. Urry's (1981) capitalist societies, involving people groups 
and organisations is such a framework. 
Organisations 
Activities are often co-ordinated and developed by groups, and 
it is necessary to reach an appropriate understanding of their 
operation. Ranson, Hinings and Greenwood (1980) provide an insight 
L~to organisational structures: 
"The concept 0£ structure is usually understood to imply a 
configy,ration_ of activities that is characteristically 
enduring and persistent, the dominant feature of organisational 
structure is its patterned regularity. Yet descriptions of 
structure have typically focussed on very different aspects 
of such patterned regularity. Some have sought to describe 
structure as- a formal conf.igyration_ oB order and procedures, 
the prescribed framevork of the organisation ••• " 
(Ranson, etal, 1980, 1-2) 
They see the organisational framework as focussing on the 
'differentiation of positions, formulations of rules and procedures, 
and prescriptions of authority.• Combined with this they see the 
... / 
properties of their 'structural frameworks' as having 'important 
consequences for the orga~isations effectiveness' (Ranson, et al 
1980, 2) The authors, provide 'three abstract and interdependent 
categories' to analyse organisations. These categories are 
'integral to a theoretical model that seeks to articulate the 
way in which the process of structuring itself defines and 
mediates organisational structures'. (Ranson, et al 1980, 4) 
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These three categories are termed; provinces of meaning, dependencies 
of power and contextual constraints: 
"1) Organisational members create provinces of meaning 
which incorporate interpretive schemes, intermittently 
articulated as values and interests, that form the 
basis of their orientation and strategic purposes 
within organisations. 
2) Since interpretive schemes can be the basis of cleavage 
as much as consensus, it is often appropriate to 
consider an organisation as composed of alternative 
schemes, value preferences and sectional interests, the 
resolution of which is determined by dependencies of 
power 
3) Such constitutive structuring by organisational members 
has, in tum, always to accommodate contextual constrai11rs 
inherent in characteristics of the organisation and the 
environment, with organisational members differentially 
responding to and enacting their contextual conditions 
according to the opportunities provided by infra-
structure and time" (Ranson et al, 1980, 4) 
In the day-to-day operation of organisations care must be taken 
to ensure that they are sensitive to social features as well as 
the demands of operation: 
"••• If organisations wish to perform effectively their 
structural forms must remain sensitive not only to these 
infrastructural elements (e.g., size of market, deraographic 
pattern), but equally to such qualitative characteristics as 
... / 
the complexity, stability or uncertainty of cha."'lging 
teclmologies, populations and markets. Apart from 
confronting demands for its products and services, the 
organisation faces an environment upon which it is 
dependent for finaY1ce, manpower and materials, that is 
its resources" (Ra.Ylson, et al, 1980, 10) 
To analyse the activity of organisations it is important not only 
to look within organisations but between them. Ranson et al•saw 
'' those relations as significant. One such relationship is the role 
of powerful actors: 
"The constitutional structuring of relations between (as 
within) organisations is a dual one in which powerful 
actors wish to create structures 0£ domination (that is 
of power and meaning) that mediate their own reconstitut@d 
meanings are sedimented in structures as well as in 
perceptual processes" (Ranson et al, 1980, 11) 
The action# of these PecPle, along with others less significant, 
strongly influenced by their view of the world: 
"The attempt of power holders to constitute structural 
arrangements according to their interpretive scheme 
is typically a process of coping with obstacles, the 
milieu within which organisational life carries on" 
(Ranson, et al, 1980, 12) 
As these authors note, 'all organisations are located in a 
broader social structure that will constrain the forms which 
they can develop' (Ranson, et al, 1980, 10). Given this 
understanding it is appreciated that social influences are 
constrained by the rules of capitalist production. 
D. Harvey (1982) reasons organisations reconstitute themselves to 
meet the challenging demands of commodity production. He connects 
the need for orga"'l isational change with his 'general argument on 
technological change' (Harvey, 1982, 138). He explains this 
... / 
12 
necessity: 
" ••• 
competition impels capitalism towards perpetual 
revolutions in the productive forces by whatever means of 
whatever sort. Capitalists compete with each other in 
the realm of exchange. Each has the possibility to alter 
his own production process so that it becomes more 
efficient than the social average••• Once the competitors 
have caught up, the original innovators have every 
incentive to leap ahead once more in order to sustain 
the relative surplus value they were previously capturing 
••• the social consequence of competition is, or course, 
to force continuous leap frogging in the adoption of new 
technologies and new organisational forms independent of 
the will of any particular entrepreneur" 
(Harvey, 1982, 121). 
If this analysis of technological change holds true, then 'we 
13 
must L~terpret organisational change as a response to contradictory 
forces: 
"we must alsoaaticipate that the organisation achieved at 
any particular moment will embody powerful contradictions 
which will likely be the sources of instability and crises" 
(Harvey, 198 2, 1 3 8). 
J. Urry (1981) identifies the importance of the State in such 
developments. He sees the State as broadly maintaining the 
existing framework, and because of this function it has developed 
in a distinct way: 
"The Capitalist State possesses a form which is given by 
its attempt to sustain the overall conditions u.~der which 
profitable accumulation can take place within its national 
territory. This demand on each results from the structure 
within which it is situated. It cannot avoid attempting to 
sustain such conditions, although each State will vary in both 
its internal structure and in its policies it happens to 
pursue" (Urry, 1 981 , 101 ) 
... / 
Yet the State, cannot be simply reduced to economic .functions 
alone. The State may, and does act outside of the demands of 
capital accumulation: 
"The actions of the State can neither eliminate the 
contradictions of capitalism nor can it act independently 
of them. The effect of a major change in the State forms 
or policy always involves the establishment or at least 
a temporary power bloc out of the politically dominant 
social forces. The establishment of such a power bloc 
14 
is problematic involving balancing out, manipulation, coercicn, 
compromising and bargaining between the different classes, 
factors and popular forces ••• The State must not be viewed 
as automatically reacting to the demands of capital accum-
ulation. L~deed for a substa~tial period there may be no 
power bloc establishmen.t at all; merely a number of 
politically dominant classes, factors and social forces with 
no particular organisation unity or policy" 
(Urry, 1981, 105) 
The centrality of the State in modern societies is confirmed by 
Scott (1982): 
"In the late capitalist society then, it can surely be said 
that the basic mechanisms of social regulation are no longer 
co-ordL~ated to any significant degree by a network of 
market relations, but that on the contrary, social stability 
and continuity are nowadays largely secured by means of 
bureaucratic intervention" 
(Scott, 1982, 144). 
Furthermore, he sees the State as 'constrained and structured by two 
very stubborn sorts of social pressures'. 
Scott explains: 
"On the one hand, ••• the State finds itself having to secure 
highly rationalised initiatives by means of tecrmical control 
of resources. At the present time there is no doubt that this 
... / 
is the domina~t mode of State intervention given a 
prevailing situation in which the fiscal a~d political 
penalties of improductive public expense are L~deed severe. 
On the other hand the State must seek to contain the socio-
cultural stresses and strains that break out at different 
junctures in late capitalist society and it achieves this 
end by means of a proliferation of human relations programmes 
and social administration devices". 
(Scott, 1982, 144). 
With these forces, there has bee.~ a corresponding need for 
increasingly more precise intervention by the State: 
"As capitalist society evolves and becomes more complex, 
new problems calling for more subtle forms of control, 
cultural and pyschological management start to present 
themselves. The new problems emerge once society reaches 
a historical stage in which the development of human resources 
becomes a critical and omnipresent public policy issue and 
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is which complex processes of reproduction and legitimation are 
collectively secured" 
(Scott, 1982, 146) 
The Social Context of Space 
In social theorisations there is a need for a more explicit development 
of the context of space and place. M. Castells (1983) argues that 
space is more than just a 'reflection of society' 
" ••• it is one of it's (Society's) fundamental material 
dimensions, ~d to consider it independently from social 
relationships, even with the intention of studyL~g their 
interaction, is actually to separate nature from culture 
and thus destroy the first prL~ciple of any social science: 
that matter and consciousness are interrelated and that this 
fusion is the essence of what history and science are each 
about. Therefore, spatial forms, at least on our planet will 
... / 
be produced, as all other objects are, by human action. They 
will express and perform the interests of the domL~ant class 
according to a give.~ mode of production and to a specific 
mode of development. They will express ~~d implement the 
power relationships of a state in a historically defined 
society" (Castells, 1983, 4) 
In brie£, space can be viewed as 'neither absolute, relative or 
relational in itself'. It can become 'one or all sirrultaneously 
depending on the circumstances. Harvey (1982) sees this 'problem 
of the proper conceptualisation of space as being resolved through 
human practice with respect to it' (Harvey, 198a, 339) 
How-thus can human practice be studied and interpreted? Richard 
Peet (1980) states that the way people view the world (their 
consciousness) will affect the way they order and respond to their 
world. Consciousness develops from our experiences. 
"Consciousness develops by the accumulation of ideas from 
particular inst~~ces of experience, their interaction as 
generalisations within the mind, and the production,of new 
ideas from this interaction which are confirmed or denied 
by practice. Consciousness thus both reflects past modes 
of producticn, and past historical moments of the mode of 
production dominant in the existing social formation ••• " 
(Peet, 1983, 93). 
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This coosciousness is that part of social being devoted to 
understanding the direction of activity. 'Understanding', according 
to Peet, 'can only come from the interaction of thought with an 
existing social p~actice', and the knowledge gained by the encounter. 
(Peet, 1983, 113). 
The development of consciousness and meaning by people is control 
of the perpetuation of the existing order. Raymond Williams (1981) 
considers broadcasting along with the cinema, record industry and 
publishing as integral to the general social and economic organisation 
and order. (Williams, 1981, 54) Peet (1982) reviewL~g the work of 
... / 
Enzerberger (1974) believes that these activities are designed 
not to sell particular products but to sell or reproduce the 
existing order. 
"Because this industry holds the central position in 
late capitalism, it can use the attractions of high 
monetary return and mass adulation to employ the most 
'creative' minds, the most beautiful bodies, the most skilled 
technicians to produce technicoloured, stereophonic pieces 
of false consciousness which are continuously projected 
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into the minds of people living at the centre of world 
capitalism with the use of the most sophisticated 'communications' 
technology ever known. The techniques used involve particularly 
the provision of manufactured 'experie.~ce' in audio and visual 
formats which replicate and especially exaggerate, real events, 
intervening between everyday sensory experience and the process 
of consciousness formation by providing ready-formed but 
inaccurate generalisations •• •" (Pred, 1982, 293) 
"With particular institutional projects occurring at specific 
temporal and spatial locations." 
(Pred, 1982, 165) 
These intersections may only be brief moments (such as visits to the 
store or theatre) or much longer in duration (such as a student at 
University) (Pred, 1982, 165). The literature of Time Geography 
introduces the combination in social analysis of individual agency 
and societal structure. But Pred and others have found it important 
to link 'details of everyday paths' to 'the details of the past' and 
'the future'. This thesis is not a work in Time-Geography but it does 
however, utilise in a background sense the ideas of combining the 
human agency and structures proposed by this approach. 
Studies on Broadcasting 
It is useful to briefly summarise the major studies of broadcasting 
in the past. Wood (1982) in a review of the world writings on the 
topic, comments that there have been 'two dominant a~d rival approaches 
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to theorising the connections between broadcasting organisations 
and the political and economic practices of specific societies' 
(Wood, 1982, 73). 
Wood labels these: 1) Liberal Democrats a~d the Fourth Estate and, 
2) Marxist theories. Both approaches recognise the power of 
broadcasting and attempts to articulate, often contradictory 
missions for broadcasting. 
Wood states that in the approach of the 'Liberal Democrats and 
the Fourth Estate•, broadcasting organisations are understood as 
mediums of interrogating messages from political agents to the 
electorate (Wood, 1982, 74). This he attributes to traditional 
privalist notions of the press: 
"With the development of liberal democracy and rational 
individualism, credible channels of communication were 
necessary for the citizenry to make rational political 
and economic decisions. Autonomy from political control 
guaranteed the objective truth of the information tr~~smitted'. 
(Wood, 1982, 75). 
What has eventuated from these conceptions are distinct organisational 
forms: 
"In terms of broadcasting the praetical correlation of these 
conceptions was the attempt to create formal broadcasting 
systems beyond Government influence, and to develop the 
required codes of journalistic practice" 
(Wood, 1982, 75) 
Wood argues that the liberal democratic theories rest on •two 
fundamental propositions about the nature of their society'. 
'Firstly the social formation consists of a diffused plurality of 
social groups on the legitimacy of society's values'. (Wood, 
1982, 76-77). 
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A serious dilemma arises out of the liberal democratic conception 
of politics. According to Wood: 
"AVJ.alysis is rarely exte.Ylded to the State in general, 
and ever more rarely are the linkages to economic practices 
explored. As some liberal democratic theories tend to 
ignore both the conflicts, incorporations, etc., with the 
State, through which the media are politicised, and the 
relationships to developing economic structures and the 
associated class struggles ••• 
••• The second related problem with liberal democrats 
conception of politics is subjectivism, the tendency to 
reduce political and journalistic practices, to the 
collison of various personalities" 
(Wood, 1982, 80) 
This 'fourth estate' media research 'can tell us much about the 
cultural practices and ideological assumptions of broadcasting' 
(Wood, 1981, 83). Yet alone it proves unsatisfactory. As this 
chapter asserts.,. there is a need to develop accounts of broadcasting 
that explore the activity in relation to the wider social context. 
Opposed to the 'Liberal Democratic traditions• is the 'Marxist 
response'. Described in traditional terms: 
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"This response stresses the determination_ of broadcasting 
organisations by the dominant economic, political and 
ideological structures of society. The emphasis on integration 
power, stratification, and so nn decisively breaks with the 
'Fourth Estate' advocacy of formal autonomy. The fundamental 
proposition ·of Marxist media studies is that there can be 
no theory of mass communications sui generis, that it is 
necessary to situate analysis within a political economy 
that includes both broadcasting, institutions and the social 
formula as a whole". 
(wood, 1982, 83-4). 
. .. / 
Furthermore, Wood observes, 'V~rxists insist that class is the 
fundamental structuring principle of modern Western societies'. 
"Thus a consideration of the relationship between class and 
media structures is held to be the best place from which 
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to start a~alysing the connections between mass communicatiO!'ls 
a.~d society in general" 
(Wood, 1982, 84) 
As Wood himself identifies, Marxist analyses are traditionally 
split into determinism (structuralism) versus agency 
(instrumentalism), (Wood, 1982, 85). Clearly this is inappropriate. 
Theory must encompass the individuals and constraints imposed upon 
them by a system they have helped create a~d reinforce. 
Review of Thesis 
This study is about how and why broadcasting has been organised 
in New Zealand. Broadcasting is inextricably woven into the 
relationship of the late capitalist State. In particular this 
thesis seeks to develop the changing character of broadcasting and 
' location 0£ radio stations and other facilities. There are three 
movements which have considerably shaped Radio and Television. 
Firstly there have been successive technological changes in the 
many facets of broadcasting. These have brought new possibilities 
and new restrictions. Secondly~there has been the development of 
new conceptions of broadcasting by key people and influential groups. 
The change of meanings, and the ability to articulate them has been 
an influential force in this sector. Thirdly cha~ging State-Economy, 
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Economy-Civil Society and State-Civil Society relationships have 
promoted broadcasting cha.~ge. 
This thesis chronicles the major events, ideas and actions in 
New Zealand broadcasting throughout the twentieth century. This 
is carried out with an eye to the ideals developed by modern social 
theorists. Each following chapter has its own emphasis, each cutting 
differently into the subject matter, while at the same time 
providing the reader with a sense of development, which proceeds 
with reference to recorded eve~ts. 
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Chapter 3 looks at the early development of broadcasting 
technology a~d the exploration of applications for that 
knowledge. It concentrates on the influence of often well 
prepared people who acted within a ra~ge of opportunities 
prese~ted to them. It looks at the germination of a~ activity 
and the subsequent cha'1rlelling by various promoters and advocate 
groups. 
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Chapter 4 explores why and how the State intervened in the new 
practices, especially those of Civil Society and channelled 
possibilities in 'rational' ways. With the passage of time 
differe~t possibilities were realised, relationships changed a.~d 
new actions were deemed appropriate. This chapter follows closely 
the introduction of State management. 
Chapter 5 deals with the contradictions that developed in the 
operation of a State service. New tasks were developed for 
the medium and reorganisation was necessary to remove a~omalies. 
The benchmarks for management were partly those of national 
production and partly the shifting demands of pressure groups, 
especially in Civil Society and the Economy. This chapter 
considers especially the contradictions inherent in the intervention 
which yielded compromises, themselves the seeds for later cha~ge. 
Chapter 6 looks at the management and regulation of development 
by the State through particularly turbulent times. The distinctive 
aspect of the period was the manipulation of the activity at the 
disputed hands of different power groups within broadcasting. 
Authority was perpetuated through successive organisational action, 
often taken without the sanction of the members withL~ key 
organisations. 
In Chapter 7 the changing field of broadcasting after the e~try of 
television is examined. There were new missions articulated, and 
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there was a need for new organisational structures to administer 
the activity. This chapter pulls together the themes of the 
earlier chapters and looks at the more rece.~t cha~ges associated 
with broadcasting. 
Whilst chapters 3 to 7 chronicle the time - space constitution 
of broadcasting in New Zealand, they each examine different 
aspects of this process. Yet together they represent a unified 
account of an ongoing process of organisational structuring. As 
radio and televisbn have progressed, different elements of their 
activities have become importa~t. The individuals of the 1920's, 
the national demands of wartime, the size of investme~t needed to 
develop television, each in their own way have shaped the 
operation of broadcasting. 
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"I never gave up my conviction that amateur radio 
would have a part to play in re-orienting human 
society when it was given encou.ragement and scope 
to try. But in these early days, a~d to some extent 
still, authority has been stra~gely reluctant even 
afraid to recognise amateur radio as a significant 
extension of the field of human communication. For 
a long time political and commercial interests were 
concerned to see that amateur activities were strictly 
limited to 'harmless hobby' level and Governme.~t 
regulations were framed accordingly" 
J.E. Stracha~, Radio Experimenter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RADIO: INNOVATION AND MANIPULATION 
Introduction: 
This chapter looks at the establishment of Broadcasting Tehcnology 
in New Zealand and the way that teclmology was applied. It highlights 
the events, reviews the actions of individuals and groups, relates the 
ideas being expressed at the time, and expands upon the way radio 
initially developed in New Zealand. 
The development of radio tec.!m.ology enabled the activity of Broad-
casting to occur. That innovation created opportunities and 
possibilities for successive action. 
While the development of radio teclmology is acknowledged as being 
crucial to the ability of broadcasting to advance, this thesis is 
more interested with the elaboration of the activity itself. It 
seeks to explore the responses in New Zealand to an opportunity 
granted by teclmological advances. 
Early Innovators 
The innovaticn of broadcasting was not just an imported idea. In 
1894, Ernest Rutherford sent a •signal of Hertzian waves from one end 
of his physics lab to the other' (Hall, 1980, 1). Although 
Rutherford was soon to leave Christchu.rch for Cambridge, his small 
experiments were the start 0£ radio in New Zealand. By the 
tum 0£ the ventury other keen individuals were experimenting. 
By the middle of 1901 two Dunedin pupil teachers had their "wireless 
waves" ringing a bell a hundred yards away from a transmitter. 
In 1902, a J.L. Passmore 0£ Dunedin came across a magazine article with 
instructions £or building "an e££icien t wireless telegraph at a small 
cost." Inside the year he had constructed a 'wireless telegraph' with 
a range of 200 yards, and a year later had a range of six miles. 
Elsewhere in 1902, W.P. Huggins of Timaru built a receiving set. He 
ccntinued experimenting under licence granted by the Government through 
the 1903 Wireless Telegraphy Act. Huggins' enthusiasm £or the new 
... / 
technology was to make him an important innovator. 
Individuals like these men were responsible for the initial spread 
of the activity. Through their enthusiasm and activity for the 
new,technology was brought to the attention of those in the colony. 
Parliament Acts 
Almost from the outset, Government was concerned about the new 
technology. This was reflected in the Wireless Telegraphy Act 
1903, which authorised the establishment of: 
,~ •• stations for the purpose of receiving and transmitting 
messages within New Zealand or between New Zealand and 
parts beyond New Zealand by what is commonly known as 
'wireless telegraphy' including in that expression every 
method of transmitting messages by electricity otherwise 
than by wires, whether such is in use at the time of the 
passing of this act or is heeeafter applied" 
(Bills, 1903, M to Z. Vol II No. 6-4) 
Significantly the act preserved the right of the State to act in 
the area and required everyone else to seek a licence: 
"Every person who erects, constructs, or establishes'any 
station or plant for the purposes of receiving or 
transmitting communications for hire or profit without 
having first obtained the consent of the Governor in 
council is liable to penalty not exceeding five hundred 
pounds, and any plant, machinery, instruments and material 
used by him for such purpose may be forfeited and dealt with 
as the Commissioner directs". 
(Bills, 1903, M to Z, Vol II No. 6-4) 
The act was one designed to protect the investments of the Crown 
especially in regard to the State monop~ly on communication. The 
Postmaster-General made this clear during the second reading of the 
Bill: 
... / 
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"Sir, this Bill is necessary in view of the fact that the 
Marconi system of telegraphy may possibly be utilised in 
New Zealand. It is, therefore, expedient that we should 
take the necessary power of protection so as to carry on 
a system of this kind if applied to the Colony ••• There 
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can be no doubt that, if this Marconi system is gone on with 
so as to become a commercial reality, the colony might be in 
trouble at once if, for want of such power as is proposed 
to be taken in this measure, someone from outside comes in, 
and we allow this new system to supplant our olllt telegraph 
system over which we have incurred such a large expenditure ••• " 
(Hansard, July 31, 1903. p.171) 
This speech concluded with the remark that the Bill was "one purely 
of a protective nature". 
Country members of the Opposition in the House of Representatives 
upheld the Legislative Council in proposing an amendment to the 
Bill which would have permitted unrest~icted establishment of stations 
not operating for hire of profit. They had in mind the linking of 
back country settlers, mention of whose isolation evoked sympathy from 
both sides of the House. The Premier, Richard Seddon coun'tered this 
move with a message from the Imperial Authorities: 
"A most important communication has been received from the 
Imperial Authorities. If the Bill, as proposed, was passed, 
foreign powers would be free to erect wireless stations here, 
for their own purposes. Parliament's duty to the Colony and 
the Empire alike was to guard against this possibility". 
(Hall, 1980, 3) 
As Hall (1980) comments, "this action came at the end of the 
Seddonian political reign and was in tune with the general policies 
of State socialism'' (Hall, 1980, 2). Whether it is 'state socialism' 
as Hall claims or not, the Act firmly established the State presence 
in the sector. Coming late in the liberal period, it is important to 
appreciate the liberal experience. 
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The Liberal Experience 
The citizens of the colony had from very early times looked to 
the State and had often appealed to the Government for help. 
New Zealand had utilised the powers of the State to break up 
the great estates, institute protective tari£fs.to assist local 
industry, laid down labour laws to ensure reasonable working 
conditions, created a tribunal to fix a fair level of wages, to get 
small farmers on the land, sponsored state industries to compete 
with monopolies and brought in social reform such as support for 
the aged. Most of this formidable programme of soc.ial legislation 
had been put on the Statute books within a decadel (Condcliffe, 
1963, 180). 
With such a wide ranging programme of State intervention, it 
is little wonder that the State pre-empted any major development 
in the new technology. How did this intervention come about? 
J.B. Condcliffe (1963) reasons that the widening of State functions 
was primarily due to 'Colonial opportunity and freedom from 
theories•. Condcliffe suggests that William:,emberReeves phrase 
"Colonial Governmentalism'' is a 'better description of the Liberal-
Labour experiments than State socialism•. Condcliffe cites 
'Public ownership and disposal of land, later Governmental 
development and ownership of transport, the weakness of Local 
Bodies and equally of private enterprise; all threw action into 
the hands of Government. There were few vested interests or other 
obstacles to overcome. State action had a comparatively clear 
field' (Condcliffe, 1963, 182). 
Given tha nature of the Stat~ s race to perpetuate the mode of 
production, Condcliffe's argument is correct. The Crown had to 
intervene heavily in order to promote the development of the 
economy. Just as they had opened up the land, built the~-Main Trunk 
railway to improve transportation, they now saw the need to order 
the new communication and reserve their right to act. 
27 
28 
Irene Webley (1978) holds that the isolation of New Zealand, the 
ruggedness of the terrain and small size of population meant that 
the cost of building an economic infrastructure was high. The 
probability that such capital investment would be unprofitable left 
the State as the only means to raise the necessary loans. The 
New Zealand State was seen as ahead of other Western Countries. It 
had already 'begun active involvement with economic enterprise, 
through development of road, rail and telegraph links, as well as 
providing life insurance and education services•. (Webley, 1978, 19). 
'Wireless telegraphy' was probably seen as another form of the 
infrastructure, from which further economic and social development 
might take place. This conception has some validity; radio 
frequencies are much like roads, provide routes along which goods/ 
services can move. Whether this movement is advertising or 
speeding up communication and the flow of goods by two way communication, 
it does not matter. But this conception is perhaps out of context 
here. The concept of Broadcasting as we know it today was not part 
of the rationale behind the passing of this Act. It was the drafting 
of the Act in terms wide enough to encompass the development of 
Broadcasting that enabled Government to take control of B~oadcasting 
whea it arrived. T~ey 11_\i\9,e sure subsequent Parliaments wrote the 
newcomer into law (Hall, 1980, 2). 
New Zealand was a frontrunner in the reservation of Wireless 
Telegraphy for state and state approved activities. The British 
Government passed a similar act in 1904, assigning control of the 
new medium of communication to the Government, and in October 1905, 
the Commonwealth of Australia passed its own legislation, (Curnow, 
1963, 53). 
The Innovation Spreads 
Wireless Telegraphy began to capture public imagination. Two 
individuals were to play an important part in one such episode. 
'In 1906, two pupils of Otago Boys High School became interested in 
Wireless and began to experiment. They were joined by a third, an 
apprentice in electrical engineering, and together they built a 
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transmitter-receiver' (Hall, 1980, 2). They were later to 
conduct a major exhibition of the new technology. Hall explains: 
"On the evening of the 10th of September 1908, two of these 
'stations' •••• were used for New Zealand's first public demon-
stration of wireless telegraphy. Messages were exchanged across 
Otago Harbour, between the Mayor of Dunedin••• and the Mayor of 
West Harbour ••• 
••• One special greeting was wirelessed across the harbour for 
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onward transmission to Wellington by land telegraph. For it, the 
young principals had unofficially incorporated themselves. "On 
behalf of the boys attending the schools in the Dominion, the S.B. & 
B. Wireless Company sent hearty good wishes to the Postmaster-General 
and the Parliament of New Zealand" (Hall, 1980, 3). 
The Postmaster-General (Ward) heartily congratulated the boys. ~Such 
successful experiments in our own backyards, and by schoolboys was 
news. The press association carried the story anti. illustrated 
weeklies throughout the country published photographs of the three 
and their gear• (Hall, 1980, 3). This particular episode demonstrates 
the type of activity of the period. Human agency was important in 
spreading the innovation. Example bred emulation and in the next 
few years the hobby spread widely. As the experiamts multiplied 
the participants began to grumble about •restrictions• being placed 
on themt The control exerted by the State was enforced by the Post 
and Telegraph Department. They •argued that the restrictions were 
essential to protect the freeflow and secrecy of official messages•. 
The situation was one of frustration on both sides. The justification 
for intervention and regulation was one of order. Without such 
control, the State argued, chaos would result. 
International Experiences 
Before long the New Zealand Government became involved in the 
development of wireless for International Defence reasons. A 
conference to study the matter of developing a wireless service to 
augment the submarine cable for the British Western Pacific was 
called in 1908 at Melbourne. The conference agreed to develop 
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links across Australia, between Australia and New Zealand and 
between New Zealand and Fiji. The con£erence concluded: 
"A£ter full consideration of the proposals, the conference 
unanimously adopted a resolution to the effect that it is 
desirable that any service of wireless telegraph established 
to meet the requirements of the British Western Pacific be 
established and maintained under direct State Control or 
through a State Agency" 
(Quoted from Australian External Affairs Archives, 
in CURNOW, 1963, 57) 
State Ccntrol was reaffirmed by International commitment • 
.Another in ternatianal event was to reinforce the need for stroog 
enforcement of radio communication. This event occurred oo the 
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far side of the world. The sinking of the Titanic dernoostrated· to 
the world, and in particular the British Authorities, the merits of 
radio comnunicaticn and the need for standardisaticn of maritime 
service (Clarkson, n.d. 75) 
In 1910 the New Zealand Government followed the rest of the, world 
and began building a number of shore stations. These stations 
were to be used for communicatioo with ships at sea. The contract 
for the shore statioos was granted to the German firm, Telefunkin, and 
not the British firm Marconi (Strachan, n,d, 141) 
'By the second decade of this century Wireless Telegraphy was turning 
professional. Simultaneously, officialdom~ewmore agitated in its 
protective role. Fuller powers to restrict the erection and working 
of amateur statioos were taken by Parliament in 1913 1 •. (Hall, 1980, 4). 
As the teclmology advanced, there was a need for Governmental control 
to be tightened. 
War 
-
The First World War was both impetus and impediment to change. It 
brought stricter controls to those experimenting. All amateur status 
was closed for the duratioo of the war. The state of emergency also 
provided opportunities for experience. Not only were people trained 
in Wireless for military purposes but many others saw the benefits 
of such communication. Hall (1980) quotes a signaller in that war; 
"We all learned much for our experience in Fra"'lce and 
returned full of energy for fresh experime~ts. The 
valve had been invented, we had used them in France, and 
most of us managed to stow a few inside our pockets to 
take back with us". (Hall, 1980, 4). 
In 1919 the burgeoning fascination with radio telegraphy was 
reflected in Parliament by the M.P. for Wallace, J.C. Thompson. 
'New Zealand and the Falkla~d Islands were the only two territories 
in the world', Wallace said, that were not issuing licences 'to 
people wishing to study Radio Telegraphy and Telephony'. Would 
the Government, he asked, 'with view to stimulating research and 
invention, consider authorising experiments here? (Hall, 1980, 4) 
Thompson echoed the concern that such experimental stations ought 
not be 'operated for profit'. They were to be used '£or private 
practice and research in the art of radio communication•. In 
response to Thompson's question, the Government simply replied 
that the matter •was at present being considered'. 
Concern was expressed in Parliament that 'Wireless Telegraphy' 
might be operated for profit. This attitude was to pervade for 
many years. It initially arose out of the need to protect the 
Government monopoly on telegrams. No possibilities for radio 
were being realised. 
New Possibilities 
Professor R. Jack of the University of 0tago's Physics Department 
offered a vision of how 'Wireless' might develop in post-war 
New Zealand. He commented in August 1921: 
"Wireless telephony will develop rapidly along its own 
special lines and will tend greatly to strengthen the 
bonds by which a civilised community is held together 
and formed into an organised whole". (Hall, 1980, 7) 
He went on to say that the activities made possible by •wireless 
telegraphy' would 'bring country settlers into close touch with 
all the life of the town'. He saw that 'no country stands to 
benefit more than New Zealand by having the disadvantage of 
isolation removed' (Hall, 1980, 7). 
. .. / 
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This conception of utilising the technology to bring people, 
previously isolated, closer together is an important one. This 
social use of the technology can be seen throughout the history 
of New Zealand Broadcasting. The New Zealand public were quick 
to appreciate this potential for creating a closer community 
and were vocal in demanding its implacement. It can in part be 
explained as a reflection of the New Zealand egalitarian ethos 
for equal service. But the ability to realise this demand was 
contrasted by the tight financial controls and shortages of 
resources. With such demands on the wide extension of the 
Broadcasting service meant that the State would really be the 
only agency in a position to widely deploy the medium. 
Timidity and Control 
The Post and Telegraph began its issue of provisional permits 
to receive only in 1921. In May, Professor Jack approached the 
Department for Authority to send as well as receive, using a power 
of 500 watts. The Department suggested 250 watts, in fear that 
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the higher power might interfere with official wireless Telegraph 
Stations at Bluff and Wellington. The Professor contended that the 
comparative isolation of Dunedin from official stations and shipping 
made it an ideal centre for experimental transmitting, but Wellington 
did not agree. No licence was issued. This incident is illustrative 
of the timidity with which the Government was approaching 'Wireless'. 
Such attitudes must have been frustrating for the innovators keen to 
get on and explore the technology. 
The power of radio as a means of entertainment was demonstrated by 
visiting ships. 'The visit of the American Steamer 'The Eastern 
Planet•, for instance provided a concert, 'broadcast from its radio 
room'. People began to realise that those possibilities Professor 
Jack had spoke of were becoming more like realities. 'On 17 November 
1921, Professor Jack sent out from the University the first of a 
series of long ranging concerts, with live voice and gramophone\ 
Broadcasting as we know it, had commenced (Hall, 1980, 9) • 
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But the State retained a firm control of the 'broadcasts'. 
'Professor Jack had to get separate authority for each 
broadcast and submit each of the items for approval. A 
Dunedin music house provided the gramaphone and recordings. 
The concerts were to encourage new 'listeners-in' and they 
were 'heard at many points in 0tago and Southland, in Timaru, 
Christchurch, Greymouth and Nelson,' (Hall, 1980, 9). 
By the end of 1921 the question of licencing was again under 
review. In an Imprest Supply debate, the Postmaster-General 
Gordon Coates, stated that the question of allowing amateurs 
to transmit was "being considered", although the officers at 
his Department assured him that New Zealand was following the 
British practice of restricting them to receiving. However, 
"in view of the possibilities of wireless telephony" it was 
necessary to consider carefully whether it was possible "to 
assist those who are desirous of developing in that direction". 
(Hall, 1980, 10). The practice of following the lead of 
Britain, was one which persisted for many years. 
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Already the appeal of the isolated broadcast was beginni~g to 
wane. As radio audiences grew, so did its appetite for regular 
entertainment, and simultaneously,enterprises began to discern the 
possibilities of profit. 
Broadcasting Begins 
The first regular 'Broadcasting Station' took to the air in 
Wellington in February 1922. Sporadic broadcasts in Auckland 
commenced later that year. Broadcasting by societies, also 
commenced that year. The 0tago Radio Association, and the Radio 
Society of Christchurch being the first. Enthusiasm was still 
the main drive of the activity rather than the pursuit of profit 
by the participants. 
Whilst Broadcasting proper started up, Parliament unrolled some 
tentative plans. 'They proposed to divide the country into areas, 
eight, six or four of them, that had yet to be decided, and to 
issue licences in each area. The Postmaster-General stated in the 
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house that the Government itself would not operate Broadcasting, 
it would licence private enterprise to provide the service' 
(Hall, 1980, 11). 
Parliament had recognised a need for legislation to catch up 
with the growing enthusiasm. The announceme~t that fresh 
regulations were on the way was greeted by many. In Dunedin, 
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which was emerging as a growth centre for the new service, listener 
support was canvassed and members of Parliament were lobbied. The 
press were kept well appraised of fresh steps towards regular 
Broadcasting in their area. The enthusiasts were not the only 
ones keen for change. The District Telegraph Authorities longed 
for the new regulations promised by the Postmaster-General. "We 
are being pestered by the various bodies and individuals who wish 
to commence Broadcasting", they wrote to Head Office in October, and 
"we ask you to expedite the issue which is now under consideration" 
(Hall, 1980,12). 
Regulation. 
The "Radio Telegraph Regulations for Amateur, Experimental and 
Broadcasting Stations" were gazetted on the 18th January 1923. The 
regulations instituted a regional configuration upon the land for 
Broadcasting. As promised by the Postmaster-General, four radio 
districts were established: 
" ••• the mainland of New Zealand shall be divided into 
four (4) radio districts, which shall be identical with 
the Telegraph and Telephone districts superintended by 
the District Telegraph Engineers. These radio districts 
shall be classified as follows: 
1) Auckland 3) 
2) Wellington 4) 
Canterbury 
Otago 
Chatham Islands shall be included in the Wellington 
district and Stewart Island shall be included in the Otago 
Radio District" 
(Gazette, Jan 18 1923, p.142 (No.5).) 
... / 
The numbers granted to these regions e~dure today as the call signs 
of the Radio Stations (e.g. 2ZA, 2ZB) The regulations also 
established two further radic districts: Western Samoa (5) and 
the Cook Islands(6). 
Applicants who wished to get an experimental licence had to 
supply evidence of British nationality and a reference as to 
character from a reputable citizen amongst other things. The 
regulations were also concerned with censorship. Stations were 
not allowed to be used: 
" ••• ~or the d~ssemination of propaganda of a controversial 
nature, but shall be restricted to matter of an educative 
nature or entertaining character, such as news, lectures, 
useful information, religious services, musical or 
elocutionary entertainment and other such items of general 
interest which may be approved by the Minister from time 
to time"(Statutes, Jan, 1923, p.149) 
Furthermore the Minister was empowered to prohibit the Broadcasting 
of Communications held to be outside of this authorisation, or not 
conducive to public interest. Advertising whether direct or 
indirect was prohibited and on Sundays between certain hours 
priority was to be given "to broadcasts of religious services 
and kindred matter'. (Hall, 1980, 13) 
The State had clearly established its control of the medium. While 
the Government had decided not to develop its own broadcasting 
service it had clearly laid the ground rules for those which it 
licensed. The move was justified on the grounds of reducing chaos 
andinstilling order. Postmaster-General Coates wrote in a letter 
dated 4 September 1923 to experimenter J.E. Strachan that: 
"The regulations are being formed to serve the best interests 
of the public generally and are being designed to obviate 
as far as possible, the confusion experienced in other 
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countries owing to the lack of formal control" (Harris, 1975, 139) 
The manipulation of the innovation had clearly begun. What was this 
•confusion experienced in other countries' that Coates spuke of? 
... / 
Overseas Experience 
New Zealand echoed the concern being mooted in Britain about the order 
of American airwaves. It had been quickly appreciated that the 
radio spectrum was a limited resource. In the United States the more 
open attitude to the development of radio had allowed crowding 
and chaos in the ether. Up to this time stations in the same 
locality were licensed to broadcast on the same wavelength. In 
each community where there was more than one station, time was to 
be divided up amongst them. 'As the stations multiplied sharing 
became difficult. Some defied each other and broadcast simultaneously. 
There were considerable demands to establish some order but Government 
action was limited. The law was vague in its powers and it seemed 
to imply that anyone applying for a licence had a right for one. A 
meeting was called to discuss the pandemonium and what to do about 
it' (Barnouw, 1978, 13). 
Administrator Herbert Hoover had, by the time of the second of these 
conferences, taken drastic steps to reduce the chaos. Hoover 
managed the situation by dispersing two stations among several 
wavelengths. He adopted a plan that in effect created a hierarchy 
of stations. Some stations were granted clear channels' over most 
of the country, and, therefore, able to use maximum permitted power. 
Less privileged would be the regional stations, and these were 
limited to medium power. At the bottom of the hierarchy would be 
the local stations serving small areas and, therefore, very 
restricted in power and in some case confined to daytime :tnurs 
to reduce interference' (Barnouw, 1978, 19). Such was the control 
instituted in America. Briti~, too, recognised the need for State 
management of the airwaves. 
The 1923 Sykes Committee of Enquiry into Broadcasting and the 
subsequent 1926 Crawford Committee, r~ognised that any consideration 
of Broadcasting must be dominated by the fact that the service is 
dependent on the allocation of radio frequencies. This, it was noted 
included the allocation of frequencies to other services such as 
Radio Telegraphy, Radio Telephones and Radio Navigation. The Sykes 
Committee considered that the 'wavelengths available in any country 
... / 
mu.st be regarded as a valuable form of public property'. When 
the Crawford Committee reported it stated that this 'national 
asset' should be used in the 'general public interest and not 
for the benefit of powerful or rich non interest groups'. The 
Committee went as far as to p~cpose an organisational typ~ to 
accommodate these ideals. They suggested that 'the Broadcasting 
Service should be conducted by a public corporation acting as a 
trustee for the national interest and that its status and duties 
should correspond with those of a public service' (Annan 1977, A 
8-9). 
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Both the Sykes and Crawford committees acknowledged that the State, 
through Parliament, should retain the right of ultimate control 
to ensure the orderly use of frequencies. As the Sykes committee 
put it: 
"We consider that the control of such a potential power 
over the public opinion and the life of the nation ought 
to remain within the State" (Arulan 1977, A. 9) 
The committee also emphasised the disadvantages of direct 
Government operation of the service: 
"A minister might well shrink from the prospect of 
having to defend in Parliament the various items in 
Government concerts. If a Government Department had 
to select the news,speeches, lectures, etc., to be 
broadcast, it would be constantly open to suspicion that 
it was using its unique opportunities to advance the 
interests of the political party in power, and in the 
endeavour to avoid anything in the slightest degree 
controversial, it would succeed in maJ:::ing the service 
intolerably dull" (Annan, 1977, A.9). 
The Crawford committee thought it essential that the public 
corporation they had recommended should.be independent of 
ministerial control. The cor~oration should not be: 
... / 
" ... 
subject to the continuing ministerial guidance 
and direction which apply to Government offices. The 
progress of science and the harmonies of art will be 
tampered by too rigid rules and too constant a 
supervision by the state ••• it would discourage 
enterprise and initiative, both in regards experiments 
and the intricate problems of programmes, were the 
authority subjected to too much control••• the 
(Corporation), therefore, should be invested with 
the maximum freedom which Parliament is prepared to 
concede" (Annan, 1977, A. 9) 
This notion was reaffirmed by the British Postmaster-General 
who told the House of Commons that measures of domestic 
policy and matters of the day to day control were to be left 
to the free judgement of the Co~poration. Successive 
Governments of the United Xingdom have maintained this 
policy (Annan, 1977, A 10). The development of the British 
Corporation, was not something New Zealand chose to emulate 
for some years, but the experiences of America and Britain 
were to prove influential in the actions taken by successive 
New Zealand Governments. Both the American and British Govern-
ments had legislated and regulated the Radio sector, and the 
New Zealand State followed suit. 
An early experimenter, J.E. Strachan later wrote that New Zealand 
faced three possibilities: a) a renewal of the embargo of non-
Government wireless, b) free enterprise, and c) regulation. 
Strachan explained the options. THe first would have at least 
safeguarded official communications especially with ships at 
sea, but it would 'defraud people of the right to enjoy the 
facilities afforded by the advance of science•. The second 
option 'would lead to a hopeless jumble' which left the third. 
The problem was whether the State could both ~afeguard official 
traffic and at the same time afford reasonable facilities to 
experimenters and the public generally' (Harris (ed) 1975, 6) • 
. . . / 
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J.E. Strachan, reveals something of the motivation the early 
experimenters had, in a letter written late in life, to another 
early radio experimenter, A.R. Harris: 
"I never gave up my conviction that amateur radio would 
have a part to play in reorienting human society when 
it was given encouragement and scope to try. But in these 
early days and to some extent still, authority has been 
strongly reluctant, even afraid to recognise amateur radio 
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as a significant extension of the field of human communication. 
For a long time political and commercial interests were 
concerned to see that amateur activities were strictly limited 
to 'harmless hobby' level and Government regulations were 
framed accordingly'' 
(J.E. Strachan in a letter to A.R. Harris of 24/9/70 
in Harris (ed, 1976,6) Alexander Turnbull Library) 
The concern, noted by Strachan of Commercial and State interests 
to keep the activity at the 'harmless hobby' level is interesting. 
The State's concern has been clearly identified in preceeding 
pages, but why would commercial interests be against development? 
Perhaps the threat of hundreds of new enthusiast small businesses 
each plying for an expanding market was distasteful to them. 
Strachan unfortunately did not elaborate. 
Shaping the Future 
The 1923 regulations did more than just authorise licences and 
censorship. It sought to develop a national plan of stations. 
It carefully worked out a two tier development scheme for 
future expansion of the broadcasting sector. In an endeavour 
to minimise interference between stations, and ½o make broadcasting 
available throughout New Zealand, they organised the following 
system. Fourteen stations would be granted a power of half a 
kilowatt and nineteen stations a power of quarter of a kilowatt. 
Figure 3.1. shows the distribution. 
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Figure 3.1: The Plan for Broadcasting as laid down by the 1923 Regulations. 
(Statutes, 18 January 1923. 148) 
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This 'paper distribution' ca~ be seen as little more tha~ an 
illustration of how Broadcasting might develop a~d spread through 
the country. Authority was given in the regulations to ·vary the 
scheme as it needed, a~d tech~ical advances soon negated much of 
the planning. The increasing power a~d range of the metropolitan 
stations from 1925 onwards extinguished tr.e need for as many as 
33 points of transmission to cover the country. Some of the towns 
on that list waited until the 1960's for a local Broadcasting 
station, a~d some centres, not mentioned in 1923, developed 
unexpexted,ly. and obtained stations before others on the list. 
However, the plan did not go as far as to detail how the proposal 
might be achieved. It was a vision of what the future ought to 
hold, not how to bring it about. 
The distribution is important in a number of respects. Firstly it 
embodied those principles already being demanded for Broadcasting; 
it sought to develop a nationwide service, provide order instead 
of chaos and to link the rural areas more closely. Not only were 
the stations evenly spread geographically, but the spectrum itself 
was carefully planned. However, the frequencies were allocated to 
centres not stations. The regulations provided for centres with 
more than one station by a sharing of time: 
"Where more than one Broadcasting station is licensed to 
operate at the same Broadcasting centre, the Minister shall 
determine the hours of operation, and shall thereon by 
consideration of the public interest". (Statutes, Jan 18, 
1 923 , p. 1 48) 
The Activity Expands 
Some 2,800 receiving licences were issued in the next 15 months, 
and the 7 stations of 1922 became 11 in the course of 1923, but only 
3 of them were to be found in provincial areas. There was a 
strong bias toward the urban centres which provided strong support 
for the fledgling technology. 
'Technological development along with increased listeners created 
spirited competition which enlivened programmes in those towns 
which had Broadcasting stations. Nevertheless it was soon apparent 
... / 
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that Broadcasting could not long remain as it was. Although the 
annual licence charge was not burdensome, neither did it promise 
mu.ch revenue toward providing the informative and entertaining 
programmes envisaged by the regulations. For the time being the 
entire amount went to the Post Office, none to the Broadcasters. 
Yet Broadcasting was costing money'. (Hall, 1980, 14). 
Many of the stations were operated by radio shops, hoping to 
encourage sale of their wares. However, the profits from their 
broadcast did not accrue to them alone 'but to all radio dealers' 
Sales of parts and assembled sets were rising. But although 
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the Broadcasters'privilege of being able to broadcast his business 
establishment in station announcema~ts did attract business to him, 
it was never his exclusively. Traders who did not broadcast, 
profited from those that did~ perhaps not equally, but as demand 
mounted' (Hall, 1980, 14-15). 
Funding 
The whole issue of .Bu.nding the Service was a critical one. With 
Broadcasting prohibited the stations could not operate as a 
business concern on their own. Yet sales of sets would only 
increase with the introduction of radio stations. The Government 
was still taking fees for radio, yet not contributing to broadcasting 
itself. 
Professor Jack recognised the inequality of the situation and put 
a scheme for allowing revenue to go to Broadcasters. His scheme 
increased the fees for listeners and dealers, and put a substantial 
amount of the increase towards the Broadcasters. In this way, he 
claimed, 'not only would all radio dealers be contributing toward 
Broadcasting that sustained the demand for their wares, but also 
listeners would be made to pay for what they were getting for free'. 
Not only would the user pay but 'listeners could legitimately 
expect an improved service if they were aontributing toward the cost. 
Many of the non-broadcasting retailers were prepared to pay such a 
levy' (Hall, 1980, 15) 
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In Wellington, two firms joined together to form a company to 
operate a broadcasting station. Later on a further two firms 
joined in with the company. The trade elsewhere applauded the 
Wellington exai.nple, and in Auckland other dealers began to 
subsidise 1YA's expenses. But nowhere else did this co-operating 
broadcasting become complete. 'Events ~ere running too quickly in 
another direction', (Hall, 1980, 15). It was the inability of 
the private fragmented interests to co-operate that prompted the 
Government to manipulate a national service. 
A Dominion Wide Scheme 
In November 1923, Postmaster-General Coates disclosed the 
Government's plan for broadcasting. 'Present broadcast enter-
tainment was poor, he said, 'bwing chiefly to the lack of revenue 
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to provide better programmes: The only manner in which broadcasting 
could be made satisfactory was to have a Dominion wide scheme, 
some organisation under semi-Governme..ntal control. The scheme 
was quite detailed. The points of the scheme were:-
"a) Those interested in Broadcasting, chie£ly dealers 
in radio apparatus, to form an association with 
authority to issue debentures or raise capital in 
any other way theught fit, 
b) The proposed association would be granted a licence 
to broadcast from each of the four main centres, 
c) The association to be controlled by a board comprising 
of the Postmaster-Ge..neral, a representative of the 
radio trade, a representative of the Listeners-in, 
and certain officials appointed by the Postmaster-General, 
d) Power to be 500 watts, 
e) Wavelengths to be allotted by agreement, 
f) Hours and programmes to be controlled by agreement, 
g) Listeners fee to be increased from 1 pound to one 
pound ten shillings and ninepence, half of this to 
go to the association and the other half to the Post 
and Telegraph Department, 
h) The Government to have access to the Associatiods 
accounts, 
. . . I 
i) 
j) 
k) 
Broadaasting's share of the fees to be shared equally 
amongst the four stations "on a population basis 
according to the number of listeners-in in the area 
served by the station", 
Dealers to be licenged, 
No monopoly to be permitted on the sale of 
apparatus" (Hall,.1980, 15). 
The Reform Pariystrongly reaffirmed the policy of state 
manipulation of the innovation. The plan reiterated the desire 
for an organised, controlled and widespread introduction of 
radio. Funding was provided, and all parties in the sector were 
to be represented on the Board with responsibility to Government. 
The plan copied the one developed in Britain in December 1922 
which had established the British Broadcasting Company. That 
company, had, according to Emery (1969), embodied three 
principles:-
"Firstly it confirmed the principle that the radio spectrum 
is part of the public domain and that the state should 
exercise regulatory control after both transmission and 
reception. It required the licensing of all t:mmsmitters 
and receivers by the Government, and that it was desirable 
to finance the system by licence fees rather than by 
Public Taxation Than by the sale of advertisint' (Emery, 
1969, 83). 
Of persons or companies engaged in broadcasting or of persons 
or companies who in consideration of payment under this section 
undertake a broadcasting service, (Statutes, 19~4, N.19. p.68) 
The Minister in charge of Telegraphs was 'empowered to enter into 
agreement with any such person or company for the payment to him 
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or it of portion of the licence fees received asaforesaid in any 
period of not more than five years, but that any such agreement may 
from time to time be renewed for a period or of further periods, 
not exceeding five years at one time'. Power of renewal was to 
rest at the whim of government, something which many commercial 
interests were not keen on. Hall contends that commercial 
... / 
interests would have been interested in developing the National 
Broadcasting Service for a period longer than five years. 
Without the assurance of the longer time it was not possible 
to take on the large capital investment and get a viable 
return. 
During the second reading of the Bill, the Postmaster-Ge~eral 
outlined the need for the new service. 
New Zealand's action also embodied those principles. 
'It was evident that the Government was interested in finding 
businessmen who would accept the responsibility and opportunity 
it was prepared to offer them, and initially the Minister 
hoped to find them close to or in the radio trade. Attempts 
were made in 1923/4 by direct approach to commercial leaders 
in Wellington and by sounding the trade throughout the country 
to ascertain whether there was interest to take on permanent 
broadcasting, and to what extent financial support was likely 
to be forthcoming. The results were not encouraging, principally 
because the Government was talking in terms of a five year period, 
with no sure right of extension. Nevertheless, the policy of 
developing broadcasting by Private Enterprise remained', (Hall, 
1980, 15). 
Parliament introduced the 1924 Post and Telegraph Amendment Bill 
to make more firm their commitment to the National Broadcasting 
Scheme. This act provided for part of the licence revenue to be 
granted "in assistance: 
" •• • we have, I think two small stations in Auckland, 
one station in Wellington, one station in Christchurch 
and one or two in Dunedin, and the best that is provided 
by these stations in inadequate, as the power is too 
low. They are making the best of the appliances they 
have and/or the money at their disposal, but they are 
not able to give complete programmes" (Hansard, Sept 23 
1924, 1075). 
. .. / 
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But the planned service would not, the Postmaster-Ge~eral 
assured the house, 
"become an exploiting monopoly. The whole thing that 
is bad in connection with the monopoly is the power 
which it has for good or ill" (Hansard, Sept,23, 1924, 
1077). 
The potential power of the medium was well recognised. The 
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real motivation for the establishment of a Company to conduct 
broadcasting, was that it might explore, at no costs to the 
Government, the potential of a National ,Service. The Postmaster-
General said:-
"It is a very short cut at monopolising the wireless 
of New Zealand and bringing it under the regulations 
immediately rather than going to the length of experience 
of other countries where they have spent millions of pounds 
which have practically been wasted so far as effectiveness 
is concerned" (Hansard, Sept 23, 1924, 1078). 
New Zealand it seemed would gain all the advantages of State 
Control, but none of the expense of a State Service. The 
Government would be happy enough for private interests to do 
the work, provided they obeyed the ruler. 
'As hope faded of the trades' ability to finance dominion wide 
broadcasting, the Government hastily revived an earlier set of 
discussions. Two years previously two men, in the Waikato had 
falle~ to talking about broadcasting. One was an electrical 
contractor from Christchurch, the other Managing Director of 
The New Zealand Dairy Company: Ambrose Harris and William Goodfellow 
(Later knighted). Harris was newly back from the lhited States, 
where he had worked in the Edison Laboratories. Goodfellow was 
stimulated by Harris' accounts of North American broadcasting. 
Goodfellow was interested in radio and envisaged the possibility 
of keeping in contact with the shareholders of his Dairy 
Co-operative. He was later to recall: 
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"I realised that Broadcasting could give the country 
people a marvellous service and could greatly strengthen 
the Co-operative movement in the South Auckland. Province". 
(Goodfellow, S.A. T570) 
The Directors of the co-operative agreed and in May 1923, 
Goodfellow sought the Postmaster-General's authority to 
erect and run in Hamilton a transmitter with the range of 
eightjmiles. Harris was sent to Australia to collect information 
and it was decided 'to form a small company to be owned and 
operated by the New Zealand c~-op Dairy Company on a non-profit 
basis, primarily for the benefit of the dairy farmers of the 
South Auckland province' (Goodfellow, S.A. T570). The 
co-operative was also going to import radio sets and sell 
them at competitive prices. They handed their proposal to 
Gordon Coates who:-
"••• informed us that ours was the first concrete 
proposal and he would give us the required lieence 
to have exclusive rights to broadcast at Hamilton and 
within an eighty mile radius. Subsequently, the 
promise was withdrawn as it was found to be undesirable 
to subdivide New Zealand into radio areas" (Goodfellow, 
S.A.T570 ). 
A National Scheme - A Political Necessity 
Although Coates had favoured the proposal, Cabinet did not. 
Goodfellow stated that he did not want to pursue radio beyond the 
Waikato. By the winter of 1925 Coates had become Prime Minister 
and Sir James Parr,Postmaster-General. Earlier in March the 
Government had gazetted new radio regulations. These regulations 
had brought about a mammoth increase in the annual licence fee 
from 5s. to 30s. Provision was also given that the Broadcasting 
Authority could be paid up to one pound from that fee • 
. . . / 
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From April the Government began payments of a subsidy of 
fiftee~ pounds per week to a private station in each of the 
four main centres. This was to be an interim measure until 
such time as the national scheme was in place. (Hall, 1980,16). 
Both the Prime Minister and the Postmaster-General appreciated 
the political urgency of maintaining the higher licence fees 
with a good a~d permanent system of broadcasting. Goodfellow 
was still anxious to develop a service for his dairy farmers 
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in the Waikato. He stated that he would operate a station in 
Auckland City if his farmers could be serviced from there. 
Postmaster-General Parr, an Aucklander and an astute lawyer, saw 
the chance to confound the criticism. Goodfellow was invited 
to resume talks. As Goodfellow recalled: 
"After several meetings I finally agreed, rather 
reluctantly to go into the national scheme provided 
that Mr Harris would personally manage the Company 
and also provided that we had some assurance that we 
would get an extension of the contract if the service 
was satisfactory •.•• 
••• I pointed out to Mr Coates that five years was 
too short a contract period. What I visualised would 
happen is that the company would do all the pioneering 
donkey work and the P. and T. Department would say thank 
you and take over the concern at valuation terms of 
agreement •••• 
••• He assured me that the Department had no such intention 
but I told him that we wanted something in writing. He 
finally agreed to ask Sir James Parr, the Postmaster-General 
to give us a letter of intent which satisfied us". 
(Goodfellow, S.A. ~570) 
The New Zealand Dairy Company formed no part of the agreement. 
'!he Government dealt directly with Goodfellow and Harris personally 
as trustees of the proposed Radio Broadcasting Company of New Zealand • 
. . . / 
The Company was incorporated on the 22nd August 1925. In 
their agreement with the Government, the Compa~y undertook 
to pursue four conditions:-
1) The purchase of four stations, one each in Wellington, 
Auckland, Dunedin and Christchurch, then broadcasting 
under subsidy from the Post and Telegraph Department. 
2) Within six months to establish and operate 500 watt 
stations at Auckland and Christchurch. 
3) On request of the Minister after the first two stations 
were on the air to provide similar installations at 
v?ellington and Dunedin. 
4) Pending erection 0£ its own stations to carry from the 
subsidised stations as purchased, or by other means in 
the same centres, as good a broadcasting ser-.;rice as the 
private owners had been providing. 
(Hall, 1980, 17) 
Tlie Government had commissioned a 'national' broadcasting scheme 
i.mder the auspices of private enterprise, yet primarily funded 
by licence fees, with capital expansion by Government loans. The 
Company quickly set to work, ordering the 500 watt transmitters for 
Auckland and Christchurch be.fore the company was even incorporated. 
But delays at the manufacturers meant that at the end of six months 
there was still no broadcasting. Auckland licensees grew critical, 
which Hall suggests•.}'las onlyparochialism; they disliked the 
Company being operated from Christchurch. Within weeks they had, 
however, negotiated agreeme.~ts for the purchase of the stations 
in Dunedin, and followed shortly by Christchurch and Auckland. 
(Hall, 1980, 18). 
There was an early challe.~ge to the company's monopoly. The 
New Zealand and South Seas Exhibition was due to open and 
Amalgamated Wireless (Australasia) Ltd., (A.W.A.), had been 
... / 
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pressing the Government for leave to broadcast from the 
exhibition. The service proposed was to be free, without 
aid from licence fees. However, the Government saw it as 
placing AWA in regional competition with the Company. On 
these grounds they declined the application. The Postmaster-
General referred Otago's special need to the company. The 
Government backed the Company's monopoly on broadcasting. 
(Hall, 1980, 18) 
The Company Begins 
In February 1926, conceding that delays in the arrival of the 
500 watt transmitters were not the Company's fault, the 
Government extended the period by which the Company had to 
commence broadcasting. The Postmaster-General asked if the 
extension to June would be the only one needed. He was told 
that the makers, English Western Electric, hoped to ship for 
June delivery. This wasn't so and the transmitters weren't in 
service until August and September 1926. (Hall, 1980, 20). 
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The Company laid down a set of priorities to approach i½s task. 
First they were to build the stations, next engage the staff and 
thirdly improve the programmes. As a commercial enterprise, the 
Company had to reach profitability quickly. To achieve this, the 
priority was to enlarge the area of reception, hence the urgency 
to begin building. Ultimately the success or failure of the 
system would be the calculated manipulation of those three 
priorities. It was important not to make any miscalculation 
in timing, in deciding at what point of physical construction 
to press toward with improving programmes. (Hall, 1980. 20). 
Goodfellow had recollections of considerable Government pressure: 
"The Government insisted for political reasons, on erecting 
stations in Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin -
as soon as possible despite our protest that the income 
would be too small to run four stations" (Goodfellow, S .A. 
T570). 
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The service was operati11g under pressure. They had only five years 
to develop the service and make it a success. 
"All the time we had in mind that we had to give a good 
service so that at the eDd of five years we would certainly 
get a renewal ••• 11 
(Goodfellow, S.A. T570) 
It is clear that the Government regarded the Radio Broadcasting 
Company as as experimental development organisation. The Company 
was charged with implementing a "Dominion-wide" scheme as soon 
as possible. At least it was a~ attempt at getting a wide 
distribution. Many areas would not be serviced by the Company. 
If progress was too slow the Government was distanced from the 
delay, yet it still controlled the service. 
After some months of experience, the Government accepted a 
Company proposal to increase the proposed power of the new 
Wellington station to 5,000 watts, a tenfold increase. As 
this involved mu.ch greater expense than had been contemplated 
in 1925, Government agreed to adva~ce the Company fifteen 
thousand pounds to be secured by mortgage. This was taken over 
the plant, apparatus and assets of the new station, for a term 
of five years. In order to encompass the tenure of the new loan 
the Company's agreement with the Government was extended until 
31 December 1931. (Hall, 1980, 21 ). 
The Company's activities brought great advances to New Zeala~d 
Broadcasting. New stations were opened, lectures, talks and 
records were broadcast, and people enjoyed increased radio time. 
Audiences were entertained by local and overseas artists, kept 
up to date with sports commentaries, and held in suspense listening 
to observations of current events. The British Empire Short Wave 
Service provided not only local reception, but also, local 
re-broadcasts were highly praised. New Zealanders were brought 
into contact for the first time with events virtually as they 
happened. World events like the signing of the Kellog Peace Pact 
... / 
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in Paris and the running of the Melbourne Cup were shared by 
New Zeala.~ders (Hall, 1980, 30) • 
As audiences grew a.~d broadcasts le~gthened, the demand for 
such service multiplied. Government regulations demanded a 
certain percentage of live music, difficulty was experienced 
in making the programmes lively. (Hall, 1980, 30). The 
problem being experienced was one essentially of what could be 
done with the new medium. Experimentation was over, the radio 
service had to develop into a distinct character. A mission 
needed to be articulated. 
'A.R. Harris suggested in August 1929 that the primary 
object of broadcasting should be to disseminate such 
desirable news, information and entertainment as was already 
available, and that this should be based on the spirit of 
co-operative effort with other interests. Every endeavour, 
he said, was being made to feature the broad~ast of public 
functions so as liste~ers living away from the cities, and 
those in cities unable to attend functions, were able to keep 
in touch with current events. The Company was of the opinion 
that the service could be developed as a medium of communication 
for the broadcasting of public functions and matters of public 
interest. The proposal did not appeal 1 as Harris had proposed 
this as a means of matching the shortfall not as an extension 
to the service. 'Listeners wanted more relays, and more studio 
broadcasts' (Hall, 1980, 30). 
This attempt to find a solution to a short term programming 
problem had come close to developing a long term raison d'etre. 
To contrast listenerd demands, the Company was faced with 
severe financial limitations and legal restrictions. There 
were many hidden obligations in Radio. 
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Alluring Opportu.~ities and Hidden Obligations 
The opportunities of the medium were soon to be restricted by 
obscure responsibilities and hidden obligations. Government 
control the sector had known a.~d accepted, but many demands 
were made in connectionwithrights and claimed to be associated 
with appliances, materials a.nd invisible materials they used. 
First to emerge were those associated with the international 
patents on transmitters and receivers, all of which were owned 
by Amalgamated Wireless (Australasia) Ltd (AWA), Cnnnected 
with this development was the market protection of private 
property. These series of legal challe~ges should be seen 
as a determination of ownership boundaries and rights. 
'In April 1923, AWA issued a strong public warning of its 
intention to take legal action against persons and companies 
believed to be infringing its rights. The trade, although 
momentarily alarmed, ignored the warning for more than a year, 
during which the volume of broadcasting grew. AWA's patience 
ran out, and its solicitors were ordered to proceed. As none 
of the private stations had money for litigation they fell 
back on local goodwill and agitating power. Threatened by the 
loss of their entertainment, listeners turned to their M.P.'s 
as stations closed. By the second week of October 1924 all were 
silent. Ten days later the Government acted' (Hall, 1980, 32). 
A Post and Telegraph Amendment Bill was already on the order 
paper. With the addition of an extra clause, the Bill was put 
through all stages in five minutes, by which every licenced 
Broadcaster was made an agent of the Department. This authorised 
them to use patented inventions. The Crown had accepted 
liability for the patentees claims. The silent stations were 
told they could safely resume broadcasting and a lump sum of 
£10,852 was paid in settlement of past liability. It was agreed 
that for the next five years AWA was to get three shillings a 
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y~ar for each licen~ed household. In the next year the 
Government 1 s acceptance of liability was written into the 
Radio Broadcasting Company's agreement. It also continued 
to cover the private stations as well, (Hall, 1980, 32). 
The private stations escaped less happily in their next legal 
encounter. Within five months of the R.B.C.N.Z.'s commencement 
the Australasian Performing Rights Association (APRA) was 
registered in New South Wales. This organisation claimed to 
represent more than 98% of the world's copyrighted music, and 
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at once presented a demand for Copyright dues. They threatened, 
failing compliance,to seek from the Supreme Court an injunction 
prohibiting the broadcast in New Zealand of any of its numbers. 
Although there was no mention then of broadcasting in Nevi Zealand 
Copyright lav1s, it was acknowledged that the broadcasting 
without permission, of music subject to Copyright was an 
infringement of the Act. The Company had to come to an agree-
ment with APRA. (Hall, 1980, 32). The reception of the demands 
is remembered by Goodfellow:-
"•••they wanted 12.5% of the gross revenue, came over 
and demanded it ••• they got hold of the Minister of 
Finance, I think it was a chap called Guthrie, and they 
scared six months growth out of him••• they told him 
that if we didn't settle this that it might mean 
International complications - it might even mean war with 
Italy. He got those fellows terrified, the whole cabinet 
was stampeded. We were told by Mr Norseworthy, who was 
then the Minister, things have got to be settled~ 
(Goodfellow, S.A. T570) 
On the eve of opening station 1YA, Auckland, the Company was 
forced to protect itself from action for infringeme~t of 
Copyright. It entered into a one year agreement with APRA, 
accepting its demands (Hall, 1980, 32). Broadcasting had 
not been forseen by the 1913 Copyright Act. By 1926, however, 
there was a strong case for Radio Broadcasting to be included 
within the orbit of copyright. The Company had urged the 
Government to act on this matter, before the signing of the 
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agreement with APRA. But an International Copyright Conference 
to be held in Rome was imminent, and it seemed wise to defer 
action until after that gathering. The New Zealand delegate 
was due to report back to the Government after the conference. 
In the intervening period, APRA made application for a Court 
injunction. The application was to be heard on 10 October 1928. 
On 9 October 1928 Parliament passed the Copyright (Temporary) 
Amendment Act, which ran retrospectively from 1 October 1927 
to 31 August 1929. It declared that copyright in·a musical work 
was not infringed by the broadcasting of that work, but provided 
a fund for compensation to the GWners of the copyright. It 
also established a commission which was to affix a fair rate 
of payment. This commission later decided that the share should 
be a flat 6% of the Company's share of revenue. (Hall, 1980, 34). 
APRA being the only claimant on the compensation fund received 
the full 6%, and after the Act lapsed the same rate of payment 
was maintained by mutual agreement. The arrangement did not, 
however, apply to the privately owned stations. Harris, among 
others, thought that 6% of the revenue was sufficient for all 
the country's stations. Nevertheless, APRA persisted in 
reminding the 'B' stations that they were not included in the 
deal but remained separately liable. APRA proposed an annual 
fee of £200 to cover all private stations. (Hall, 1980, 34). 
Private proprietors acknowledged that APRA, had a claim, 
although some considered that it had been included in the 
Company's arrangement. If not, they claimed, it would lead 
many 'B' stations to bankruptcy4• Those in Dunedin gathered 
at a public meeting and resolved that it was unfair to 
expect 'B' stations to provide amusement and also pay 
copyright fees. The gathering decided to take the initiative 
in trying to form a New Zealand Radio Listeners League, "to 
carry out the wishes of the meeting and watch the interests 
of the listeners generally". (Hall, 1980, 34). 
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Review 
The activity known as Broadcasting had arrived. Its 
development in the early stages was one of innovation and 
manipulation. Lnnovation with the technology and its 
application; manipulation in that individuals and groups 
sought to channel the medium's development. The role of the 
State was important, it constraLned the activity from the 
unco-ordinated experimental phase to a highly orchestrated 
service. The rise of the Listener League is another example. 
The establishment of that pressure group was in response to the 
actions and non-actions of the State. A group was formed to 
co-ordinate attempts to impose their ideas on what Radio should 
be. 
But not only was human agency important in this period. Private 
ownership, an integral feature of capitalist production, was 
central to the copyt>ight challenges to radio. The idea of the 
State, acting to establish order and rationalise development 
of radio is an important influence. This principle was important 
in legitimating the intervention and control established by the 
State. 
But the order established by groups and individuals was not 
enough. Broadcasting was soon to be subjected to tighter 
controls. The next chapter explores this more from manipulation 
to management. 
Radio had, in approximately three decades, developed sub-
stantially from the crude experiments of Rutherford. Both 
human agency constrained by social structure and social structure 
created by human agency produced the early form of radio in 
New Zealand. An economic space had been moulded for the activity 
but the direction of development was in no way obvious • 
... / 
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Footnotes 
1. J.L. Passmore illustrates the small individual innovator 
of the period. He would go on to be the most influential 
in the development of New Zealand Radio. He became, in 
1922, a founder of the Otago Radio Association and in 
1935 was appointed a member of the Broadcasting Board. 
2. For instance, he gave two Dunedin pupil teachers a 
textbook which really got them properly started in 1922. 
Some years later, he gave another young man, Jim Bingham, 
a piece of Galena to make his first detector. That man 
went on to become Chief Engineer of the Radio Broadcasting 
Company. 
3. The stations were: 
1Ya Radio Service Ltd., Auckland 
2YB Wellington Broadcasters Ltd., 
4YA British Electrical & Engineering Co., Dunedin 
4YO Radio Supply Co., Dunedin 
1YA Charles H. Pearson for Newcombe Ltd., Auckland 
2YM Gisborne Radio Company 
2YA Wilkins & Field Ltd., Nelson 
2YJ: Dominion Radio Company Ltd., Wellington 
4AB Otago Radio Association, Dunedin. 
3AC Radio Society of Christchurch. 
2AH Wanganui Amateur Radio Club. 
(Hall, 1980, 14) 
4. 'B' stations were those that were privately owned. 
5'. 
"Before long we will have television ••• 
For that reason it is necessary that the service should 
be in the hands of a public company. Broadcasting 
is a public utility, and on that score also, it should 
be a monopoly of the people. It is created by the 
people, and therefore, it belongs to the people. No 
company should be allowed to make large profits at 
the expense of the people, especially with a monopoly" 
J.B. Donald 
(Ha"lsard. Nov.2, 1931, p.6"2) 
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CHP..PTER 4 
"FROM l'-t~JHPULATION TO MAJ.'l'AGEMENT" 
Introduction 
In the capitalist system reorganisation is an integral part of 
the production and reproduction. Cha~ge is needed, expected 
and e~couraged. Yet there are times whe~ widespread major 
reconstructions are needed, to perpetuate the system. In our 
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own rece~t history, the 1930's is one such period of revolutionary 
reform. Old orders, along with some recent ones were severely 
challenged, many were altered and some displaced. The order of 
capitalism itself faced a major structural crisis, out of which 
new relationships were created. Within this context broadcasting's 
form was reworked, new demands for radio appeared and the service 
was viewed in a different light. A major part of that reform was 
the greater control exerted by the State. 
This chapter follows the move towards greater intervention in 
broadcasting. The State channelled the activity toward what it 
considered to be rational development. This chapter also outlines 
the different stances of involved groups. The listeners, the 'B' 
stations, the Politicians all had different interpretations of the 
field of radio. This chapter explores those differences and how 
they influe~ced subseque~t action. 
The Company in Context 
At 1930 the broadcasting sce~e was characterised by a Government 
sponsored a~d restrained private compa~y attempting to establish 
a service, spread throughout the country. But the compa~y was not 
dominant. 'There were signi:icantly more privately owned a~d 
independently operated stations; thirty six in fact compared to 
the four of the RBCNZ' (Prothero, 1946, 56). 
. .. / 
Radio receiving lice.~ces totalled 53,407, a ratio of 3.59 
per 100 head of population. 
60 
The RBC'!:!Z were in a comfortable position. They proudly proclaimed 
in their house journal: 
"From the very inception of the Radio ~Broadcasting Company 
there has been a double link between the compa~y a~d the 
public - the bond of ether waves bringing together those 
at the transmitting and receiving ends of a broadcast a~d 
a subtle bond of their common interest in a great 
adventure of science which spells for the listening people 
of this Dominion a new source of enjoyment, a medium 
of culture and a new sense of National solidarity'' 
(RBCNZ, n.d. 7) 
This publication sought to justify the form of its compa>1y, 
promoting its role, as outlined above, a'1d defending its 
organisation. 
"New Zeala>1d was iYi the fortunate position of being able 
to take adva'1tage of the experience of other countries. 
After considering the good and bad features of the systems 
of control followed in other parts of the world, the 
Government of the day decided that the most satisfactory 
method would be by a private compa~y operating under 
Government regulations. It was a momentous decision, the 
wisdom of which soon became apparent, both here and abroad. 
Confusion that was well nigh chaos became resolved into 
order''. 
Q.tBCNZ, n.d. 7) 
'The Compa~y had e.>1tered 1930 with the reasonable expectation that, 
with revenue assureq,progress would continue at a quickened pace 
and mou.'1ting quality' (Hall, 1980, 42). Yet the wider economic 
situatioYi was far from rosy. 'Unemployme.>1t had bee.>1 bad since 
1926' ~1d the prices received for the export of 'primary produce 
had bee.>1 very uncertain'. The Reform Party, although being 'the 
most vigorous borrowers since Vogel' beg&1 to restrict Government 
expenditure. (Sinclair, 1959, 247) 
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Providing a backdrop to the broadcasting spr.ere was a turbulent 
political arena. The 1923 general election had shown that 
many rural voters 'considered that Reform (the Governm~1t) had 
become a tool in the }:a:1ds of urban allies'. On the other ha::1.d, 
1 businessmen in turn resented the promotion of State activity' 
by a Governme..vit which l-:ad pledged 'more business in Government, 
an.d less Government iv'. business'. Prime Minister Coates, a.YJ.d 
the Reform Party lost the election. Sir Joseph Ward and the 
United Party e.vitered the Treasury be.nches with the help of an 
unstable alliance with Labour. 'It soon became apparent, to~ 
that the United Party had little to offer. Unable to borrow, 
and in failing health, Ward simply waited. His inaction alienated 
Labour members, who held him in power. But they were reluctant 
to withdraw their support for fear that Reform would replace United'. 
Ward resigned in Hay 1930 and Labour soon withdrew their support. 
Ward was suceeded by Forbes. (Richardson, 1981, 220) 
The rise of Labour is also h1fluential to the story of BroadcastL1g. 
From 1930 to 1935 Labour was the official opposition. In the 
1922 election it had won 17 seats on the strength of the urban 
worker. But thereafter Labour needed to gain some of the country 
vote if it was to become the Government. 'But a party traditionally 
wedded to land nationalisation would not easily attract the votes of 
the farmers'. In the 1928 election 'Labour offered, with a sure 
instinct, easy credit and mortgage relief to the farmer'. The 
farmers may have taken to this offer if Sir Joseph Ward hadn't 
tempted them with an immense loan (Oliver, 1960, 176-77) 
In early October 1930 the United Postmaster-General, J.B. Donald, 
announced u.~expectedly that his department would take control 
of the Broadcasting Service when the Government's agreement with 
the company expired at the end of the following year. He added 
that extensive improvements wuuld be made to the existing service, 
a.vid that 'minor stations of more modern design would be established 
I 
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in provincial ce~tres'. The new stations were to be located at 
Whangarei, Hamiluon, New Plymouth, Napi~r or Hastings, Wanganui, 
Timaru, Invercargill and on the West Coast of the South Island. 
The Postmaster-General commented that there were no plans to do 
away with private stations, and that investigations would be made 
so that 'they can run, along with the Government sections', 
(Hall, 1980, 44) 
What was interesting was that the RBCNZ had submitted a very 
similar 'scheme for the installation of a carefully planned 
system of regional relay stations to be linked up with the four 
main transmitting stations'. Furthermore this scheme was to 
'make available to the majority of listeners in the country 
districts a broadcast service unaffected by atmospheric and 
topographical vagaries•. (RBCNZ, n.d. 11). That plan had not 
been well received. As Goodfellow was later to recall: 
Goodfellow: "Ah well, we got a plan out to cover 
New Zealand with relay stations••• 
Interviewer:."••• and they still turned it down'?" 
Goodfellow: "Oh, yes, it was political you 
see, political, you can't fight 
a Government". 
(Goodfellow, S.A. T570) 
It must have been quite flattering for the company to see 
their scheme minced by the Government. The State had 
decided that the company's reign wa:s to come to an end • 
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The i~ta,tion to bring broadcasting within the realm of 
Government enterprise was warmly received by the small Labour 
Party. It was attacked on the other hand by the Opposition 
a~d generally ill received by the radio audience (Hall, 1980, 45). 
the 'Dominion' criticised the ML~ister's stateme~t of intent: 
"Since when did the State give better service at the 
same or eve~ at a mu.ch higher price that private 
enterprise? Listeners should be very critical of 
this suggested transfer to officialdom, and the general 
taxpayer on his guard lest he find another State service 
on his hands for subsidies". 
(Quoted in Hall, 1980, 45). 
This proposed action of the State can also be seen in terms of 
the wider actions of the State in response to the Depression. The 
compa~y did not publicly contest its dismissal, it went ahead with 
its own plans of improving the service. (Hall 1980, 45). The 
Postmaster-General, J.B. Donald would later comment in 1931 that: 
"We have no reason to find fault with the present broadcasting 
company. They have done very well indeed under strained 
circumstances in one way, they started off the business, and it 
was not to be expected that they would reach perfection in 
the first 12 months or so. I do believe, however, that 
listeners are demanding more than they are getting today, 
and seeing that they have to pay the piper, they are 
entitled to get it". (Hall, 1980, 48). 
The Postmaster-General was unsure of what form the new organisation 
should take, and invited suggestions. Harris and Goodfellow 
proposed a scheme partial "customer ownership" consisting of a 
public company with three types of shares. CabL~et considered 
this plan when preparing legislation for future control, but no 
part of it was adopted. (Hall, 1980, 48). 
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Considerable concern was expressed during the debates about 
private ownership and profit making, which was reflective 
of the general questioning of the capitalist system at the 
time. Mr J. Savage stated: 
"•••I am viewing the question from the point of view 
that a public service ought to be controlled by the 
public in the public interest. A public service 
controlled by a private corporation may put private 
interests before the interests of the public" 
(Hansard, Nov.2, 1931, pp 660-1) 
The institution of public corporation for Broadcasting was 
also questioned. Labour members suggested that the Post 
and Telegraph Department might be a better administering 
body. But the government was concerned to ensure that the 
Board would be seen to be independent from the State. 
Sir James Parr stated in the Legislative Council that the 
Board would not 'be a State Department' but would 'be entirely 
independent' (Hansard, Nov.6, 1931 p.811). 
The private stations did not escape attention with the Bill. The 
old Postmaster-General J.B. Donald stated: 
"The Prime Minister takes the view that the new Board, 
when it is created, will deal sympathetically with these 
stations. I believe that the department considers 
thirty six of these 'B' stations is in excess of the 
reasonable Pequirements of so small a community as one 
million five hundred thousand, and the proposal is to 
reduce these smaller stations from thirty six to twelve. 
The question as to what particular attitude is to be 
adopted towards the 'B' stations is, as I say, largely 
a matter for the Board" 
(HaYJ.sard, Nov.6, 1931, p 803) 
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The 8abinet Committee, considering the question, decided to 
adopt the British Broadcasting Corporation as the model for 
New Zeal&~d. They saw it offering the 'advantages of non-profit 
direction with none of the disadva~tages attached to private 
monopoly of the public utility• (Prothero, 1946, 63-4). 
The Bill to make Broadcasting a State enterprise was introduced 
by one Minister and steered through Parliament by another, 
(Hall, 1980, 48). With the depression deepening every day and 
an election in the offing it had become more and more difficult 
for Coates ~o maintain the Reform Party's independence from 
thited.1 Prime Minister Forbes set up an interparty Economic 
Committee to discuss further cutbacks in expenditure, thus making 
it clear that thited was not prepared alone to introduce measures 
that both parties agreed were necessary. He would force Reform 
to share the unpleasantness of Office. On Friday, 
18 September 1931, Forbes told a none-too surprised country 
that a coalition Government was to be formed' betwee.~ the Reform 
and thited PaEties. 1 
Bassett (1982) comments: 
"It soon became clear that the Reform Party which had 
so clearly had the upper hand, had driven a hard bargain. 
'For all practical purposes the Reform Party is now the 
Government, notwithstanding its devastating defeat in 
1928', Labour's Harry Holland said on 24 October 1931. 
The thited cabinet had 13 ministers; the new Coalition 
Government was to have only ten, five from each side. 
This meant that for the 'greater good' at least eight 
thi ted Cabinet members had to be fired". 
(Bassett, 1982, 57) 
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Among them was the Postmaster-General, J.B. Donald. He was 
replaced by Adam H~~ilton, a Southland farmer, who belonged 
to the Reform and Private Enterprise wing of Coalition. 
Despite this he 'freely accepted the principles of State 
Control' (Hall, 1980, 48). 
After mu.ch decision and confusion, a date was finally set for 
the election. Parliament rose on 11 November and the election 
was set for 2 December. One of the last Acts of Parliament 
was the placing of the Broadcasting Act 1931 onto the statute 
books. The Act established a Broadcasting Board of three 
members •to carry on broadcasting from the stations the 
Government was about to take over' from the RBCNZ and •to 
develop and improve the service. The employees of the board 
were deemed to be outside the Public Service. There was .iso 
provision for the.appointment of an Advisory Council of eight 
members to 'advise' the Board' (Hall, 1980, 48: Gazette 
1931• No 39, pp437-441) 
Corporation Control 
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State management had been implemented. A public corporation had 
been established. It was defended, by Mr Donald in the second 
reading of the Bill: 
"Before long we will have television••• 
For that reason it is necessary that the Service should be 
in the hands of a public company. Broadcasting is a 
public utility, and on that score also it should be a 
monopoly of the people. It is created by the people, 
and therefore it belongs to the people. No company 
should be allowed to make large profits at the expense 
of the people, especially with a monopoly'' 
(Hansard, Nov 2, 1931. p. 662 
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Postmaster-General Hamilton, in summing up reaffirmed the 
commitment to a Public corporation: 
" ••• I think the ge.11eral cornmuni ty is in favour of 
Board control of this class of business. The Post 
and Telegraph Department is controlling a class of 
business. Broadcasting is very closely associated 
with the social and educational life of the community, 
and it is just a question of whether the Post and 
Telegraph Department could pay as much attention to 
the subject as a Board selected for the purpose". 
(Hansard, Nov.2, 1931, p.673) 
G.R. Hawke (1981) comments that the Coalition Government 
coosidered its role as facilitating the activities of groups 
within the economy. Politicians of the time, Hawke says, 
were sensitive to the interests of ru.ral people, and the 
Reform wing was strcng in country electorates. On the other 
hand the Coalition was wary of urban interest. Downie Stewart 
the Coalitions Minister of Finance for instance, represented 
a Dunedin electorate, and had to draw support from both 
urban businessmen and wage earners. 'Hawke, 1981, 145). 
The Government then had the difficult task of balancing 
urban and rural interests, and this would be a notable 
concern in Radio. Decisive action was needed in the broadcasting 
field, and it was an activity which could both stinulate urban 
and rural peoples. The com.position of the first board also 
re£1ects the need to balance rural and urban. The three directors 
coosisted of an Accountant, a Company Director and a Farmer. 
R.B.C.N.Z. - Success and Failure 
The company had been used by the Government as an experimental 
and building agent, which would distance the State from any 
failure. The company's tenure was not renewed, partly because 
a successful service had been developed. A.R. Harris was later 
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to say, in the Arbitration procedures during the sale of 
the RBCNZ, that the Governme~t had clearly taken this attitude: 
" ••• the Minister - now Sir James Parr - in explaining to 
the house the nature of the arrangement with the company 
claimed he had made a~ excellent bargain from the point of 
view of the Governme~t, in as much as the Government was 
freed from all financial responsibility and risk, but that 
the Government had the right in the event of everything 
going '\!/ell, to assume control of the service" 
(Nat. Ar. JC/w1. Statement of A.R. Harris to 
Arbitration Commission. p.3) 
As Harris sadly noted: 
"The Company ••• has made a success of the venture, 
particularly on the technical side, and as a result 
of this very success, had been compelled by the 
Government ••• to yield all the advantages which 
would have accrued from a continuation of the Licence" 
(Ibid) 
I 
Yet the company had failed too. While it had succeeded in 
developing a coverage for the main cities it accomplished little 
in its 'short career to consolidate its position with the many 
thousands of listeners who lived outside the four main centres' 
McKay (1953) suggests that this failure was 'the rock on which the 
Company foundered'. McKay argues that the RBCNZ ought to have 
•sought the assistance of some strategically situated 'B' stations 
which for the outlay of a subsidy could have provided a somewhat 
wider service. As he comments, 'instead the company acted as 
though they were unaware of the existence of these stations, 
alienating the sympathies of thousands of people who derived their 
entertainment from them' (11:::Kay, 1953, 36). 
Technically, the company had developed a fine service, upon 
'\!/hich the Broadcasting Board could successfully build. The 
Board had had many advantages, a steady annual income, capital 
development loans from the State and general ass:is:ance. 
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The Directors opeed to •concentrate their efforts on a 
narrow front in preference to spFeading themselves thinly 
over the country areas. To accomplish the latter would 
have involved heavy capital expenditure•. They were not 
prepared to undertake such expenditure u..~til they had 
'secured some of the fruits of the narrow front of city 
coverage' (McKay, 1953, 37). 
McKay sees that the board made two cardinal errors. Firstly 
they went into business without sufficient capital (McKay 
1953,38). Goodfellow also identified that as a problem: 
"Really there should have been a good deal more 
capital. We could have got it, and to be able to 
run at a loss for a couple of years••• 
••• if we had plenty of money, we would have run 
at a bigger loss and got the revenue up l<{Uick. If 
we had been sure we were going to get ten years. We 
thought we were safe for ten years. But we hadn't 
got the extra capital - we couldn't get it" 
(Goodfellow, T570) 
Secondly McXay asserts that the second error was not making 
any attempt to 'gauge the feelings of resentment in the 
country areas' (McXay, 1953, 38). It is possible that, as 
Goodfellow said, that development for rural areas was 
planned for the period after the licence was revoked. As 
McKay argues, the company was building on the assumption that 
they would remain in business indefinitely. They thought 
that time was on tbeir side. The company certainly misjudged 
the political atmosphere! When the extension was not granted 
they were caught completely by surprise (M::Kay 1953, 38) • 
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When the Govemmen t and the RBCNZ could not agree on a.11 
equitable price for assets, the case went to arbitration. 
RBCNZ claimed£85,812, the Government offered £27,353, and 
the Arbitrator, after examination, fixed the figure at 
£58,646 6s 2d. As McKay eloquently concludes: 
"Broadcasting had arrived, was by naw an integral 
part of the community life, and listeners had 
experienced some of the fruits of an organised 
service. Private enterprise had pioneePed the way 
and like most pioneers, made many mistakes but 
accomplished a great deal. Admittedly, the Government's 
breath was not on the company's neck throughout, 
the regulations preventing them from having an entirely 
free hand. The company was encouraged to expa.>td, but 
wha11 it reached a certain phase the Government 
decided it had served its purpose and the State 
would take a more perscnal interest in future 
broadcasting activity". 
(McKay, 1953, 38) 
llider New Management 
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The Board inherited what had been the company's prime problem -
coverage. (Hall, 1980, 58). In recognition of this the Board 
quickly appointed a Coverage Commission charged with investigating 
reception, and developing a better coverage. The Commission 
visited some eighty towns where they were • welcomed by Radio Clubs 
and Societies all anxious to provide data•. When they reported 
in July 1932, they had four main recommendations: 
"1) tYA, 2YA, and 4YA, the respective stations in the 
four main centres, to be modernised, increased in 
power and rendered stable in operation; 
2) Im. emergency transmitter to be installed in Wellington; 
... / 
3) Relay stations in the vicinity of L~vercargill, 
Woodville, East Coast of the North Island and 
Tirau; 
4) Special provision for assist~~ce to~ards improved 
service at Cromwell, Timaru, West Coast of South 
Island, Nelson, Tarana.~i, Ohakune, Opotiki and 
Whangarei. 
(M:Kay, 1953, 41) 
After a review of the report, the Board announced a range of 
actions. 'Station 2YA would be overhauled, increased in power 
and an emergency plant would be provided'. New sites for 1YA, 
3YA and 4YA would be tested at once, and their hours of broadcast 
would be extended. 'Finally assistance was given to certain 
provincial 'B' stations, but not to city 'B' stations•. (Hall, 1980, 
59). The Board's first report to Parliament, noted the decision 
to 'render assistance to a number of broadcasting stations 
operating in areas where transmission from the Board's stations 
is unsatisfactory' (AJHR, F3, 1933, 4) 2• 
The scheme proposed by the Commission had been adopted in 
principle, if not in detail. Figure 4.1 illustrates the principle 
adopted by the Board - to develop a four tier system: 1) Government 
stations, 2) Relay Stations, 3) Subsidised 'B' staticns, and 
4) Private stations. 
A comparison of the stations proposed by the Commissi.on shows 
a tendency in the North Island to develop relay stations, and 
subsidised staticns in areas not already served by stations, (e.g., 
Ohak:une, Tirau, W9odville). The Board, on the other hand, chose to 
provide relay. services to established radio centres. The coverage 
in 1932 is also interesting, for it was the year that had the 
greatest number of stations, 40 in all, and only 4 being State 
owned. The Board also set about making improvements to the 
programmes and presentation. Alec O'Donoghue (1946) wrote: 
... / 
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"By the efforts of the Radio Broadcasting Company of 
New Zealand Ltd., which laid the foundations of the 
service, the New Zealand Broadcasting Board which 
succeeded it, we had built in this country a broadcasting 
service of a very high standard, a service which was 
founded on hard work, dignity and honour, and which 
reflected in its transmission the obligations and 
duty it owed to its listeners". 
(O'Donoghue, 1946, 13) 
The Board modernised its four stations during the course of 1933 
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and opened two more, 2YC, Wellington and 1YX, Auckland. In the 
first three months of 1934 it had opened two more, 3YL, Christchurch 
and 4YO, Dunedin. While the Board had doubled its stations, they 
were still all in the four main centres. (Hall, 1980, 60) 
But the Board was to face considerable criticism of its 
performance. McKay (1953) commented that no-one was very 
happy with the accomplishments of the Board. By 1934 opponents 
of the existing method of control concentrated on the regulations 
banning controversial material from programmes or talks, along 
with the treatment accorded to the 'B' stations. 'These two topics 
were always likely to arouse spirited protests in Parliamentary 
debates and on many platforms, driving through narrow party lines 
much to the embarrassment of the Minister. lhdoubtedly changes 
were contemplatedt It came as no surprise when the Postmaster-
General introduced a Broadcasting Bill on 6 March 1935 (M::Kay 1953, 51). 
Private Enterprise lhder Fire 
The Broadcasting Amendment Act 1934-35 enlarged the Board from 
three to seven members, and abolished Advisory Council. The 
Board was granted power to supervise programmes from all 
stations, including private stations. Hitherto this function 
had been exercised as an adjunct of licencing by the Post and 
Telegraph Department. It also established a ceiling on the 
number of stations, no more licences were to be issued, though 
lapsed licences might be re-issued. The net was closing on 
private enterprise. (Hall, 1980, 61) 
... / 
Criticism of the attack on 'B' stations was forthcoming in 
the House of Representatives. The member for Timaru sa~d: 
"If (the Government) is afnaid of these little broad-
casting stations, and so it is taking means to knock 
them out, well I think the 'B' class stations might 
make it appear to the British instincts of the 
Government and say 'hit someone your own size'" • 
(Hansard, ¥.ar 7, 1935, 303). 
Many saw the clause as a means to eliminate the 'B' stations. 
Mr Atmore, member for Nelson said: 
11 
••• Hon. the Minister stated that it is not the 
Government's intention to kill the 'B' class stations, 
he did not say that the conditions are being made so 
that they will die; and that is undoubtedly the 
position" 
(Hansard, Mar 7, 1935, p.331) 
The Government justified the measure on the basis of limited 
resource. The Postmaster-General stated: 
" ••• I would like to point out that there is no 
unlimited space on the air for all classes of 
broadcasting, for stations to have any power they 
like and any hours they choose" 
(Hansard, 6 Mar, 1935, p.294) 
In the debates, the future Labour Pr.ime Minister, Mr'IJ. Savage 
clearly stated his view of the future control of New Zealand 
Broadcasting: 
"But the day will come when the Government will control 
the Broadcasting Service from A to Z - when it will have 
sufficient wisdom to draft a policy to be carried out by 
those appointed to do so. But it will be the Policy of the 
Government, and not that of the Board, and if the Board 
fails to carry out the Policy laid down by the Government 
it will have to make room for those who will" 
(Hansard, 15 March 1935, 407) 
... / 
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The Bill gave the Board responsibility previously held by the 
Minister. Their action was strongly criticised by the Labour 
Party on the grounds that the Government was farming out 
responsibilities to a Board, who though handling public funds 
was not directly answerable to the people. Mr Savage promised 
that if Labour came to power at the next election they would 
see that the elected representatives of the people, not a 
Board, controlled the service. So strong was the criticism 
that two concessions were made in the Bill. Firstly two members 
of the Board were to be selected from persons nominated by 
organisations repFesenting listeners. Secondly the word 'control' 
was altered to read 'supervised' as related to the Board's 
authority over 'B' stations. (M::Iay, 1953, 52-3). 
The intent was clear, a national service was to be established, 
but the position of the 'B' stations in the system was that 
they should be around until such a time as the National Service 
could be implemented. Mr E.C. Hands, General Manager of the 
Board wrote to the Postmaster-General about the proposed amend-
ments: 
"As intimated to you today, I feel that a valuable step 
towards our National Service ideal would be a provision 
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calling upon the Board to rep~r\ in, say ,three months time as to 
the 'B' stations necessary to provide an adequate broadcasting 
service pending the completion of the Board's coverage 
scheme. The stations deemed unnecessary to be bought out 
by the Broadcasting Board" 
(N.A. BC I IV, letter d. 6 March 1935) 
The Act took effect from 2 April 1935, and the Board wasted little 
time in exerting its influence. The General Manager wrote to 
'B' station 3ZM, Christchurch on 16 April 
... / 
" ••• As you are aware, :ny Board has the duty of 
supervising all programmes to be transmitted from 
Private Broadcasting Stations ••• Kindly note that 
the Board desires you to ensure that no speaker be 
allowed to express an opL~ion regarding the actions 
of Parliament or Government or the Administration 
of Government Departments, Boards or Local Bodies 
set up in pursuance of statutory authority" 
(ATL, MS 1645 Folder 2, l.d. 16 April 1935) 
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The lot of the 'B' stations was an un~nviable one. They were~ 
as M::Kay (1953) put it, 'the illegitimate offspring of 
successive administrations and no-one wished to assume 
responsibility for their upbringing'. The mortality rate 
was high, those who survived did so with the assistance 
of individuals and chaos. In the face of Government pressure 
the 'B' stations decided to organise. 
The first attempt to organise a national pressure group was in 
Dunedin in 1928. The local stations, 4ZL, 4ZM, and 4ZO 
circularised the other stations in existence, suggesting 
to them that a national organisation be formed, to secure 
monetary return for their services (M::Kay, 1953, 59). Three 
schemes for assistance were proposed. Firstly the Government 
could provide grants to cover expenses. The second scheme 
suggested that 10% (six minutes of every hour) of transmission 
hours was given to paid advertising. The third scheme was a 
combination of grant and reduced advertising time. (Prothero, 
1946, 96). 
This attempt by a particular section of the community to form 
an interest group and mould broadcasting is important. It 
attempted to change the directi:m of Government policy. It 
was not alone. In 1929 operators and radio dealers held a 
conference in Wellington to examine various proposals for 
assistance to 'B' stations. A scheme was placed before the 
... / 
Minister which sought permission to form a company to operate 
Four 'B' stations. No subsidy was sought, but the compa,.viy 
wished to use 10% of its programme time for advertising. They 
proposed an administering board of five members representing 
the Government, 'B' stations, the radio trade and listeners. 
But opponents 0£ the scheme thouglt that to set up another 
radio network was unwise. They claimed it may weaken the 
organisation in place, thus •two weaklings would be struggling 
for 'the nourishment for one'. The reques; after consideration 
was declined. (Mcray, 1953, 60-61) 
In September 1928 the expected blow fell upon the 'B' stations. 
APRA served notice for copyright dues3• The demands for copy-
right payment were met by renewed calls for the 'B' stations 
to be allowed to earn revenue. The obvious answer was sponsored 
programmes. A meeting in support of the Dunedin stations 
decided to £orm a Listeners League to support the 'B' station~' 
claims for commercial broadcasting. (McKay, 1953, 61-2). The 
Press, too, were concerned about commercial broadcasting. They 
saw commercial radio as encroaching on that service which they 
o££ered: advertising. 
Commercial Radio 
A small concession was made by the Government. Postmaster-General 
Donald announced in June 1931 that the Government had authorised 
a form of sponsored programmes for 'B' stations. The concession 
was limited, stations only being permitted short announcements 
of the name of the sponsor at the opening and close of each 
programmes. No P.roduct was allowed to be mentioned. McKay (1953) 
saw the gesture as meaningless in that it secured so little 
revenue. There was some questioning about why at all the gesture 
had bee.'1. made, '£or it vJas know that the Lhited Government was 
not as close to the press as its predecessors'. There was 
suggestion that the press had been threatened with commercial 
broadcasting unless they eased attacks on the Government's 
financial policy (McKay 1953, 62-3). 
. .. / 
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It is useful to consider the impact of advertising. Advertising 
was not a 'pretty' subject in the minds of many New Zealander's 
at the time. It was seen as 'foreign' and undesirable for 
broadcasting. The member fur Nelson, Mr Atmore, commented in 
the 1934-35 Broadcasting Amendment Debate that advertising 
distorted the activities of those that utilised it: 
"Big advertising interests are catered for by the so 
called public press of the country which has =eased 
to be a public press batting for the people's interests. 
As soon as the newspapers took on big scale advertising 
they adopted the role of defenders of big interests -
whose interests as a rule conflict with those of the 
people - and consequently since then the people are 
deprived of the information they are entitled to" 
(Hansard, 15 Mar. 1935, p.417) 
This was a perceptive comment, which closely identifies the 
link advertising has in the capitalist system. To these early 
broadcasters and administrators, to combine advertisL~g with 
such a powerful force as broadcasting was unthinkable. The 
Postmaster-General stated, "Advertising is not a part of the 
Broadcasting Service". It was suggested that this attitude was 
just 'an arrangement between the newspapers and the Government• 
(Hansard;• 6 Mar 1935, p.295). 
However, with the mounting claims for payments on copyright, 
and with no Governmental grants to 'B' stations forthcoming, 
advertising appeared to be the only viable option available. 
In respcnse to such pressure the 'B' stations formed another 
pressure group, the New Zealand Alliance headed by 1ZR, Auckland 
and 2ZW, Wellington. 
. .. / 
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"This group was considerably more powerful that its 
predecessors and towards the end of 1932 petitioned 
Parliament for the right to advertise. In December 
a Parliamentary Ctmmittee referred the proposal to 
the Government for 'favourable consideration', 
interest being aroused during the debate when 
members from both sides of the House supported 
the 'B' stations as being necessary to the broad-
casting system" 
(:t-'.cXay, 1953, 64) 
The Government agreed to relax the regulations, but the 
admL~istering department received no new instructions, so 
the existing regulations remained in forme. The Post and 
Telegraph officials were very zealous in enforcing the 
regulations, and in June 1932, a District Telegraph Engineer 
suspended the licence of 1ZR, Auckland, ordering it to 
cease broadcasting, after a minor breach of the regulations. 
1ZR called a public protest meeting claiming that some of 
the regulations were only enforced against 'B' stations. 1ZR 
was back on air within a week, after promising not to-break 
the regulations again (?-i::Kay 1953, 64). 
After demands for copyright on records were placed on the 'B' 
stations most stations grouped behind the powerful 1ZR, Auckland 
and 2ZW Wellington, both of which were owned by well established 
business firms. The Government's reaction to the renewed demands 
was swift. They purchased 1ZR and 2ZW, It appeared that the 
Governme~t had made quite a good offer and informed the owners 
that if they didn't accept they would be forced off the air. 
They stated that sponsored programmes would be prohibited and 
the demands of the gramophone companies would also make it 
'impossible for stations to continue•. The owners had no choice 
and no publicity was to be given to the negotiations. The 
purchase was so quickly undertaken that neither listeners nor 
... / 
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the clubs associated with the two stations were informed. Even 
more extraordinary was that the Broadcasting Board was not 
consulted, and the press provided their first knowledge of the 
event. (M:Kay 1953, 65). The government had decisively 
undermined the opposition to its Broadcasting plans4• 
On 10 November 1933 the Postmaster-General defended the 
acquisition on the grounds 'that yeoman service had been 
ra~dered when the national coverage was inadequate a~d the 
Government considered there was a moral, if not legal, obligation 
to assist these stationsl It was pointed out that for years 
they had been included in the AWA copyright agreement. This 
agreement was due to run out and the 'B' stations would have 
to cater for themselves. The final blow was that from 
31 March 1934 sponsored programmes would be prohibited once 
again (M:Kay 1953, 66). 
By removing the ability of private stations to survive, the 
Government effectively would alter the form of radio in 
New Zealand. It was far cheaper to •starve out' the stations 
than purchase each station individually. The administration 
of the regulations was tightened to restrict their activities. 
1ZB, Auckland, after being thwarted by the Department, organised 
the largest public meeting held in Auckland. Some 20,000 
people gathered to hear about the efforts of 1:IB. The meeting 
was told that this was the 'last in a series of petty 
irritations that was undermL~ing the foundation of the 'B' 
stations and could no longer be tolerated' (M:ray 1953, 67) 
Freedom or Restriction? 
As New Zealand approached the landmark 1935 General Election 
there was considerable criticism of the censorship of 
'controversial matter'. Two recent visitors to New Zealand 
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had come up against this ban. Indian philosopher Jidda Krislmamurti 
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visited Auckland and was ba:r1ned from speaking over the air. 
Author, G.B. Shaw, was invited to speak and asked to submit 
copies for censorship. Had he done so, he would have be~n 
banned. Local talks were also barmed due to their controversial 
nature, for instance ~rofessor Sewell was prohibited from 
spea.':i..ng on Religioo and Philosophy and an Economics Lecturer 
forbidden to comment on 1-f.arxism and Fascism. One broadcast 
from 1ZM Auckland (a 'B' station) on British- Israelism was 
disallowed (Hall, 1980, 68-70) 
The rules and laws laid down were coming into conflict with 
the ideas being developed by the media. The real power 
and potential of broadcasting was only just being brought 
into fruition yet it was being knocked back by outsize 
regulations. There was considerable debate about the bounds 
of freedom for radio. Was it to be like the press and enjoy 
a 'freedom of the airwaves''? Comments in Parliament reflected 
this debate: 
"One of our prized British traditions is the freedom 
of speech; why not let us have freedom on the air'? 
Is there any difference'? We allow anyone to start a 
newspaper and in fact we say - the more the merrier" 
(Hansard, ?Mar. 1935. 303) 
Scrimgeour 
During 1934 the focus of broadcasting politics settled in 
Auckland and was dominated by one individual, the Reverend 
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C.G. Scrimgeour •. Scrimgeour bought a lapsed station and 
licenced it in the name of the 'Fellowship of the Friendly Road'. 
Scrimgeour developed the station along a pseudo-religious 
philosophy. His station was bought out by the State, but he 
acquired the idle plant and other assets of the station. He 
invited listeners to write or telegraph the Government, and 
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a proposed protest meeting at Carlaw Park the licence was 
granted. (Hall, 1980, 50-7). 
But the demands did not end there. Scrimgeour was to continually 
pester authorities for extended hours and power. He had won 
his licence by political pressure, against the advice of 
Governmental advisors, yet he continually asked for more. 
•such people did not endear themselves to administrators•. 
After the 1ZR incident, the Friendly Road declared war. At 
a gathering of 12,000 in Carlaw Park Scrimgeour told the people: 
"Ve have had nothing but hindrance from the Post and 
Telegraph Department since our statioo came en the 
air. The position in regard to radio control has 
become intolerable, and the Friendly Road is being 
forced into taking political action, and we will 
have something to say to the electors prior to the 
General Electioo•. (Hall, 1980, 73) 
From there Scrimgeour proceded about the country on a speaking 
tour, criticising the Government acticns. He saw the 
Broadcasting Amendment Bill as "the most atrocious piece 
of legislatioo ever drafted in New Zealand" (Hall, 1980, 74) 
Public support was forthcoming. Mooey was sent, letters 
were written and the debate became a lively election issue. 
In the press, 'B' statioos were criticised. Scrimgeour (1976), 
was later to recall: 
"The Press knew it (radio) as a means of communicatioo. 
Now, therefore, everything that was wrong, or could be 
identified as being even doubtful about commercialising 
radio, they found out, and they didn't want radio ••• 
••• it wasn't so much the commercial intrusicn that 
they were warned about, they were worried about another 
channel being open for matters of news and information. 
This was where the big challenge came. They didn't want 
anyone to dispute what they said - and they certainly 
didn't want anyooe to dispute what they didn't say" 
(Scrimgeour et al, 1976, 44) 
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Once again the thoughts and actions of an individual proved 
to be integral to the development of broadcasting. Scrimgeour•s 
lead was followed by other radio stations. The 3ZM Radio Club 
for instance, issued a Radio Listener's Ballot Paper, which 
discussed the various viewpoints and implored the Listener-
Reader to be judge. The pamphlet summarised the Government's 
case in three points: 
n1) The Government has declared its intention of 
preventing the pollution of advertising, 
2) The Government has decided to model its broadcasting 
system on lines similar to those of the broadcasting 
system in Great Britain under the Broadcasting 
Corporation, 
3) The Government con tends that it has catered for 
all the listeners and that the natiaial statiais 
and their auxiliaries in the cities and in the 
smaller towns provide the fullest average" 
(3ZM Christchurch, 5 
ATLMS 1845 ) 
The case for defence was introduced with this eloquent phrase: 
"1£ there is an earthly paradise where narrow-minded 
officialdom can give free rein to its moraiic 
inhibitiais, then that place is Ne'W Zealand" 
(3ZM Christchurch, 7 
ATL MS 1845) 
Their case was summed up in four questiais: 
"1) Shall 'B' class statiais be shifted by the 
Government whose one aim appears to be to get 
rid of the competitive element which they provide? 
2) Shall listeners be deprived of the additiooal 
entertainment which the 'B' class statiais provide, 
so that the Government may satisfy the demands of 
an organisatiai whose atly interest is the protection 
of its mcnopolistic advertising rights? 
... / 
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3) Do you object to sponsored programmes as they 
are broadcast at present? 
4) Would you object to an extension of the right of 
3B' class stations to broadcast, say 30 words of 
advertising each half hour?" 
(3ZM Christchurch, 11 
ATL MS 1845) 
This novel pamphlet provides an insight into the debate at the 
local level. It is clear that the 'B' statiais accepted some 
of the Government's viewpoint, but asked whether this provided 
the best service. 
An Electicn Looms, 
As the general electicn approached the debate livened. The 
Government's policy was to follow Britain, not the American or 
Australian model. Support for the 'B' stations came from all 
corners of the House, irrespective of party allegiances, local 
loyalties were strongly expressed. (Hall, 1980, 75-76). 
Scrimgeour returned from a visit to Australia in August and 
stated he would survey all the political parties for their 
broadcasting policies. A questionnaire was circularised and 
in October a booklet entitled "The Scandal of New Zealand 
Broadcasting" was printed with the results. Scrimgeour recalled 
later: 
"I composed and distributed the questionnaire to all 
parties, and every oo.e of the Labour Party wrote back: 
Yes, yes, yes, yes, In other words they were giving1he 
go-ahead for the 'B' staticns to earn revenue. Of the 
other parties there was quite a variety of them -
No reply, no reply, no reply, no reply" 
(Scrimgeour et al, 1976, 44) 
With the Labour Party committed to providing revenue for 'B' 
stations, voting was clear in relation to radio. 
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The pressure groups saw it as a fight against freedom. 
Listeners were urged to act: 
"The Press supports the Government in its Poli tic al 
Party and in return the Government helps the Press 
by maintaining a restrictive radio policy. Your 
opportunity is here to break this vicious circle and 
to free the human family from the deathlike grip 
of monopoly" 
(1ZB Radio Club, 12) 
In many centres voters 'Were urged to vote for candidates who 
supported the 'B' stations. 2ZR, Nelson implored its readers 
to do likewise: 
"Remember -
A vote for the National Candidate is a vote for the 
muzzling of the microphone and for ending 'B' stations. 
A vote for candidates pledged to support 'B' class 
staticns is a vote for Freedom of the Air and life 
for the 'B' stations, 
Vote accordingly:-" 
(3ZM Christchurch, ATL E 1845) 
The Government looked to the American system for guidance. They 
were clearly caught within a series of different interpretations. 
They vere clearly against maintaining the status quo. Their 
a~tions had sought to remove the 'B' stations. The 'B' stations 
sought to get commercial broadcasting in order that they might 
continue to exist. The Government stood firm, they were committed 
to following the British model of State Corporation monopoly. 
As the following day approached, tensions began to rise. 'iith 
electicn day set for Wednesday 27 November 1935, Scrimgeour 
was due to broadcast as usual three days before, en Sunday 
evening. Many still awaited Scrim's prona.mcement, direction 
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or call to tell them how they should vote. (Hall, 1980, 77). 
In the light of the ccntroversial matter ruling such a 
statement would lose Scrim his licence. Once again the 
Government acted, they jammed the broadcast. Scrim recalled 
later: 
"I would not be foolish enough to lose my licence. There 
was no guarantee that Labour would go in and I think that 
they thought I wouldn't take the risk of losing my 
licence. I don't think they w~re frightened of that -
that I was going to say anything political. They were 
extremely frightened of the fact that they had made a 
mistake and left a loophole, in that you could give a 
report to members of the Listener's Clubs, and that 
report would be based on the questiamaire which showed 
unanimous endorsement for the revenue questicn on the 
part of the Labour Party, and complete silence en the 
part of all the other parties. And that was what they 
had been waiting for. They knew that there was going to 
be no speech saying "Vote Labour", but instead, "I've 
just received the results of a questiamaire and this 
is what they are". This was not cootroversial - every 
member had seen it and they had the right to annwnce 
it as they wished. And the Govemment suddenly realised 
that they had made a mistake" 
(Scrimgeour, et al, 1976. 44-45) 
The jamming became great news. The Deputy-Prime Minister who 
was in Auckland stated: 
BE 
"I have received comrra.mications suggesting that the 
Government is in some way respcnsible for the interference. 
These are quite without foundation. Neither the Government 
nor the Post Office, nor the Broadcasting Board had the 
slightest camection with the occurrence, nor did they 
have any knowledge of it. The interference is either 
a childish rag, or an unscrupulous attempt to make 
political capital by throwing suspicion on the Government" 
(Hall, 1980. 78) 
.... / 
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The 1935 Labour Party victory ha~ been well recorded. Broadcasting 
was part of that change. As Burdon (1965) wrote "The Labour 
Party were given a mandate to reform capitalism, not to institute 
socialism• (Burdon, 165, 212). The system had been under 
severe strain. Conservative solutioos were to be voted 
inadequate. Yet the Labour Party had pledged to support 
private enterprise broadcasting. The new Labour Postmaster-
General stated in his Christmas message that: 
"The Government is determined to carry out the policy 
enunciated du.ring the general election campaign -
to keep broadcasting in closer touch with the people 
and to give service to all listeners in the Dominion" 
(Hall, 1980, 82) 
Whilst broadcasting had generated a lot of heat du.ring the 
election, it was still accorded a low priority in the new 
Government's task sheet. It would have to wait for action. 
Yet its potential was warmly recognised by the new Government. 
"The old avenues 0£ publicity - the newspapers have been 
deliberately closed against us", said Prime Minister Savage. 
"Radio, this means of comrnunicati.ag our work and our aims to the 
public is being enthusiastically taken up by the Labour Government". 
(Hall, 1980, 83). Change £or radio was once again on the 
horizon. 
Review 
This chapter has explored the movement in broadcasting of a 
service under State manipulation to one of State management. 
As radio technology matured, new opticns appeared and were 
explored. With maturaticn it became clear that the institutions 
of broadcasting would not go loog unaltered. With the realisaticn 
of new potentials, particular secticns of society observed that 
unchecked, broadcasting would soon be a force to be reckcned with • 
. . . / • 
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Although the State had already strongly influenced New Zealand 
Broadcasting, this was extended to explicit management of radio. 
But these actions were not without challengers. Individuals 
and groups tried to set in place alternative operaticnal forms. 
The different viewpoints, and the interaction between those 
exposing them, provided the body of the chapter. 
New organisational forms were needed and were often developed, 
through compromise. The late 1920's and early 1930's were a 
period of coo.siderable reform. New meanings for activities 
allied with broadcasting were articulated, new demands were made 
of existing systems. The pressures also brought social 
questioo.ing and reform. That reform within broadcasting was 
evident in the debates oo. 'B' stations. 
A dominant feature of the period was direct State action. 
Government•s,and their policies,changed yet consistent throughout 
was a movement toward greater ccntrol and management of the 
sector by the State. The State sought to not merely manipulate 
but to manage and control. Private enterprise broadcasting was 
progressively excluded from the sphere. 
Yet the exclusicn of private enterprise could not be achieved without 
some compromise. Chapter 5 explores the necessity of the State to 
ccnsolidate its newly found power bloc. There was to be cnce again, 
struggle over whose views about the organisation of broadcasting 
should prevail, but the struggle, unlike the period just covered, 
was to be largely, if not entirely, located within the orbit of 
the State. 
. .. / 
Footnotes: 
----
1. The 1928 electioo. brought down a Parliament like this: 
Re.form 28 seats 
lhited 27 seats 
Ind. Liberal 4 seats 
Labour 19 seats 
Country Party 1 seat 
Miscellaneous 1 seat 
total 80 seats (Bassett, 1982, 67) 
2. The following stations received assistance from the Board 
in its .first year totalling £1,097 15s 10d. 
1ZH Hamilton 
* 
2YB New Plymouth 
2ZF Palmerstcn North * 
2ZD Masterton 
* 
2ZJ Gisborne 
2ZH Napier 
4ZP Invercargill 
3ZR Greymouth 
* Relays of programmes also provided. 
3. For an account 0£ this refer to Chapter 3. 
4. Statiai 3ZC Christclru.rch was later acquired ai the same grounds. 
"I believe in the State, because the State is now the 
people, and the people the State, and because the 
people are orderly and well-ecnicated" 
Villiam Pember Reeves 
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New Zealand Parliamentary Debates 
1892. 
"I do not think any organisation is superior to Parliament 
in being able to reflect the views of listeners, the right 
of control should be vested in the Government" 
F. Jones, 
Postmaster-General 
9 June 1936. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE CONTRADICTIONS OF INTERVENTION 
Introductioo. 
thder the first Labour Government, New Zealand broadcasting went 
through a period of coosiderable change. The public broadcasting 
system was drawn into a Department of State, all private stations 
were natiooalised and a unique hybrid, State Commercial Radio was 
born. The State• s intervention in the sector was total, yt now 
owned and operated a monopoly. 
With the cnset of war, the instituticns of the State; economy and 
civil society spheres were placed under scrutiny. Inconsistencies, 
Economic waste and inefficiencies in particular were under fire. 
Broadcasting could not escape such scrutiny, staffing levels would 
be cut, capital expansion delayed and the role of the radio would 
be redefined. Major reforms were undertaken to ensure the peproduct-
ion to which New Zealand saw itself belcnging to. These reforms 
would influence society well beymd the duration of war. 
New Zealand Broadcasting, however, was not shaped by major 
social forces alai.e. Xey individuals would often hold influential 
positions in the re-shaping of the activity. People like 
G.G. Scrimgeour, M.J. Savage, P. Fraser and others were prominent 
in the reformation of radio. Clearly there is a need to integrate 
the influences of structure and agency. 
A Department of State 
In June 1 936, the new Labour Govern.men t introduced its 
Broadcasting Bill. It sought to abolish the Broadcasting 
Board and was to vest ownership and operation of the 
Broadcasting Service with the Crown. It directed that the 
service be carried under ministerial control as a Department 
of State. The Bill further authorised the appointment of an 
advisory council. It also permitted the establishment of 
... / 
commercial staticns and prohibited advertising from all other 
stations, Government or private. The duty of supervising 
programmes from private stations passed now to the Minister, 
and no more private stations could be licensed. Lastly, no 
no licence for private broadcasting could be sold, leased 
mortgaged or assigned without the written consent of the 
Minister (Hall, 1980, 85). 
Labour's Postmaster-General, F. Jones stated that broadcasting 
had been brought baclc to the realm of the Govemmen t because 
only Parliament could reflect the views of the people: 
"I do not thinlc any organisatioo is superior to 
Parliament in being able to reflect the views of 
listeners, the right of control should be vested 
in the Government". 
(Hansard, 9 June 1936, 749). 
However, the measures were strongly attacked by the former 
Postmaster-General Adam Hamilton. He went so far as to call 
the Bill the 'Most autocratic or dictatorial measures the 
Government• had introduced& 
"The freedom of the individual and lndividuality are 
by this Bill, going to be interfc-Y':"d with, and 
everyone must step into line and dance to the 
Government's tune" 
(Hansard, 9 June. 754, 756) 
Why had the Government's policy changed from its electioo 
promises? According to L. Edwards (1971) the Prime Minister 
had landed, almost immediately after the election, in difficulty: 
"He (Savage) had heard that a syndicate of newspaper 
proprietors intended to buy up 'B' stations if private 
commercial radio was authorised. This loolced lilce the 
tables being turned and double turned - not only a 
revenue windfall for the newspapers, but a propaganda 
outlet being snatched from under Labour's nose and put 
to Tory advantage •• •" 
(Edward, 1971, 91.) 
... / 
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And the new plan was heavily attacked, as an assault on the 
press. Adam Hamiltcn said: 
"It looks as if this is going to whip certain newspapers 
if they criticise the Government. It is a potential 
whip, to be applied to the newspapers if they do not 
report the members of the Government in the style in 
which they would like to be reported" 
~ansard, 9 June 1936, p.756). 
Commercial radio was not seen yet as a competitor for news, but 
a competitor in advertising. The propaganda value of radio for 
the dissemination of information was well appreciated. During 
the Labour Government• s early years, the Government might have 
started a full radio news service, but never did, although a 
Government controlled news service would have been of great 
value (Hobbs, 1967, 147) 
To the criticism levelled by the Press, the Government 
counter-claimed that the newspapers 'lost no opportunity 
of attacking and misrepresenting their actions and motives, 
and made it quite clear that they in turn would take any 
step necessary to combat the Press• (M::Xay, 1953, 77). 
Prime Minister Savage commented in the New Zealand Herald: 
"The Government has a duty to the people not to keep 
them in the dark. What the newspapers neglect to do 
Broadcasting will do. Ve have a far reaching programme 
and we want the people to come with us everywhere. The 
Government is going to be master of publicity" 
(N.Z. Herald, 9/6/36 
Quoted in Gregory, 1979, 427) 
... / 
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There was a questioning during this time of what was a 
legitimate use of the radio. As a means of communication 
it was an extremely useful tool for good or ill. The 
Oppositiai contended that the Government eagerly used the 
microphone for propaganda purposes, and in the years 
following 1937, ministerial appearances on the air were 
certainly numerous. When the Government embarked upcn its 
spectacular social and economic reconstruction, communicating 
it to its citizens through the radio, the opposition were 
excluded. It is significant that during the next 13 years 
the Opposition did not have any opportunity of stating a case 
against Government policy, other than during Broadcasting 
Parliamentary debatest (M::Xay, 1953, 77) 
With the Press antagonistic to the Government, there was 
little hope that the radio service, recently claimed in the 
name of •the people' would be able to criticise a 'peoples' 
Government•. While the Labour Government did not actively 
develop its own news service, it did create a climate sympathetic 
to Governmental actions which it used to its advantage. 
Hobbs (1967) comments that 'it would be nice to think that 
Labour turned down the radio news service idea in a belief that 
Government should not dabble in the news', but really it was 
a matter of complacency about publicity after Savage's death. 
(Hobbs, 1967, 147-48). Liberal notiais of a fourth estate clearly 
did not yet include radio. 
The Demise of the Board 
As symbols of the new Government's activist determination, Labour 
removed a number of activities from Corporation control and 
returned them to State Departments. For example, the Railways 
and the Mortgage Corporation were reinstituted in the Departmental 
stable (Hawke, 1981, 157). While the demise of the board may be 
seen in a similar light, they did little in their short career 
to ensure their own existence. The board's record on administration 
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was weak, and it appeared to lack confidence in its own 
engineers. It had often alienated the listeners, and their 
policies failed to encourage eager staff. While many 
regional areas still had no satisfactory service, the Board 
busied itself providing a duplicate service in the four main--
centres. Administrators saw new ideas, imported programmes and 
'B' statiai iniatives as irritants rather than encouragement 
toinprove. 'They wanted to control radio in all forms, but 
spent too much time preparing to ward off certain possibilities. 
Censorship, prohibitiais and restrictions were acceptable alike 
to the board, and the Government. They had become their very 
tools of the trade' (&ray, 1953, 56). 
In retrospect, there seemed very little to argue to retain 
the board and the change to a Government Department would be 
almost inevitable. M::Xay (1953) lays blame ~f~rthe failure 
of the board, not o~ the organisation, but the actors in it: 
"What should be made clear was that the method of 
control did not fail but the men who were appointed 
were not big enough. Their failure made the vision 
of ministerial control appear as a welcome alternative 
that wou.ld at least be amenable to some form of 
listener control through Parliament" 
(M::Kay, 1953, 57) 
State-Commercial Radio 
A unique hybrid was formed with the new legislation, State-
Commercial radio. Unique i~ the world, New Zealand's public 
broadcasting would offer radio advertising. It would, however, 
be ai.ly a part of a wider radio system, designed to cater for a 
variety of tastes. There w~ to be two independent services, 
both owned and operated by the State, and subject to Ministerial 
control. The National Broadcasting Service (N.B.S.) would 
present all types of programmes, to appeal to varying sections 
... / 
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of the audience. The Commercial Broadcasting Service (C.B.S.) 
on the other hand would give entertainment acceptable to a larger 
proportion of the listeners, a popular programme to ensure 
advertising revenue. From the outset, a network of 'ZB' stations 
would be self"." supporting and would not receive any financial 
assistance from listener funds. The two networks were designed 
to compete and inspire better broadcasting. 
The installation of commercial radio was in part a re.sponse to 
criticism of the State's actions. By developing an alternative 
network, based oo a popular appeal, the Government cleared the 
way for the ultimate removal of private statioos. Critics• 
noticns of a drab State Service were placated by the introduction 
of a competitive up market alternative network. It would not 
cost any more to run, and it would cooveniently cut across the 
advertising revenue of the antagonistic press. 
No time was wasted in the search for the Director of Broadcasting. 
e Out of more than 150 applicants, James Shelly, Professor of 
Educaticn at Canterbury thiversity College was appointed. The 
new Director quiclly set about his job, and articulated two 
principles for future programming. Firstly, that every legitimate 
and sizeable demand for entertainment, informaticn and instruction 
was to be supplied. And, secondly, that once its type had been 
decided, quality alcne should determine the contents of a programme. 
(Hall, 1980, 87) 
Shelfy•s tenure as Director of Broadcasting is marked by the 
,\ 
delineation time and time again of a mission, a case for 
public broadcasting. This initial programming initiative 
illustrates the type of measure he instilled in the service. 
Both principles are still central tenets of the present broad-
casting service. 
. .. / 
To the other post, Controller of Commercial Broadcasting, 
Prime Minister Savage alone appointed Scrimgeour at a 
salary of £500 per annum, plus a commission of 7½% of 
advertising revenue. The salary for Shelly had been £1500, but 
/\ 
Shelfy had been appointed after advertisement of the position, 
/\ 
Scrimgeou.r had not. 
Questicns were asked; why had the controller's job not been 
advertised? In respcnse to Parliamentary questions, Savage 
commented: 
"Applications were not called by advertisement. The 
whole matter of staffing the service, including the 
appointment of the ccntroller, has been discussed with 
the Public Service Commissioner" 
(Hall, 1980, 90) 
Scrimgeour was to later recall that he had been offered Shelly's 
A 
job: 
"Cabinet reversed its sworn policy on broadcasting, but 
Joe knew he had to make a gesture of sorts. I still had 
a vast microphone audience in place of the free licence 
promised. They offered me the job of Director of 
Broadcasting at a salary of £1500 per year. I refused 
the job. Neither Fraser, nor Nash wanted commercial 
broadcasting, nor did Professor Shelly whom they 
I\ 
appointed. His dislike of commercial radio suited 
Nash and Fraser. Shelly made his attitude too pronounced 
he denied the right of the 'B' stations, but we still 
held 80% of New Zealand listeners, including the Prime 
Minister ••• 
••• Joe Savage had undertaken to preserve the 'B' 
stations with the right to compete with newspapers 
for advertising" 
(Scrimgeour, et al. 1976, 60) 
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Scrimgeour claims that the Labour Party was one of expediency, 
they would rely oo •certain radio stations to give them a 
fair go when they were in oppositim ••• • Scrim explains that 
while the Prime Minister was committed to the protecticn of 
the 'B' stations many in cabinet were not: 
"So the Government just made a decisiai in the absence 
of Joe Savage who'd made those promises to the people 
as well as to me, and they said - "We'll make it State 
ccntrolled", so that when you. were in the Opposition 
it was all right to have the 'B' stations criticising 
the Government in a free way, but aice you. were the 
Government, it was a different matter" 
(Scrimgeou.r, et al. 1976, 62) 
So Scrimgeour•s appointment was important to the Prime Minister 
to validate his promise 0£ preserving the 'B' staticns. While 
his cabinet had reversed his campaign pledge, he could adapt 
it to preserve his 'electoral integrity•. What is more, he 
could placate what would be the greatest critic of the Labour 
Party policy reversal: Divide and Ru.le. 
At the end 0£ March 1937, Scrimgeour•s salary was altered, his 
commissiai was discaitinued and his salary was raised to £1500. 
The commercial was quick to get underway, commercial staticns 
were opened in Wellington (2ZB) in April 1937, Christchurch (3ZB) 
in S~ptember and Dunedin (4ZB) in October. (Hall, 1980, 93)2• 
The End 0£ Private Ownership 
By the end 0£ 1937 two contrasting patterns began to emerge, 
in part reflecting their two heads. The commercial service 
enjoyed the advantage that always accrues to the newcomer, it 
had no past to live down. (Hall, 1980, 94). With the commercial 
services underway the Government turned its attention to the 
remaining private stations. 
There were now 21 'B' stations about the country, and all were 
valued by the Government. Firm offers to buy were made by 
April 1937. The end was in sight for private enterprise radio • 
. . . / 
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Government had cc:ncluded 'that the interests of all would be best 
served by carrying on all broadcasting from Government owned 
static:ns•. Accordingly Government wished to acquire all private 
static:ns, and considered the fairest course was to buy their 
equipment, 'at a fair price to owners and communities alike'. 
The offers were made on 14 April and replies requested by the 
end of the month. (Hall, 1980. 95) 
A deputation from the Federation of 'B' Staticn owners visited 
Acting Prime Minister, Fraser, Jones and Departmental officers 
on 21 April. They expressed their members' feelings that the 
Government• s prices were too low and that time allowed for 
decision was too short. They also noted that the majority of 
statims wished to sell, but they would also like to hear more 
abou.t operating subsidies. The attitude was to no~ dispute 
the Government's decision but to get the best deal possible £or 
members. (Nat. Ar. P.M. 20/6 d. 21 April 1937, 8) 
Postmaster-General extended the time for replies. Before the 
end 0£ June, 7 of the 21 statim owners had sold, 15 before 
Christmas and two more by the end of March 1938. Of these 17 
stations, 7 were closed on purchase, 3 became N.B.S. statiais, 
6 were caitinued under contract to maintain service until the 
N.B.S. opened statiais, and aie was operated by the N.C.B.S. 
(Hall, 1980, 95) 
But still 4 statiais remained outside of the Government service, 
and were operated under subsidy. After three months, aie of 
them was back at the negotiating table. That was sold in the 
winter of 1938, and was followed by another in November. In 
the course of 20 months, the Government had bought 20 stations 
for a shade more than £20,000 (Hall, 1980, 96). 
From its inception the N.C.B.S. and its controversial controller 
had been vigorously attacked by the Parliamentary opposition and 
the Press. Scrim flourished amid the controversy which his own 
actions and words frequently provoked (Hall, 1980, 98). The 
criticism did have an adverse effect, many businesses refused to 
use the new medium's advertising service. Political issues and 
loyalties were also involved, thus many people were wary of the 
JifASSEY UNIVERSITY 
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service, and were not keen to rush in and utilise radio 
until the 'smoke of the battle had settled•. (M:::Xay, 1953, 80) 
In part, the commercial service had been established separately so 
as it would be seen to not interfere,to denigratethe National 
service. Yet this duality was beginning to cause some tension. 
The two services were becoming competitive. Advertisers were 
wooed into purchasing time on the new 2ZB statien in Wellin ten. 
The commercial staticn was shown to have a popular appeal, 
compared to the two natienal stations. Within 48 hours of 2ZB 
opening, the national service opened a new station with a bright 
popular entertainment with a commercial presentatien. Advertisers 
were angry, accusing the Government of unfair tactics: 
"On the me hand, we have a Government creating an 
organisaticn to take advertisers' mcney, and on the 
other hand they create a service to take away the 
advertisers audience" 
(M:::Xay, 1953, 81) 
This incident demoostrates clearly that it was not the commercial 
service that was sought after by the listeners, but the 
popular programmes it had to employ. The 2ZB example also 
reflects the two d:cecream vendors en the beach, each trying 
to maximise their •audience•. Both are drawn close together, 
narrowing the range of service. The principles of competing 
in broadcasting have repeatedly shown that the promised wider 
range of service did not eventuate, instead two very similar 
statims began to broadcast very similar programmes. 
The roles of the two services were still very mu.ch under debate. 
New ideas were aired, and reactim gauged. Often controversy 
would wage over whether a programme or comment was suitable for 
a Government service. In August 1938 for instance Scrim produced 
some reactioo in relatic:n to comments he had made on his 'Man 
in the Street• sessiai. A general election was in the offing and 
an oppositim political organiser alleged that 'poismou.s 
political propaganda• was being broadcast 'in the name of religion• • 
. . . / 
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Scrimgeour took this as a personal reflectim and chose to 
reply in the same sessim. He first tendered his resignation 
to the Minister, then over the air told the organiser that he 
was •an unmitigated and malicious liar' - a description he later 
extended to • the gang who employ you to say such things•. 
Parliament was in sessiai, and the opposition moved an adjournment 
in order to discuss 'the misuse and abuse of broadcasting' 
by public servants. They argued that coo.stitutiaially it was 
£or the Minister, not the Departmental head, to respcnd to 
any adverse criticism of a Department•. Nevertheless so far 
as the motiai was anything more than a political maneouvre, 
it centred on Scrimgeour and the power of broadcasting as an 
instrument of informatim of propaganda. The motion was talked 
out and his resignaticn was not accepted. (Hall, 1980, 98) 
Growth and Dual Ccn trol 
The spring and early sum.mer of 1938 were notable £or broadcasting 
growth. The N .B.S. opened statims in Invercargill, Napier 
and Greymouth. Transmission strengths were increased, and the 
stations equipment was modernised. On 7 October 1938 a fifth 
commercial station was opened, the first in a provincial area, 
at Palmerston North. Prime Minister Savage defended the system 
of dual control in his opening address of the station: 
"When the Government decided to introduce commercial radio 
to New Zealand it was faced with two methods of control. 
The first, which an first sight may appear to be obvious, 
was to bring it under the direction and control of the 
National Service. The secaid was to make the commercial 
service a separate department •••• we chose to put it 
(commercial radio) under separate control because we felt 
that commercial radio although in the broadcasting sense, 
similar to the Natioo.al Service, differed from all other 
respects - commercial radio was something new, something 
untried as £ar as New Zealand was concerned, and moreover 
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it was something which had to stand on its own two 
feet against the fiercest organised opposition. This 
fact alone made it necessary for the Government to 
frame something which, while it had the flexibility 
necessary to compete on a commercial basis, rrust also 
fit into the established practice of Government 
Departments. This could be achieved ai.ly be separating 
it from a department by which its very character was 
subject to restrictions which would hamper a commercial 
undertaking••• In addition, the competition which 
would be endangered by the separate control was 
ccnsidered to be a major consideratim both for1he 
good of the N atioo.al Service and the good of the 
commercial service itself" 
(Hall, 1980, 99) 
Competiticn not aily brought a chance for the commercial service 
to devise its own ~dentity' but it also brou.ght unnecessary 
duplicaticn of staff, inflation in the costs of programming 
through competitive buying and unco-ordinated development. 
The duality was wasteful and inefficient. World events were 
to lead quickly to an international situation where the natim 
could no laiger countenance such waste. 
Yet the NCBS independence brought initiative and daring to the 
radio. The sixth commercial statioo. (5ZB) was me such innovator. 
It was a cmcept which would widely extend the commercial networks 
support at only committment of one plant. As Hall (1980) puts it, 
it was a transient, a rover, finding audiences and writing businesses 
all over the North Island. It was a station en wheels, built into 
a railway car. The venture was highly successful bringing a new 
service to new areas, and bringing the NCBS a profit or more that 
100% en outlay and running costs (Hall, 1980, 99). 
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The -war closed in upon civilian enterprise, and reorientated 
the priorities of New Zealand societies. It was to strongly 
influence the nature of radio. 
The Approach of War 
When preparations £or the possible state of emergency began in 
New Zealand, it was quickly realised that any policy would have 
to include measures £or the supervision of broadcast services. 
The ability 0£ radio to convey information accurately and 
immediately as well as offer entertainment would be critical 
to the organisaticn of New Zealand society during wartime. 
(Nat. Ar. W .A. C.N .z., 1 ). 
The approach of hostilities had not gene unnoticed in 
New Zealand. Certain precauticns had been made. The 
Government had called up a territorial force 0£ 6,000 by the 
Prime Minister appealing to the public through a series of 
national broadcasts (Wood, 1958, 82). Radio was beginning 
to be used to unify the nation into a community to £ace the 
dilemma of an imminent war. 
From 1938, B.B.C transmission had been monitered during normal 
New Zealand broadcasting hours and from September 1939 and 
throughrut the war, a 24 hour listening watch was maintained 
en the B.B.C. 3 (Nat, Ar. W.A. CNZ, 23) 
In particular, advertising came under careful censorship. On 
5 September the controller issued a comprehensive memorandum 
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on the censorship 0£ advertising copy. While it vas thought 
unlikely that enemy agents would try to convey valuable information 
through advertising, the service reserved the right to make any 
alterations it desired. All care was to be taken, especially 
\.there the advertiser was an alien or known to be connected with 
foreign business. Special care was to be taken 0£ copy from 
any perscn who insisted it sh01.1ld be broadcast unaltered. Adlibbing 
unless written out and approved first, was to take only the form 0£ 
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comment on an i tern just played, or an exchange of greetings 
between announcers when changing staff. (Nat Ar. W.A. CNZ, 
P• 4,5,6) 
The war had brought strict censorship. Controls which would have 
been unacceptable in peace time were quickly implemented 
in the state of emergency. 
While broadcasting faced cmtrols and restrictions it also 
experienced expansion of service. This was a difficult 
stress on the two services, complicated by the fact that 
men with teclmical training were in great demand with the 
armed services. (Nat. Ar. V.A. CNZ p.10) 
Rationalisation 
In January 1941 the Var Cabinet of New Zealand requested that 
an enquiry be made into, and a report submitted as to the 
steps which might be taken to reduce and ratiaialise Radio 
Broadcasting Services, 1with a view, inter alia, to releasing 
radio teclmicians and others with experience in radio for 
war service. (Nat. Ar. W.A. CNZ P• 12-13) 
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In March the Minister of Broadcasting organised such a committee. 
They were charged with considering the following terms of reference: 
"A) The conditions under which it would be feasible to 
amalgamate the staffs and the work of two services 
whilst still retaining the commercial programmes, 
B) The possibility of making available radio teclmicians for 
war service by the reduction of existing stations and/ 
or a reductim of existing programmes.such action being 
consistent with the service that will have to be 
rendered by the radio services during a natiooal 
emergency, 
c) Such other matters as the committee caisiders to be 
essential to the proper functioning of the broadcasting 
services, particularly, but not exclusively during 
the war period". 
(C.,R.R. 1941, p.2) 
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The resulting report provides a unique snapshot of the two 
services, their internal aims, methods and staffing. The 
report advised considerable change, not cnly for the wartime 
economies, but changes designed to improve the service in the 
longer term. 
Dual Services, Dual Goals 
In outlining the activities of the two services, the commission 
brought down what it saw as the goals and functions of the 
two radio networks. 
The committee saw the National Broadcasting Service as seeking: 
"A) To provide a dominion wide high grade coverage under 
both day and night conditioo.s, service to sparsely popu-
lated areas being considered equally as important 
as to service to urban areas, 
B) To provide a reasonable number of alternative 
programmes so as to meet the tastes and mooods of 
as many listeners as possible. Collaterally the 
immediate aim being to provide all listeners with 
a choice of two programmes, 
C) To provide such programmes as are calculated to 
meet with approval, according to the item, because 
of: 
i) their educative value or 
ii) their entertainment value or 
iii) their cultural value or 
-iv) their publicity value. 
The service has a responsibility to lead rather than 
follow public taste, and to this end skilled professional 
executive, are employed to central the various programme 
deparments. 
D) To encourage and develop local talent" 
(C.R.R., 1941, 3) 
... / 
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This review of functions gives an insight into how the N.s.s. saw 
,i;,, 
itself, a look at its internal raisoo d'etre. Clearly the N.B.S 
was firmly set in the Public Service, providing a high ~ality 
radio service for all. Yet it viewed itself as more than a 
public servant. It sought not to'follow public taste•, but to 
develop culture and educatioo. The Commercial Broadcasting 
Service operated under a different set of f'unctiais: 
"A) To provide entertainment of a bright; diversifieq, and 
popular nature, calculated to attract and hold mass 
listening, mainly in metropolitan and urban areas. 
While the entertainment offered by the commercial 
statiais is not without its cult aspects, it is very 
largely designed to match trends in public taste and 
to appeal to the maximum audience a, a profitable 
basis. 
B) To plan the programme, to carry advertising material 
in the form of spoosorship of features, or direct 
advertising announcements. Advertising is coo.fined 
to weekdays, while on Sundays and religious holidays, 
the commercial schedules are substituted by sustaining 
programmes designed to retain listeners for the week 
day commercial programmes, 
c) To introduce utility and community service features 
whose object, apart from assisting worthy causes, it 
is to develop practical usefulness 0£ the commercial 
statioo.s for the greatest number of listeners, thus 
building comnnmity interest as an essential to business 
goodwill, 
D) To place the service on a non-pro£i t earning basis, 
thus providing the public with al tern ate radio 
entertainment without extra cost to them as listeners" 
(C.R.R. 1941, p.10) 
... / 
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The report concluded that 'while advertising interests do not 
actually control the standards of programme and presentation, 
they nevertheless tend to become a dominant factor for the 
reason that the programme or entertainment offered by the 
service is built around the advertising units, and must 
necessarily be conditioned by the amount of revenue accruing 
from the sale of time or the sponsoring of entertainment 
features by advertisers. (C.R.R. 1941, p.10). In essence, the 
£unctions of the N.C.B.s. were more dominantly commercial 
than a State Service. The only proviso was £unctioo D) which 
sought to have the service an a non profit basis. Yet profits 
could be justified, in that the money was needed for further 
development. The N.C.B.s. was a strange combination of a State 
owned, commercially run enterprise. 
The Committee did not feel that the differences outlined would 
preclude the amalgamation of the two services. It recommended 
the establishment of a unified organisaticn, with one permanent 
head and commoo engineering staff. The recording sections could be 
commonly.own.ad and a central purchasing agency £or both services 
established. (Nat. Ar. N.A. CNZ, p.14-15) 
A New Broadcasting System 
The committee suggested a framework of duties for the new 
service: 
"The committee feels that the first duty of the combined 
broadcasting service would be to provide adequate coverage 
and such alternative programmes as the resources of the 
service permit. Having reached a stage where alternative 
pr0grammes are available to all listeners, the next 
responsibility should be to improve the standard of 
programmes by the wise expenditure of £unds available, 
on both overseas performers and the encouragement of 
local talent" 
(C.R.R., 1941, p.13) 
... / 
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The committee suggested that the permanent head s~ould regard 
advertising primarily as a means of increasing revenue, so as 
to enable a greater range of alternative programmes to be 
provided without additional expense to the listeners. It also 
suggested that administration should not necessarily demand that 
staticns giving commercial programmes shoo.ld be completely 
financed from advertising revenue, and profit mal::ing should be 
replaced by revenue production, as the aim of the commercial 
side of the service. The main objective for the Administration 
ought to be providing adequate coverage and a coo. trast in 
programmes. (C.R.R., 1941, p.13) 
The committee then struck at the incai.sistency of the N.c.s.s. 
objectives: 
"While operating as a separate unco-ordinated service 
with the objective of providing the maximum service 
with the maximum profits, it was inevitable that the 
commercial service would have a policy of broadcasting 
from comparatively low powered statiai.s located at 
centres having the greatest density of populaticn. 
I£ the profit motive were still to be dominant in 
the commercial sectiai 0£ the new service, it would 
be essential that the same policy should be perpetuated••• 
••• in the new service, commercial programmes should be 
ccnsidered as the means of providing additional revenue 
rather than of providing profits, and that the establishment 
of Government owned stations should aim at providing the 
best possible co-ordinated service to listeners with the 
new revenue available to the administraticn, under these 
circumstances, it may not be found desirable to ccntinue 
to instal low powered commercial staticns in urban areas, 
although new staticns, may, with advantage, be of such 
power and so sited as to assure the best use of the .f'unds 
available to provide commercial alternatives for the 
listening public••• in the opinion of the committee one 
commercial programme is the maximum that should be envisaged" 
(C.R.R., 1941, p.47) 
... / 
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Essentially the commercial service was being brought back 
into the State Services. Commercial radio would be a revenue 
earn.er for the ~hole integrated system. The committee argued 
that: 
"Viewing the present positicn of Government-owned 
broadcasting in New Zealand, the Government has within 
its control a monopoly. By virtue of the fact that it 
is a monopoly imposes a respcnsibility that it should be 
used for the greatest good of the people as a whole" 
(C.R.R., 1941, p.28) 
The committee perceived a need for co-ordinated expansioo and 
development, and the war provided the justification for the 
organisatiooal change. State Commercial Radio had been an 
experiment and had proved its worth. The committee succinctly 
identified that despite the immense popularity of the commercial 
stations, they were essentially an advertising service: 
"The committee cannot escape the fact that, whatever 
respcnsibility Government may place upon the commercial 
side of the new service, in the eyes of the advertiser 
its purpose will be selling his goods, and it will be 
useful to him aily insofar as it does so" 
(C.R.R., 1941, 29). 
The committee recommended that every effort should be made to secaid 
the best men for war service. They sav two reasons for such a 
recommendatiai. Firstly, they stated that the war effort requires 
• our best men• • Secaidly they reasaied • the broadcasting service 
will ultimately benefit by its most-able technical officers having 
the privilege of gaining experience in the most modern radio 
developments' • 
(C.R.R., 1941, 45) 
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The report was presented on23 July 1941 • After some delay the 
decisiai to reorganise vas taken by the War Cabinet m 21 August 1942. 
They initially recommended that the technical staffs of both services 
should be combined under the Chief Engineer of the N.B.S. Total 
amalgamatioo was completed by the Statutes Amendment Act 1943• 
(Nat. Ar. W.A. C.N.Z. p.19.) The delay can be in part explained 
by the actims of an individual - C.G. Scrimgeour. 
. . I 
Scrimgeour 
In October 1941, Scrimgeour ccnveyed his feelings on possible 
amalgamatim to his Minister: 
"It wculd be desirable to maintain separate establishments 
to the two branches of the service. The essence of the 
success of the Commercial Service is without question in 
its standing as a separate entity in the minds of listeners 
••• In order to maintain this attracticn the Commercial 
Service must preserve its atmosphere distinct and 
separate from that of the Natimal Service. Otherwise 
the commercial service must inevitably lose its appeal 
to listeners, and in turn the advertising revenue upm 
which it depends £or existence." 
(Hall, 1980, 103) 
Scrimgeour' s perscnal atli tude to amalgamation was uncompromising. 
In November 1942, Scrim was balloted for service in the Armed 
Forces. He was told that no appeal would be made m his behalf 
to retain his services in broadcasting. Machinery had been eet 
up whereby Departments of State could and did appeal £or the 
services of officers considered to be essential. Scrimgeour 
contended that this work was essential, particularly £or war 
publicity, and he appealed his call up. The hearing was set for 
February 1943, and Scrim called his Minister, Hon. D. Wilson as 
his vitness,-
In his evidence Wilson stated that in his opinim that 'iP Scrimgeour 
went into the Armed Forces it would not a££ect the public interest, 
the war effort 0£ Broadcasting one iota•. He added: 
"I might get more villing and loyal service from his 
successor" 
His appeal was dismissed. A week later Scrim was suspended from 
duty: 
"This is the outcome of a political ~endetta which Hon. 
David Wilsen has been waging against me for the past 
12 months" (Hall, 1980, 103). 
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In his dismissal of Scrimgeour, the Minister said he 'was 
suspended for flagrant disobedience of instructicns'. When 
Scrim received the telegram, he gave the news to the Press, and 
boarded the train for Wellington. When he arrived at his 
headquarters, Police were in the building and the lock to his 
office had been changed. (Hall,,1980. 103). 
After immediate protests from some trade unions, and some 
mediatim with the Prime Minister, Scrimgerur signed a 
document as a basis of settlement. Scrim undertook four 
ccnditicns: 
"1) I will undertake to faithfully carry out the Government's 
policy in regard to broadcasting, 
2) I will submit all scripts to the censor for approval 
prior to putting them en the air, and will not make 
any announcements either into newspapers or over the 
air without having first obtained the Minister's 
consent in writing, 
3) I will diligently carry ou.t all lawful instructicns 
given to me by the Minister in charge of Broadcasting. 
I vill give an assurance that I will not take up an 
hostile attitude toward the Minister and that I will 
not incite or encourage any other persm to take up 
such an attitude. I will at all time work harmmiou.sly 
with the Minister and will use all my influence and paver 
as Cmtroller to ensure that the staffs of the Commercial 
Broadcasting Service, individually or collectively give 
similar loyal service, 
4) I will withdraw the public attack made by me upcn the 
Government and the Prime Minister and will express 
regret for having made it". 
(Hall, 1980, 104) 
... / 
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And so the dispute was resolved, the suspension was lifted and 
Scrimgeour returned to work. Through three uneasy months 0£ 
mounting personal stress the arrangements for amalgamation stood 
still. Scrimgeour's call up was postponed for family reasons. 
On the eve of entering camp in June, Scrimgeour issued a press 
statement. This statement asked whether he was 'being sent 
into the Army for Army purposes? (M::Xay, 1953, 90). He continued, 
'Is my case not discrimination and victimisation at its worst? 
Is it possible £or a Minister of the Crown, a Government desiring 
to dismiss a public servant, but having no grounds that would 
commend themselves to public opinion, to take the despicable 
and cowardly course of railroading him into the Armed Forces. 
Immediately on such railroading, the public servant's mouth is 
shut by Army regulations". 
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Scrimgeour said he was happy and proud to be joining the Armed Forces 
0£ the country in which he was born, but wondered whether his 
services might be better used if he were to continue as Controller of 
Commercial Broadcasting. "Perhaps", he suggested, "the explanation 
is to be found in the Ministers own words to me on one occasion: 
"I do not want you. to get too nuch power". (Hall, 1980, 106). 
Fraser replied the next day: 
"The questicn 0£ calling up of any ooe man to the military 
forces through the usual channels, in spite of any objection 
he may have to service in the Army, and after the appropriate 
military appeal board has decided the matter, and in light 
of the further fact that his employer does not consider his 
service to be essential is not a matter that usually 
demands any special attenticn from myself as Prime Minister. 
Nor does Mr Scrimgeour•s laig list 0£ complaints, conjectures, 
insinuatiais and explanatiais £or desiring not to give 
military service enhance in any vay its importance. Rather 
the contrary ••• From the Government's point of view there 
is only ooe question of importance involved in Mr Scrimgeou.r•s 
latest statement. That is its complete violatiai of the 
... / 
undertaking given by Mr Scrimgeour as a pre-condition of his 
re-instalment after his suspensicn some mcnths ago, and the 
effect of such flagrant and persistent insubordinatioo. upon 
the public service of the Dominion, in which the first 
essential is discipline. The Government is compelled to 
give consideratiai to this latest development" 
(Hall, 1980, 106) • 
Scrim was dismissed from his job and shortly afterwards entered 
the Airforce. The ousting of Scrimgeour provides a fascinating 
account of the redefinition of authority and responsibility within 
broadcasting at that time. By having an individual of some force 
and determinaticn in a positicn 0£ authority, who was prepared 
to questicn, provides an illustration 0£ the influence 0£ 
individuals in systems. 
thder Prime Minister Savage, Scrimgeour had been guaranteed a 
cai.siderable degree of freedom of acticn and expressioo.. However, 
after Savage's death, the combinatioo 0£ personality clashes, 
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power redefinitions and international circumstances, substantially 
reduced that freedom. Changes and controls were instituted in 
broadcasting, in the name of natiooal security. Perhaps partly too, 
in £ear of a strength within broadcasting. But the incident must be 
firmly viewed within the coo.text of the var, with the Government 
taking respoosibility and authority in many fields for the war effort. 
The State had to demand total allegiance, dissent from its civil 
servants could not be tolerated. But the events are also firmly 
set in the redefinitiat of power relationships brought in part by 
actors, and by the complex internaticnal situations. The State had 
acted, it asserted its authority. 4 
Amal~amaticn Completed 
In the last week before Parliament dissolved £or 1943, Section II 
of the Broadcasting Amendment Act 1937, which had established 
the N.C.B.S. was repealed, and the way was clear to complete the 
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job of amalgamation, (Hall, 1980, 108) 
The physical amalgamation was swiftly completed, and the new 
service got down to work, 'chiefly by moving former N.C.B.S. 
transmitters into the same premises as N.B.S. Amalgamation of 
engineering services had enabled the release of 22 officers for 
service•. But amalgamaticn was not to be a smooth road. 'It 
took years, and nuch patient skill in administration, to fashion 
one homogenous service from the frequently incompatible elements 
of the two•. (Hall, 1980, 141) 
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The contributim of radio in the wartime had been large. Both were 
official organs of communication £or the administration, and were 
constantly involved in 'keeping up morale'. Travelling recording 
units were sent overseas with New Zealand troops, sending back 
recordings of New Zealanders at war. At home radio was used in 
raising war loans, running phcne-in dcnaticns, providing propaganda 
shows, talks and explanaticns and other community service activities. 
(Nat. Ar. W.A. CNZ, 33). All these new activities were dcne during 
a time when expenditure had to be curbed. 
As New Zealand came rut of the war there was a gradual easing of 
restricticns. There was a lot to do and broadcasting was not 
awarded the highest priority. However, despite these constraints 
of a 'planned' society, after the war, things began to move. The 
war had provided new experiences for broadcasters and listeners alike. 
Servicemen and women had returned with new skills, and had experienced 
overseas broadcasting. At home, New Zealanders had been exposed to 
American servicemen't, and their brand of radio. Broadcasting inherited 
equipment and buildings, from war surplus. There was a growing 
optimism, a need to get en with the job. There was also a change of 
name, to the New Zealand Broadcasting Service (NZBS). 
The Director-General was filled too with the new energy: 
"Social and cultural development are an essential factor in 
the successful readjustment of the community to post-war 
ccnditions. Creative expression is to a great degree a 
measure of a nation's stature, and it is considered that 
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broadcasting should contribute to the stimulation of 
such creative expressioo, especially but of course, not 
sole~yin relation to the musical, literary and dramatic 
arts. The power of radio in the modem world is such that 
by its agency, the thought and action of a community may be 
unified to an extent never before approached in the history 
of peoples"• 
(Hall, 1980, 150). 
Review 
During this decade the State seized total ccntrol of the eccnomy 
and civil society. Ccntrols which would have been politically and 
socially unacceptable in times of peace were quickly implemented 
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in war. Yet in the midst of major structural reformations, 
individuals still proved to be decisive. The nature of broadcasting 
too, was altered. It was brought firmly and squarely, after a 
number of compromises into the realm of public enterprise. These 
actions and compromises were to have a long-standing effect on the 
nature of broadcasting. 
The war hastened the need to remove anomalies and contradictions, 
such as the dual departments of broadcasting. The conflict 
brought new tasks, experiences, ideas and demands for broadcasting, 
These in turn necessitated change. The State was granted a free 
hand in the field of broadcasting, firstly by a new Government 
pledged to create State involvement, and secondly reinforced by 
the demands of the war. The conditions created by this situation 
were to influence the nature of broadcasting for the next two 
decades. 
This chapter has looked closely at the instituticn of total State 
ccntrol. Radio was now, unashamedly, part of the State. Yet the 
attainment of this structural character was not smooth.· 
Ccntradictiais created in the movement were influential in the 
development of broadcasting. There was a substantial alteraticn 
of broadcasting under Labour and because of the war. A new 
... / 
administrative order emerged, with different actors, both 
within,and external to,broadcasting, redefining key relation-
ships. 
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Footnotes 
1, One 0£ the aarly innovations 0£ the Labour Government 
was the broadcasting 0£ the proceedings 0£ Parliament. 
This commenced in 1936. 
2. When Scrimgeour had been appointed the Government had 
already given a de£ini te undertaking to buy 1ZB Auckland, 
although a price had not been settled. (Hall, 1980, 91) 
3. It was through maintaining that watch on the BBC that 
New Zealand gained £irst knowledge 0£ the declarations 
0£ war, and 0£ the invasicns 0£ Holland, Belgium, Denmark 
and Norway. (Nat. Ar. W.A., CNZ 23) 
4. Scrimgeour opposed Prime Minister Fraser in the electicn 
0£ September 1943, and received 2,253 votes out 0£ 15,000. 
He stood as an Independent, and came third out 0£ £our 
candidates. In late 1944 the Air Force began reducing 
its home strength and Scrimgeour was discharged. He 
went at ooce to Australia where he pPospered in radia~ 
(Hall, 1980, 108) 
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"Mr Shanahan, 
We shouldn't be launching any new projects, Christchurch 
or anywhere else, that can be avoided. This me 
appears to be inescapable. I should like ef£orts 
to be made to see if it can be postpaied" 
18 Jan. 1950. 
118 
Memo to Mr Shanahan, Minister in 
Charge of Broadcasting, from 
Prime Minister, Holland. 
CHAPTER 6 
''STATE MANAGE?WT AND THE REGULATION OF DEVELOPMENT" 
Introductioo 
With private enterprise eompletely excluded from broadcasting, the 
State now had the opportunity to completely manage and develop 
broadcasting. However, there were many tasks confronting the new 
post-war society, and broadcasting was not a Digh priority. 
Controls which had been put in place during the war, were continued 
in peacetime. The planning, necessary in war, was useful in peace. 
This chapter explores the controlled development of broadcasting 
after the second world war. While the State enjoyed total control 
of the sector, there were challenges to that authority. Often 
disputes sprang from frustration with the actions and non actions 
of state broadcasting. 
Broadcasting technology rapidly changed and due to administrative 
caution, New Zealand broadcasting was soon seen to be in falling 
behind. The economic caution of Government forestalled for many 
years the introduction of television. GrOl,lps and individuals 
sought different actions and change. They challenged the well 
established authority of State Broadcasting. 
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This chapter follows the activity of broadcasting through the 
changes brought to bear by such pressures. Organisational reforms 
legalising of private enterprise broadcasting and more 'enlightened' 
progrannning were some of the concessions made by the State under 
mounting civil pressure. 
Into Peacetime 
The end of the war brought more problems into existence than the 
war itself had solved, but it found New Zeal.and prosperous. 
themploymen t was negligible and wages could at least meet prices 
on equal terms. Manufacturing had expanded to meet the shortfall 
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of imports. There were more jobs than men or women seeking 
employment; bulk purchase agreements with Great Britain still 
gave a guaranteed market and admirable returns. But the 
economy was subject to strains of some force and complexity, 
which were to grow stronger during the years of peace. There 
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were shortages especially of imported goods, numerous and irksome 
controls imposed in the name of stabilisatim; high taxation and a 
high cost of living. (Oliver, 1960, 209). 
After the war, with the economy booming there was a continuing 
shortage of labour, thus driving up wages, with prices following. 
Such an inflationary spiral was made worse by the high price of 
imported goods once they became available. The Government's 
contribution to the malaise was high taxatim - taxes to finance 
welfare services, housing and school construction, development 
programmes, taxes to pay £or social security benefits, which had 
to increase with prices: taxes to provide the subsidies which the 
Government paid to producers in an effort to peg the prices of food. 
To meet these problems, a system of controls was implemented, 
covering most aspects of economic life. It had not been bu'ilt 
in accordance of any long range plan, but piece by piece had been 
added as needed. Total control had been found tolerable in total war, 
when sacrifices could be reasonably demanded. But even during the 
war there had been significant grumblings. Peace brought an 
irresistable pressure toward relaxation - irresistible that is, up 
to a point where it became clear that prosperity itself was in 
jeopardy. (Oliver, 1960, 211) 
In the early years of peacetime, plans long deferred were gradually 
realised. The National Orchestra was established along with a 
mobile recording unit. New equipment at last began to arrive an4 
transmission hours were increased (Hall, 1980, 150). There were 
now 23 stations in New Zealand, five of them commercial, 2 privately 
owned operating under subsidy, and 2 owned by the N.Z.B.S. and 
operated under contract. Three of these last four stations were 
in areas where there was no N.Z.B.S. staticns, The fourth was 
in Dunedin. Figure 6.1 demonstrates the very strong metropolitan 
bias of radio. In fact, 15 stations of the 23 were operating out 
of the 4 main centres. 
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Figure 6.1. Radio Broadcasting Stations in New Zealand, 1946 
(AJHR, F.3, 1946, 14) 
Kilometres 
121 
122 
An Integrated Broadcasting Plan 
As part of the 1 Plannin1 of New Zealand, the 1947 Annual Report to 
Parliament described a comprehensive broadcasting scheme. The 
plan put up seven different types of station: 
"A) An International shortv1ave station at Ti tahi Bay, 
B) National stations. At present this is represented by 2yz. 
c) 
It v1ill be to provide a means of broadcasting 
Parliament, events of national importance and outstanding 
artists, 
District stations, At present represented by 1YA, 2YC, 
3YA, 4YA, 3YH, 3ZR, and 4yz. These will be regarded as 
serving the interests of the larger districts of the 
Dominion supplying their best artists to the national 
stations and broadcasting the best of the 'local' 
artists, sometimes rebroadcasting the national station 
and sometimes rebroadcast by the national station. 
D) Alternative stations. In the main centres at present 
represented by 1YX, 3YL, and 4YO, which v1ill present 
alternative programmes to those of the district network. 
E) Local statioos - small average statioos located in the 
smaller towns and populated areas, to serve the immediate 
locality, to search out and encourage talent and to act as 
a feeder of suitable talent to the District statioos. The 
extent to which these stations will broadcast programmes 
will depend oo local ccndi tions. 
F) Commercial stations which will present light programmes 
and provide listeners with an additional alternative 
programme to that available from the district stations, 
and in the main centres, 
... / 
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G) Districts not within caivenient distance 0£ broadcasting 
studios will be visited by Mobile Recording thits 
which will record the work 0£ artists, musical and 
dramatic organisatiais, as well as talks and local 
activities, £or Broadcasts from appropriate statiais" 
(AJHR, F.3, 1947, p.21) 
The plan -aimed to give at least aie local prograrmae capable 0£ 
first class receptiai and.an altemati~natiaial' programme would 
be available to listeners in all areas. While those who were 
situated near aie 0£ the £our main centres would receive an 
alternative district programme or commercial service. The report 
saw the local statiai network as providing a 'unifying instrument 
£or the entire comnamity, stimulating civic caisciousness and 
cultural endeavour and embracing the interests 0£ remote country 
districts• (AJ'HR, F.3, 1947, p.3) 
For the first time, a plan was expressed which would develop a 
fully integrated system ai several scales. It is also interesting 
to note the downgrading 0£ the commercial service to an alternative 
service, not to equal co-service which had been earlier envisaged. 
The scheme was optimistic and forward looking. It attempted to 
develop the di££erent potentials o~ radio, unifying both smaller 
areas, and the nation as a whole. As the above outline concedes, it 
was more than a distribl.ttiai service, bl.it also a collectiai hierarchy 
to bring in talent especially. 
Restrictions 
The Annual Report 0£ 1947 also expressed some 0£ the restrictions 
the H.Z.B.S. was £acing. Buildings were needed to develop the 
service further; despite some relief from war surplusa .;,;_ 
"The service received no allocatioo. 0£ wilding resources 
Prom the commissioner 0£ works £or new projects during the 
year. In order that the coverage and expansion plan held 
in abeyance since the C01111lencement 0£ hostilities in 1939, 
c011ld proceed, it was decided to erect temporary accommodation 
by using bl.tildings caistructed £or war purposes" 
(AJHR, F.3, 1947, p.7) 
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There were other restrictions countering development. Shortages 
of electricity for instance, forced silent periods to conserve 
power. But despite these difficulties development still went on. 
A new class of station was authorised - 'X' class. They were 
composite stations carrying both commercial and non-commercial 
programmes. The extension of commercial stations into provincial 
areas, planned by Scrimgeour, was put off during the war. In 
May 1941, Scrimgeour had commented that the:ie'Would probably be 
seven provincial stations in all: 
"Commercial broadcasting was originally planned on the 
basis of four main stations, seven provincial stations 
and ultimately, four auxiliary main centre music 
stations" (Hall, 1980, 778) 
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The 'X' class station enabled the spreading of two district services 
more quickly. Two types of programmes were broadcast from one station, 
thus catering for the different audiences. 
In 1948 the NZBS embarked en 'What it called a major innovation. 
They commenced an International Short Wave Service, one transmitter 
becoming a service to the Pacific, and another to the East~rn States 
of Australia. (Hall, 1980, 169) 
But such developments were contrasted by a desire to keep spending 
at a minimum. The Secretary of the Cabinet Finance Committee 
urged the Minister in Charge of Broadcasting in 1953 to curb any 
expansionist demands: 
"The committee thought that the Broadcasting Service might 
be authorised to be firm in resisting pressure or agitation 
for additional services such as the extension of broadcasting 
hours to cover cricket tests, travelling to country areas 
to carry out outside or make documentary programmes. In 
general the committee felt that the service should hold firm 
against any further extension of services at the present 
time but as this objective involved issues of Government 
policy it is considered that nay more in this area should 
be discussed in Cabinet". 
(Nat. Ar. CAB, 203/1/1 pt.1 d. 2 July 1953) 
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Prime Minister Holland shared this view. In a memo to 
Mr Shanahan he noted: 
"We should:nt be launching any new projects Christchurch 
or anywhere else, that can be avoided. This cne appears 
to be inescapable, I should like efforts to be made 
to see if it can be postpcned" 
(Nat. Ar. CAB 203/4/1 d. 18 .Jan. 1950) 
Government spending stringencies perhaps best characterise this 
period 0£ broadcasting. Every e££ort was being made to avoid 
any major financial committment. Radio simply was not afforded 
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a high priority. Holland and his Naticnal Government had entered 
the Treasury benches en a pledge to reduce ccntrols and instil more 
competiticn. Since the war there had been a gradual crumbling & 
the ccntrol system. But cnce the bad tidings caJDe from overseas 
marketa the ccntrols were quickly reapplied. (Oliver, 1960, 211) 
Deterioraticn in the financing of the service occurred in 1951. A 
Treasury report laid the blame with 'the impact of wage increased 
and the burden 0£ the expansicn• programme the service had 
commenced in 1946. Treasury criticised the expansion programme: 
"Treasury has previously intimated that it considered the 
expansion undertaken to provide the present standards 0£ 
service and coverage to be di££icult to justify £or a 
population 0£ just under two milliais. This appears 
to be the core 0£ the present di££iculties" 
(Nat. Ar. CAB 203/9/11 pl d. 26 Sept, 1951 ) 
They recommended an increase in the listeners? licence fee to obtain 
'su£ficient revenue to bridge the gap in working finances, along 
with a curtailment 0£ further expansiai 9 • They concluded: 
"Further expansiai cannot be justified on the basis of 
cost in relatiai to our populatiai and should be rigidly 
curtailed" (Nat. Ar. CAB 203/9/11 pl. d. 26 Sept, 1951) 
... / 
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There appeared to be a mismatch between revenue and services. The 
then Director General V. Yates, defended vigorously the services 
activities: 
"There is some misunderstanding of the service's obligatioos 
and aims. The present coverage was established not on a 
population basis but an a basis demanded by the area and 
geographical features of the country and the technical 
difficulties 0£ coverage••• 
••• The technical coverage plan 0£ the service is not a 
new thing. It started in 1932 and has been implemented 
progressively from that stage" 
(Nat. Ar. CAB 203/9/1 Pt 1. 
a/ 21 Nov 1951, P• 1-2) 
Yates defended the commercial statiJns a1 the grounds that they were 
self supporting through advertising revenue. The local stations 
on the other hand, might be considered superfluous from a coverage 
point 0£ view. The Director-General had five pointsto support 
their reten ticn: 
"1) They give noise free reception, 
2) They cmtribute towards making life in rural areas more 
attractive, 
3) They provide a unity 0£ interest in the districts in which 
they operate by virtue 0£ the fact that by keeping 
certain of the hours free from advertising they were 
able to offer an rutlet £or local speakers and arti1ts, 
4) They provided an invaluable service to the district in 
emergencies, e.g., floods 
5) They make available to the business community probably 
the most effective advertising medium of the day" 
(Nat. Ar. CAB 203/9/1 pt 1 
d. 21 Nov. 1951, P• 1-2) 
... ; 
The report added: 
"One feature of our small local staticns, conducted at so 
little net cost and often overlooke~ is the way in which 
they bring broadcasting into the lives of the comnunity, 
to a far greater degree than is the case overseas" 
(ibid, p.3) 
Yates agreed that the Treasury was right in the area of technical 
expansiai, but there was still a considerable need for prcgramme 
development: 
"In the field of programme expansiai, however, we have a 
caisiderable distance to go. While no broadcasting 
authority can ever hope to give all its listeners all 
they expect, nevertheless there are some fields in 
which expansiai is justified. The service is very 
caiscious of its lack of a real New Zealand news service" 
(Nat, Ar. CAB 203/9/1 pt.1 
d. 21 Nov 1951, p.12) 
From these two reports the conflicting forces of expansicn and 
economic restricticn can be seen. Broadcasting could see many 
development possibilities, though they were often hamstrung by 
the guardians 0£ the public purse. Another technological 
development was to face the same fate. 
Televisicn 
For a lcng time televisicn had been talked about and hinted at in 
Parliament. As early as 1936 concern had been expressed by the 
· Government about the introduction of television and in particular, 
copyrights. There was some concern that pre-emftive actim again 
be taken by the State to avoid problems with corporate interests. 
A report of televisiai to Peter Fraser commented: 
" ••• before New Zealand can utilise the greatest power 
consequent en the caisolidatiai of power of radio 
broadcasting and Televisioo., the questioo. of Televisioo. 
patent rights demands requires instant and skilled attention" 
(Nat. Ar. P.H. 20/6 d. 28/10/36 p.1) 
... / 
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and that: 
" ••• Government action must be taken immediately to protect 
the defenceless public. At present the door is still 
open for the Government of New Zealand to step in and say 
it will take over the Baird Television Rights for New Zealand 
Thus••• ensuring••• (that) no undue exploitation of the 
public is going to take place in this Dominion" 
(Nat. Ar. P.M. 20/6 d. 28/10/36 p.1) 
The special subject of television was again discussed in 1949 
by an Inter-departmental committee (D.C.T.V.) consisting of 
representatives of the N.Z.B.S. and the Post Office. The committee 
was later expanded to include representatives of the Treasury and 
Department of Industries and Commerce (N.Z.B.A., 1971, 21). This 
committee was set up to study overseas experience in the development 
and operation of the new medium. (N.Z.B.C., 1965, 1) 
The report of this committee was presented in November 1950. They 
said that television could not be forestalled forever: 
"Despite the eccnomic and technical factors involved: 
we feel that having regard to the spectacular development 
overseas of televisioo and the high degree of public 
interest in it, the establishment of a televisiai. service 
cannot be wi theld indefinitely from the public of New Zeal.and" 
(D.c.T.v. Nat Ar. CAB 203/a/1 
pt 1. d.8/11/50 p.1) 
The committee advised that acticn should be taken by the Government 
on two matters: 
"A) Determination of technical standards to be adopted, 
B) Determination of Government policy in regard to 
control of television in New Zealand" 
(D.C.T.V. Nat. Ar. CAB 203/8/1 
pt 1. d.8/11/50 p.2) 
... / 
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Government decision oo. these matters would, they explained 
enable detailed and long term planning to be carried out by 
the appropriate organisations. They advised that the Government 
needed to consider seven factors: 
"1) Legislatioo to be enacted, 
2) Working out a National coverage scheme and the stages 
of implementaticn of such a scheme, 
3) Nature and extent of technical and studio facilities to 
be provided, 
4) Estimated cost of various stages of development and 
method of financing, 
5) Training of staff, 
6) Assembly of programme resources and material, 
7) Type of televisioo receiver necessary, the source of 
supply, and the rate and cost at which these receivers 
would become available to the public" 
(D.C.T.V. Nat. Ar. CAB 203/8/1 
pt. 1 d. s/11/so p.2) 
The committee firmly reaffirmed the planned integration of a 
State Service: 
"In New Zealand it is obvious that from the technical and 
economic considerations alone, it would not be feasible £or 
the country to contemplate anything but one television 
service commencing experimentally in one centre and as 
experience is gained, staff trained and financial 
prospects determined, extended to other centres when 
coo.sidered feasible. Such a development must in the 
committee's opinion be an a uniformly planned and 
national basis. While recognising the merit of private 
enterprise and control in such a matter it does not 
consider such control suitable to New Zealand, having 
regard to the many factors, economic, technical and 
social involved" 
(D.C.T.V. Nat. Ar. CAB 203/8/1 
pt. 1 d. s/11/so p.2) 
... / 
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The report favoured state control of television through the 
N.Z.B.S. though it conceded corporation control might be 
appropriate. The Cabinet postponed any decision on the grounds 
of expense. In the meantime the N.Z.B.S. sought experience in 
the new medium. 
In 1952 the D.C.T.V. reported again. This second report 
reiterated many of the earlier report's findings. They also 
related a new pressure for action: 
"Manufacturers of receiving sets who have a business 
interest in this matter are pressing increasingly for 
some indicaticn of the Government's policy in this 
matter. Private interests have already made application 
for permission to commence television stations in Auckland. 
As time goes one, pressure from the public itself will 
become greater. It seensto the committee necessary, 
therefore, that the Government, for the guidance of all 
concerned, should make a statement of its policy in this 
matter. This need not involve any immediate financial 
committment, but it will give an opportunity for 
preparatory planning, development work and training 
by those whom the Government might decide to entrust 
the operation of any further service" 
{Nat. Ar. CAB 203/8/1 pt. 1 
D.C.T.V. d. 14/10/52 p.2) 
They stroogly recommended that the televisioo service be developed 
by the N.Z.B.S.: 
"By vesting in the N .Z.B.S. the Government can itself 
determine the speed at which development should be 
undertaken and directly the demands which will be made 
on the country's ecooomy and overseas funds during such 
development" 
{Ibid, p.2) 
... / 
The committee was clearly against private enterprise control of 
television, but what of a public corporation? A Cabinet 
Committee was set up to consider the televisicn proposals, 
The D.C.T.V. put forward submissions including a consideration 
of corporation ccntrol. They advised: 
"That it would not be logical for a public corporation 
to be established to cootrol televisiat and yet leave 
the sOW1d Broadcasting system under Government control. 
The questicn of whether both services should be placed 
under a public corporaticn is a matter of policy for 
determinatioo by Government ••• Any change from the 
present system would represent a major change in 
Government policy•••• In the meantime, the New Zealand 
Broadcasting Service is a go4Ig concern accepted by the 
public and the setting up of a separate organisaticn 
would increase administrative costs". 
(Nat. Ar. CAB 203/8/1 pt.1 
MZ (Agenda) p.1) 
The agenda suggested that there would still be room for private 
enterprise to participate in New Zealand televisicn by: 
a) supply of artist's services and material, 
b) advertising, 
c) sale 0£ features/programmes to the service, 
d) supply and repair of technical equipment, 
(Ibid.) 
The Cabinet Committee's minutes reveal a preference £or allowing 
private interests to proceed. Public Corporatiat ccntrol was 
not favoured. There was some suggestion that they might well 
follow the course of radio, allowing private interests to develop 
it, and the State to come in and take over. 
. .. / 
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It was clear that the introduction of television would 
necessitate a thorough rethinking, redefinition of broadcasting 
and its organisation. But still no firm action was taken. 
Another Challenge 
The introduction of television was not the only challenge to the 
monopoly of the N.Z.B,S. A group of businessmen asked the 
Holland ministry for permission to •construct, own and operate 
a commercial broadcasting station in such centres as Lower Hutt 
and North Shore, Auckland'. 
This challenge was considered carefully by the Naticnal cabinet. 
The Director General questioned whether such a development would 
be in the •public interes~, or in 'purely commercial interests.• 
The Director General saw advantages and disadvantages to the 
scheme: 
"Sections of the public, by the infusion of competition in 
broadcasting would have a wider choice of programmes. 
Advertisers would have more time available for their 
purposes, at competitive prices, and staffs would strive 
hard to make their programmes more lively, topical and 
novel and entertaining than those of competing stations" 
"While competition might make more and livelier programmes 
available, these would not necessarily be different in 
style, often the material would be for the same material 
or material of a similar type. The competition would 
almost always be for the mass audience". 
(Nat. Ar. CAB 203/4/1 pt 1. 
tfemo 2 August 1956 P• 2-3) 
'Competition' he argued, •would send up the price of the 
particular programme talent or material being competed for•. 
(Ibid. p.3). This increased competition, Yates advised, would 
... / 
'not only increase costs, it would reduce business', thus 
lessening the return from the services commercial stations. 
'Private station owners would be willing to operate only in 
profitable areas, most of which were already covered. Coverage 
of distant and sparsely populated areas would not interest 
them•. Yates, not surprisingly recommended that: 
" ••• no change can be made in present policy, but that 
the service be permitted to develop and extend 
commercial broadcasting in an orderly way, having no 
regard to coverage needs, the advertising business 
offering, and programme requirements 0£ the country 
as a whole, the financial needs of the overall activities 
of the service and a Government financial policy" 
(Nat. Ar. CAB 203/4/1 pt. 1 
Memo 2 August 1956 p.4) 
The Minister sought Cabinet's opinion~ 'll'le 'party's' own policy 
was to favour the granting of such a concession•. The Minister 
saw that it would be hard to stand in the way of others if the 
State could not provide similar services. This challenge, must 
have been one of many, each sounding the Government out on a 
possible relaxaticn of a State monopoly. 
In March 1957, the Minister in charge of broadcasting once again 
rai.sed the questioo of broadcasting in Cabinet: 
"M.tch as I wish to delay this matter for a further period 
I feel that I must place th whole question before Cabinet 
for a decisioo on certain important questions of policy. 
I think that our Government will incur a fair amount of 
newspaper criticism unless it is in a position to publish 
soon a fairly clear and positive statement as to its 
attitude towards this problem" 
(Nat. Ar. CAB 203/8/1 pt.1 
C.p. (57) 192 d. 15 March 1957 P• 1) 
. .. / 
Considerable pressure was being brought to bear on the 
Government in the election year. According to the Minister's 
paper, pressure was not from the general public but from the 
'Manufacturers of sets, the Government was being forced to 
act•. 
"The financial and economic problems present the most 
formidable obstacle to the introduction of television 
into New Zealand. We cannot any longer put up 
convincing arguments for holding back on moral or 
social grounds. Nor can we justify inaction solel 
on the ground that we are waiting for technical 
improvements, colour viewing and so on. Television 
is inevi tablel The questions are when, how and where'?" 
(Nat. Ar. CAB 203/8/1 pt. 1 
c.p. (57) 192 d. 15 March 1957 p.3) 
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The National Government had to decide whether the State would 
maintain its monopoly on broadcasting and introduce the highly 
expensive television, or would they step aside and allow private 
enterprise to bring television to New Zealand: 
"If and when television is introduced to New Zealand, 
will it be owned and operated publicly or by free 
enterprise firms or will both systems run side by 
side? In this connection, I would point out that 
manufacturers are saying - "if the Government wor?t 
tackle it, why wodt it let free enterprise have a go?" 
Private enterprise had discerned the possibility of profit in 
television for New Zealand, and they were a force to be reckoned 
with. By the end of the year the National Governmen~, in all 
its indecision, lost the election and the secood Labour Government 
entered power with a slim ooe seat majority. The new Prime 
Minister went on the National Radio network to proclaim the 
existence of a foreign exchange crisis for New Zealand. The 
Labour Party were forced to introduce austerity measures, and 
... / 
television was delayed once again due to cost. (Chapman, 
et al, 1962, p.30,32,33). Despite the austerity measures 
the public demanded more services, better reception and 
repeatedly asked when television was to occur. 
The 1958 Annual Report of the N.Z.B.S. to Parliament 
acknowledged both the demands and the costs: 
"Part of the heavy initial cost of television would 
require the use of overseas funds; so would the 
annual costs. Although the advantages of television 
and the interest of the public in~them are fully 
recognised, the Minister of Broadcasting recently 
announced that a committment of this nature and extent 
cannot be undertaken at the present time. For the 
same reason the decision taken earlier to purchase a 
small amount of television testing equipment has 
had to be de ierred in the mean time, but will be reviewed 
again towards the end of 1958" 
(AJHR, F3 1958. p.5) 
In 1959, V.B. Sutch commented: 
"New Zealand is probably past the point of caisidering 
whether television should be introduced, that being 
the case, we should be on the eve of a great debate 
when, how and in what form television should be introduced 
and operated and to examine the likely social and 
economic effects of its introduction" 
(Sutch , 1 95 9 , 1 ) 
Sutch (1959) expressed clearly the New Zealand 'egalitarian' 
concern that private enterprise would not be interested in 
pursuing a nationwide service: 
"The system of purely privately operated stations is 
the least likely to suit New Zealand. The company or 
or companies caicerned would serve only the main centres 
of population where the audiences were large enough to 
... / 
ensure adequate advertising revenue, the unprofitable 
areas 'would be left 'without a service. An even more 
serirus objection "10Uld be that profit (naturally) would 
be the determining factor in planning programmes" 
(Sutch, 1959, 27) 
Sutch too argued for State control, and cited the satisfactory 
services of the Post Office and N.Z.B.S. as proof of the 
system. Once again Parliament "1as hailed as the only institution 
capable of representing the people's interests: 
" A State operated system can be regarded by Parliament 
to operate in the public interest with regard for the 
needs of all sections of the community, and all parts 
of the country - and this requirement can be made 
effective. The operations of such a system, 'while 
having to be effecient, would not need to be governed 
by the necessity to make a profit as its operations at 
all costs and thus it could maintain civilised standards" 
(Sutch, 1959, 33) 
There were fears too, that a State run television would possibly 
not have the fire of a commercial service. It might become dull 
in striving to reflect all citizens. Sutch was also quick to 
point out that a commercial service would not be any cheaper to 
New Zealanders than a non-commercial service, rather the public 
would just pay indirectly through the prices of advertised 
goods. 
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Finally in August 1958 the Labour Government announced that the 
Government would adopt the 625 line system as standard for any 
television service in New Zealand. Two months later the N.z.a.s. 
obtained approval for the purchase of equipment to enable technical 
investigations. Television planning was underway. (N.Z.B.C. 1965. 1) 
... / 
February,1959 brought some experimental transmissions from 
a low-powered station in Auckland to assist engineers in site 
selection and other preparation work. Public interest in 
television increased over the succeeding months until January1 
1960 when the Prime Minister Walter Nash announced plans to 
introduce television. (N.z.s.c., 1965, 1) 
As the 1960 Annual Report quietly commented: 
"It was announced on the 28th January that Government 
would introduce a television system to be owned and 
controlled by the State and associated with the N.Z.B.S." 
(A.J.H.R. F.3 1960. 4) 
State control was reasserted for televisioo by the second Labour 
Government. As the Labour M.P. for Hastings was to comment in 
the Address and Reply Debate when Parliament opened in June: 
" ••• the Labour Party does assert and will continue to assert, 
that the State has not only the ~ight, but the duty to 
command the heights of the ecoo.omy so that the economic 
and financial power cannot be concentrated in a few 
irresponsible and often a?lllf.onymous private hands, but 
either shall be exercised by responsible public authorities 
constantly under scrutiny by Parliament and the public ••• 
••• and it is for this reason that the Labour Government has 
now asserted that the State should control television. 
Television requires tremendous capital expenditure and makes 
an impact not merely on some industries but on the tender 
mercies of vulgar and more perni::: ious aspects of commercialism 
so that a few people can exploit and make fabulcus profits" 
(Hansard, 23 June 1960. p.9) 
Political rhetoric aside, this comment does illustrate some of the 
rationale of the action. Later in the session the Labour Government 
brought in legislation enabling television to be operated by the 
N.z.s.s. The plan was not well received by the ffational opposition. 
Leader Xeith Holyoake proposed a corporation not unlike the B.B.C: 
... / 
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"The authority '"'ould not just be another section or 
another separate State Department. Through its members, 
the committee would reflect the views, the ideas and the 
tastes of the people. It would not operate just at the 
dictate of a Minister of a Government. We believe that 
is important" 
(Hansard, 28 September 1960, p.2623) 
The Bill was passed into law on the 3rd October 1960. In the 
General Election, broadcasting was playing a dual role, 
constituting both an issue and a force within the campaign. 
K. Jackson (1962) claims that neither party had considered in 
depth their policies on broadcasting. The advent of television, 
Jackson says, brought about a re-evaluation of the service. 
(Jackson, 1962, 109). 
Broadcasting's other role was that of a communicator. Large 
numbers of people were brought into the campaign through its 
activities. Jackson (1962) comments that though New Zealand 
had developed a pattern of local broadcasting which would have 
been the envy of B.B.C. planners, the parties were reluctant to 
use available radio time £or local issues and campaigns. The 
second Labour Government lost the 1960 election and Nation.al held 
a majority in the House of twelve seats. The following year 
legislation was intrOduced to create a public corporation to 
administer broadcasting. 
The N.Z.B.S. and its Demise 
R.J. Gregory (1979) stresses the importance of the aquisition and 
and insta!lation of plant and facilities for any broadcasting 
organisation. The yardstick of any broadcasting authority will 
be its ability to develop the physical and demonstrable rate than 
the abstract and speculative (Gregory, 1979, 80). In the careers 
of the N.B.S., N.Z.B.S. and the amalgam N.Z.B.S., there was also 
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a strong desire to develop tangible services. Gregory notes that 
these 'physical development imperatives' were so 'strong that they 
could be seen to inhibit committment to wider more abstract social 
.... / 
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responsibilities. (Gregory, 1979, 81). 
But the development of a philosophy, or an articulated mission for 
broadcasting was also crucial to the success of any institution 
operating broadcasting. Individuals and groups articulate 
missions for an activity and will seek to impress that vision 
upon others. 
Gregory, (1979) identifies that James Shelfy was the first person 
" to set about the task of defining and articulating a mission for 
New Zealand's Public Broadcasting (Gregory, 1979, 99). Shelfy's 
" philosophy embodied three principal values, according to Gregory. 
Firstly>he regarded it as imperative that radio be used to promote 
and maintain higher standards in the arts. e Secondly, Shelly 
sought it as a chance to secure social unity through an appreciation 
of finer things, and finally he held a strong belief that radio 
was a vital means of fostering Intematiooal tolerance and peace. 
(Gregory, 1979, 84-6). 
It is important, howver, to realise that while Shelfy•s mission 
was important, others too were influential in shaping meanings: 
Shell~'s concepts were a product of his character, his power, 
position and experiences. He articulated a missioo and was in 
a positioo to impress it upon others. Gregory fails to acknowledge 
the existence of other views and their promoters, both preceeding 
and contemporary to Shelly's. 
Shelfy•s mission saw the N.Z.B.S. as a leader in social and 
cultural development. The service had adopted this role eagerly, 
it had been appropriate for the time. The N.Z.B.S. was a radio 
organisation designed to develop radio in the programme sense, not 
embark on any major teclmical building programmes. Thus while 
it could administer a matured, respected and well defined service 
it was not equipped to bring about the intr6duction of television. 
In its success as social patroo, it was not able to successfully 
transfer its objectives to the building of a major televisioo 
network. This inability to rearticulate its mission was the 
... / 
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service's demise. People doubted whether the N.Z.B.S. was a 
capable framework for an integrated radio and television service. 
It was not so much a matter of questioning State control but 
more a questioning that particular State organisation. 
Review 
This chapter has reviewed the period where the State ruled 
supreme in radio. It had total management of the service and 
did so in a fashicn that restricted development. But often, 
this control was ooe of timidity.The various Governments more 
than not delayed actions rather than took them. Televisbn for 
instance was delayed for many years oo the ecoo.omic grounds of 
cost. 
The State•s total management was not without challl:!nges. Different 
individuals and groups sought to re-establish opportunities for 
other broadcasting options. Private enterprise sought radio 
and televisicn development rights,for instance. Despite 
surviving these challenges the State was forced to reorient 
its activities. When television was finally introduced it was 
necessary to implement a new form of control, something more 
responsive to the requirements of the new technology. 
This chapter has examined a distinct peacetime period of total 
cootrol. The State €cntrolled broadcasting firmly. It was 
integrated into the total State apparatus, development options 
were assessed again:st other State projects, and were often 
accorded a low priority. Yet a new facet of broadcasting was well 
underway and this necessitated organisational changes. The device 
of departmental control was no longer appropriate. 
"The private operator must operate at a _Fll'ofit -
there's nothing wroo.g in operating at a profit; -
similarly the N.Z.B.C., if it is to fulfil its 
function as trustee of the licence holders of 
New Zealand, mu.st operate fundamentally what I 
would call a surplus. It is what the money is 
used for is the distinction". 
L.R. Sceats, 
Director-General designate 
28 May 1970. 
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CHAPTER 7 
"CONTEMPORARY NEW ZEALAND BROADCASTING: 
TELEVISION, STATE CORPORATIONS PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND 
REVENUE CRISES" 
Introduction 
Over the last two decades New Zealand broadcasting has undergone 
a series of reformations. Different people, new technologies 
and questicns of revenue were prominent in the continual reshaping 
of the activity. Technology combined with new ideas altered the 
nature and shape of broadcasting. New institutions were also 
needed to accommodate the changes. 
Such has been the nature of the reforms that much of what is 
recognised as broadcasting and what is demanded of i~ have cnly 
fully emerged, distinctively, in recent years. This chapter brings 
the analysis of broadcasting up to the present day. 
The N .z.B.C. 
Late in 1961 the new National Government introdUced legislaticn 
to the Hwse to create a public corporatiat to administer 
New Zealand Broadcasting. The new Minister of Broadcasting, 
A.E. I:insella wtlined the .roles and £unctions of the new 
corporaticn. It would be self supporting, financially, gaining 
revenue from both commercial sources and from licensing. The 
corporaticn was to administer programme standards and would be 
able to 'license private statioo.s (Hansard, 13 Oct. 1961 7 p.2997). 
The Labour Government contested stroogly this final provision. 
Ex-Prime Minister, Walter Nash commented: 
"What we are ccncerned about is the effect of televisbn 
under private control, the objective of which is to make 
money, having a major effect en public opinion. That 
is dangerous" (Hansard, 13 Oct. 1961, p.3OO2) 
... / 
Many were also concerned about the power of television, 
especially whe."l under a. mor,opoly situation. 
"It (TV) has power for good or evil. It has a 
great power for enlightenment of people. In a bad 
sense it has a great power when used for propagw.da 
purposes. It is particularly effective a"ld dangerous 
as a political and social weapon especially when a 
monopoly is running it. It is more dangerous still 
when that monopoly is under political control". 
(Hansard, 13 October 1961, p.3322) 
Corporation control seemed the most appropriate and the safest 
for the public good. The Government was reluctant to see any 
private enterprise introduced. The provisions for it in the 
Act were vague, probably put there to placate certain commercial 
interests. When the Minister outlined the functions of the 
corporation, private enterprise was accorded a very lOvJ key. 
The Minister outlined six ~.mctions with which the N.Z.B.C. 
would be charged: 
11 1) To carry out the service, develop it, expand it and 
improve it, 
2) To carry out surveys and consider and reconunend on 
the possibilities of private services if required, 
3) To supervise and control the programmes of all stations, 
either corporation or private stations, 
4) To advise the Minister on the fees and licenses which 
should be fixed for licensing, 
5) To supervise the operation of private stations if 
licenses should be granted, 
6) Charged with responsibility of ensuring accuracy and 
impartiality in news services". 
(Hansard, 7 November 1961, P• 3323-4) 
... / 
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The corporation was charged with the unusual dual respoosibilities 
of being a participant,and judg~ of activities. The corporation 
had essentially been charged with expanding broadcasting and 
that meant televisicn. By establishing a corporation, the State 
had yielded some authority, and divorced itself from a wide 
variety of respoosibilities. No loo.ger would Government be 
directly accountable to criticism of the development, nor would 
it have to find the finances. The State still retained most of 
the reins of power, yet removed a lot of the responsibility. 
Expenditure on broadcasting would from now on be ccntrolled by 
circumstance rather than by Cabinet decision. 
How was Government control retained'? 
There were three mechanisms by which Parliament held power of 
the corporaticn: 
1) The corporaticn must comply with Government directions 
that are in writing, 
2) The corporation must submit its reports and accounts 
to Parliament each year, thus giving Parliament the 
opportunity to review its activities, 
3) The corporation must have approval of Government for 
its works programme, although it was free to embark 
upcn expenditure up to sums of £25,000. 
(Hansard, 7 November 1961, p.3323) 
The last provisicn was not as inhibiting as it may appear. Due 
to its self sufficiency the corporaticn was able to utilise 
advertising revenues to embark at capital development. (Gregory, 
1979, 34). The ideals of the system are succinctly expressed 
by Lord Normanbroolc (1965), Chairman of the B.B.C.: 
"•••an organisation providing such a service as this is 
more likely to follow a steady but developing ccurse 
if it is not subject to detailed cattrol by a Minister 
directly respcnsible to Parliament. A public corporatioo. 
... / 
has ,the· , advantage that it is in a positio:-1 to 
combine the general interest while remaining free 
from day to day intervention by the political 
machine" 
(Normanbrook, 1965, 4) 
Yet the quasi-autonomous relationship was to cause problems 
with the development of television. New Zealand's 
'egalitarian ethos• required the N.Z.B.C. to quickly 
implement television reception across the country. Not 
only were the viewers insistent on this but also manufacturers 
and members of the advertising industry. Thus developed a 
fundamental tension; the speed at which development could 
be implemented and the demands made upon the organisation 
for rapid if not immediate provision of coverage. 
(Gregory, 1982, 51) 
Development 
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Tension would soon extend to the relationship between corporation 
and Government. The N.Z.B.C. had in 1963 with the Government's 
approval, embarked upon a £7.5 million capital expansion 
programme to extend the fledgling television service over the 
whole of the country, and to upgrade and expand radio services. 
While the corporation was obliged to finance this development 
itself, inflation had placed it in the position of getting more 
revenue from television advertising. (Gregory, 1979, 133) 
Yet the Government demanded that development be kept in check. 
Strained relations began to develop because the corporation 
began to direct criticism of slow progress to the Government, 
(Gregory, 1979, 134). 
In November 1964, this tension teached a peak. Chairman of 
the N .z .B.C., l1lr Llewellyn launched a strong public attack on 
the Government's "procrastination" over the N .Z.B.C.' s proposals 
for a second channel, which had been submitted to the Minister 
nine months earlier. The N.Z.B.C. had wanted to implement a 
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second channel in viable areas before completing national 
coverage of the first network. They saw the move realising 
more revenue and would greatly accelerate, in their mind, the 
development of New Zealand television. However, W.J. Scott, 
Minister of Broadcasting had fears that such an introduction would 
be politically unsound. How could the Government justify such 
a measure when many areas received no coverage at all?. 
(Gregory, 1979, 137). 
To ease the public demands for action, the Government monopoly 
was relaxed. In 1963 it was decided to allow the setting up 
of privately-owned translater statioos to provide interim 
recepticn in localities which would otherwise be required to 
wait years for adequate receptioo. (Gregory, 1982, 52). The 
corporaticn allowed viewer societies, of not less than 50 
members, to insta:IJ, operate and maintain translaters en behalf 
of the N.Z.B.C. The capital costs of purchasing and installing 
the equipment would be met by the individual members of the 
society, and the corporaticn would be licensee of the equipment 
and would subsidise the costs of the operatioo and maintenance. 
(Stringer, 1969, 3). 
The societies, were, in effect, agents of the N.Z.B.C. and were 
bound by the agreement to restrict operatioos to relaying and 
not transmission. (Stringer, 1969, 6). Thus the corporation was 
able to expand its services at a much lower cost and placate 
criticism. By the end of March 1964, 13 translators had been 
licensed. But there were still areas,which by the nature of 
of the terrain,would be unserved. The formation of a 50 member 
society was impossible in many small areas. To accommodate this 
the corporation allowed the introduction of battery operated 
mini-translators (Stringer, 1969, 6-7). By 1969 these developments 
had had a significant impact upcn televisioo recepticn. Figure 7.1 
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Figure 7.1 Television Coverage and Translator Societies, 1969. 
(Stringer 1969, 4-5) 
illustrates the impact of this slight easing of State monopoly. 
Once the corporation developed coverage in the area, it would 
buy out these societies. 
Gregory (1982) sees these actions as consistent with the 
capital development philosophy paramount within the organisation 
at that time. It was not growth per se that was of primary 
importance, but growth in order to protect the economic viability 
of public broadcasting from the threat posed by the potential 
profit-oriented competitors. (Gregory, 1982, 53). 
There were other concepts of importance, including the 
ideologies of financial self-sufficiency, low costs to the 
caisumer, the fostering of a national identity, and a pride 
that the service measured up well against overseas broadcasting 
organisatiais. Bu.t the dominant value was that the N.Z.B.C. 
should be a building organisation. (Gregory, 1982, 55-56). 
The N.Z.B.C. had been modelled on the triumvirate of the 
American political system. There was to be three partners 
in the N.Z.B.C. - the Director General and his staff were ooe, 
the Chairman and the Board the second, and thirdly the Minister 
and Parliament. This conceptiai, as expressed in Figure 7.2 
was to cause problems in the operatioo of broadcasting. 
The problem, according to the Minister of Broadcasting was the 
overt dominance of the Director General (Gregory, 1979, 137). 
The boundaries between the parties had been ill defined. 
(Toogood, 1969, 107). The board was increased from three members 
to seven in order to negate some of the Director General's influence. 
The Continued Exclusiai of Private Broadcasting 
The Government had reluctantly charged the N.Z.B.C. with the 
responsibility of hearing applicatiais for private warrants. 
The Act laid down ten matters for the ~orporation to take into 
coosideration. These comprehensive criteria were in the main, 
covering traditiaial areas of concern about private broadcasting 
(i.e. standards of service, advertising and interference with 
the State Service). 
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Figure 7.2 The Structure of New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation 
as explained by G.H. Stringer. 
(Gregory, 1979, 56). 
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How did the corporation come to receive these judicial f'u.ncticns? 
K.P. Ross (1971) argues that this £unction was acquired more by 
default than by design. It was a balancing of all three attitudes 
prevalent in the National Party's caucus. Ross identifies 
supporters of private enterprise (such as J.R. Marshall), those 
who wanted a B.B.C. type structure (like T.P. Shand) and those 
who were satisfied with the present structure (such as R.M. Algie). 
At no time were any of these attitudes dominant over the others. 
At the time of the drafting of the Bill the two latter attitudes 
(corproatioo. and State Ccntrol) were sufficiently powerful to 
ensure private enterprise was excluded. As a compromise gesture 
to keep the private enterprise supporters with the Bill, Part III 
was included. It was a political decisioo to satisfy various 
inter-party pressures rather thana move to improve broadcasting. 
(Ross, 1971, 27-8). 
Thus, by default the corporation was given power over its potential 
competitors, enough to even exclude them. The N.Z.B.C. achieved 
tremendous growth during the 1960's, mainly due to the fact it 
was selective with its responsibilities. In the early years it 
ignored the responsibility over private enterprise. Essentially 
the roles were incompatible (Ross, 1971, 30.) 
This is not to say there were not challenges. In the late 1950's 
and early 19601 s several attempts were made by private enterprise 
to enter broadcasting, notably televisioo. Why did these attempts 
fail? 
Ross (1971) suggests a number of reasons. Firstly the N.Z.B.C. was 
sufficiently powerful that the Government hesitated to upset it 
often. Secondly, up to that time New Zealand viewers were still 
'sufficiently enchanted by the ooe channel screen', And, thirdly, 
those companies and individuals interested were not putting their 
full energies into obtaining the second channel. (Ross, 1971, 34)1 • 
... / 
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The N.Z.B.C. vigorously chased the second channel. They had been 
so successful with their first television channel that the 
natiooal coverage plan had to be brought forward. (Ross, 1971, 36). 
But television was ooly part of broadcasting. Radio was still 
developing and was still the major part of the sector. 
During the 1960's the N.Z.B.C. had opened twelve further commercial 
stations (both full-and part-time). However, further expansioo 
of this network was adjourned during the mid 1960' s. Commercial 
radio was no looger a revenue eamer, it was now in deficit. But 
stations were not closed because they were unprofitable. They 
were re-assessed, and were regarded as integral to the respoosibilities 
of the corporatioo. G.H. Stringer comments that the development of 
radio stations into the smaller areas during the early 1%0's 
fulfilled a dual role. They were not only distributioo points, 
but collection points especially for news (Pers. Com.). The 
development of a news service, independent of the traditiooal 
newspaper routes was a major innovation for broadcasting and the 
media in general. Broadcasting's ability to relay news had long 
been recognised, but had never been developed. The retention 0£ 
unprofitable stations would be essential if a rel~ible news service 
was to be maintained. 
But there is little doubt that radio was being U?Staged by the 
newcomer, television. Ross (1971) argues that it was the hybrid 
nature of the N.Z.B.C. with its limited financial resources that 
meant it was caught in its early years going too many 'Ways. It 
had concentrated on televisiai, on non-commercial radio, and on 
increasing the number of commercial radio stations. Yet little 
was done m updating the programmes of commercial radio~ by which 
the public judged it most (Ross, 1971, 45). 
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The Mcnopoly Crumbles 
It was in 1966 that a thirty year mooopoly of the State over 
radio was defeated. It was the result of a challenge made by 
a Pirate radio station, in the Hauraki Gulf, A group of younger 
people, had viewed similar developments in Europe and decided that 
they might be able to invoke some change in New Zealand broadcasting. 
As the founder recalled: 
"I think it started ••••• when a group of us decided 
there were certain things wrong with radio in New Zealand 
and we thought we would do something about it and we did. 
We bought a ship and built a transmitter and we got a few 
young people together, most of them from the N.z.a.c., and 
a little naively perhaps, we went ahead and put a radio 
statim on the air and that was Radio Hauraki". 
(N.Z. Company Director, April 1970, p.80) 
This challenge had a very high profile. The main thrust of their 
attack was the unsympathetic programming of the N.z.a.c. They aimed 
their programme at an audience, under-served by the corporation: 
" ••• Radio Hauraki is designed to appeai, not exclusively, 
1'52 
but the sound of the statioo is designed to appeal to young 
people under the age of 25. It was our intentiai when we first 
formed to appeal to this market. We felt that the present 
broadcasting services, although very good in a number of ways, 
failed in the area of providing entertainment for young people". 
(N.Z. Company Director, April 1970, p.10) 
He added that the N.Z.B.C. had failed by attempting •to cater for too 
many tastes on too few radio staticns 9 • (N.Z. Company Director, April 
1970, p.10). The group stimulated public debate. During the height 
of the election campaign they began transmissions from a small vessel 
in the Hauraki Gulf. Mini~ter of Broadcasting, W.J. Scott responded by 
writing to the corporation requesting 'brighter' Y •. D. stations. At 
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the same time the National Party promised in the election manifesto 
to set up a new licensing authority to determine the need for 
additional television and radio stations, and to issue warrants 
to successful applicants (Cleveland, 1970, 47). 
This challenge, captured the New Zealand public's imagination. A 
1978 Listener article mythicisedthe challenge: 
On 23 
"The Hauraki story is a classic of New Zealand mythology 
the triumph of the gutsy average over Big Brother, individual 
enterprise versus bureaucratic monopoly. The Hauraki pirates 
were the good guys, their statements from the outset designed 
to gain public sympathy. Nobody ever said "We• re in it for 
mooey", and if they had been in those lean, early days, they 
would have had pockets to let" 
(N.z. Listener, May 13, 1978, p.24) 
March 1969, the Authority g~pi:bi_ two private radio warrants -
one to Hauraki. The Government• s monopoly was broken at the hands 
of a few young people. Another group had managed to implant some 
of their meanings oo broadcasting. A£ter the election, the 
Government passed the 1968 Broadcasting Authorities Act. It 
established an independent tribunal, as promised to adjudicate those 
' judicial functions, previously held by the N.z.B.C. The corporation 
took the removal of this pO'Wer in its stride. The 1969 Annual Report 
noted: 
"If private stations are to be licensed by the broadcasting 
Authority this will bring to an end a period of more than 
30 years in which the greater part of New Zealand Broadcasting 
Services were operated by a single organisation". 
(A.J.H.R., 1969, 5). 
This report also noted the reception of a consultancy report 
commissicned by the board into the internal organisation of the 
corporatioo. The board was worried that the N.Z.B.C. had become 
... / 
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too remote from the public. Accordingto Gregory (1979) the board 
thought the corporation was too like a Government Department, 
with control centralised in the hands of a permanent head. Gregory 
' 
argues there was a tensicn between a Director-General who preferred 
to think of himself as a sort of independent head, and a board that 
wished to assert its own authority as a public corporation vested 
with the responsibility of operating the country's broadcasting 
system (Gregory, 1979, 169). 
Significantly, the consultants recommended the establishment of 
three administrative regions. According to Ross, the value of the 
reorganisatioo. was slight (Ross, 1971, 110). The real value had 
been that the N.Z.B.C. was seen to be doing something in response 
to coosiderable public criticism. Gregory (1975) identifies an 
argument prevalent at the time which questicned whether or notth~ 
corporation was becoming too powerful and too independent 0£ mind. 
Could greater independence from undesirable political influence be 
gained from large, mcnolithic organisations,though with clear lines 
of political accountancy, or by a number of smaller organisations 
w•~ 
whose links with the Government of the day/4not so clearly defined 
by Statute (Gregory, 1975, 138) 
The move to regionalism and decentralisation was seen as a measure 
to increase the availability to the public. In 1965 the N.Z.B.C. 
had developed a regional framework of Advisory Committees to be 
a 'sounding board' for their activities. They were designed to 
'provide the environment of critical appraisal and response•. 
The Broadcasting Authority 
The Broadcasting Authority Act 1968 established an independent body 
to adjudicate the warrants for broadcasting stations. It was also 
charged with supervising the operations of stations and advising 
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the Minister of Broadcasting matters. This Act rewrote the provisicns 
under which warrants might be sought. The categories were similar to 
those given to the corporation but with the additicn of an owner-
ship ccntrol. It excluded mcnopoly control, foreign ownership and 
individual owners from operating private broadcasting stations2• 
The Authority was also obliged to comply with Government policy, 
as given by written notice. The Authority was set up as Berger(1970) 
argues, more to decide •which applicants would get warrants•, not 
whether there should be commercial radio. (Berger, 1970, B. p.73). 
G.D. ~Kay (1972) asserts that the Government was able to exert 
ccnsiderable pressure over the broadcasting sector through ensuring 
the authority was respcnsive to Government policy: 
" ••• the Government through the directive provisicns and the 
informal powers that flow from such a provisim, would 
appear to have more control than it would care to admit. 
Whether this influence is formal or not largely depends 
m whether public opinicn resists Government interference. 
If it does it only makes it more likely that informal 
influence will be used, and the only limit to these informal 
powers is the self restraint exercised by Government". 
(G.D. M:::ray, 1972, 24). 
The National Government justified the change to authority control 
on the grounds of anti-mcnopoly. Ostensibly, they argued, the 
• 'Pirates Affair' of 1966 had shown that the corporation was not 
willing to use Part III of its Act. Ttte Labour Party opposed the 
change en the grounds that private enterprise ought not be involved 
in broadcasting as it would only be interested in profit. 
Once again there was a bid by private enterprise to establish 
television. A conglomerate under the name of Associated Network 
was set up, backed by U.E.B. Industries, J. Watties Canneries, 
Wright Stephenson and Kerridge Odeon. The group sought to operate 
a national television net'Jork and radio. stations in the four main 
centres. Their proposal was not received 'Jith any enthusiasm by 
the then Minister, Lance Adams-Schneider. He re-stated the 
Government's policy that there would be no second channel before 
1971• He also said that before the authority called for applicaticns 
it would undertake a naticnal survey cn the future of television. 
(Ross, 1971, 39-40). 
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October1 1969 saw the establishment of the Inquiry. It was 
charged with exploring the 'needs of New Zealand for a seco:-,.d 
channel (and possible subsequent channels) including the timing, 
economic effects a~d various methods of introducing an additional 
channel or cha~nels in respect of both black ~1d white a~d colour 
television'. It was also charged with 'finding the best ';Jay 
of introducing private enterprise competition'. (N.Z.B.A. 1971, 8-9). 
This Inq~iry was useful to the Government in that it would enable 
Cabinet to have a full report before authorising any move. It 
would also be use~~l in delaying any action in the area of a second 
channel, thereby quietening down the topics of broadcasting for 
a forthcoming election. (Ross, 1971, 40). 
As the Lnquiry got underway the N.Z.B.C. accomplished an important 
engineering step. They commissioned in November, the microwave 
system which enabled four regiooal television services to be 
linked together for simultaneous broadcasts. A truly natiooal 
network had been established. (N.Z.B.C., 1971, 21). While 
private enterprise had been lobbying for permission to commence 
television, the corporation had been quietly working on its own 
coverage plans. It had the transmitters ready, Avalon could handle 
the programme requirements and it was experimenting with colour. 
The N.Z.B.C. were making themselves ready to take on the new channel. 
Private Broadcasting? 
It is illustrative to look at the way the corporation responded 
to the private ~~terprise hearings. The N.Z.B.C. developed 
three main arguments against private operators: 
1) That the proposals, if implemented, would affect the 
corporation's revenue and future ability to maintain 
and extend its services in the public interest, 
2) That the proposals did not evidence balanced programming, 
3) They did not provide programmes or services which the 
N.Z.B.C. was not already undertaking. 
(Gregory, 1979, 270). 
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The N.Z.B.C. stood by its record. The Government had decided that 
private enterprise was going to re-enter broadcasting and the 
sooner the better. The corporation had little to contest. But 
in its haste to introduce •competitive' broadcasting, the 
Government had forgotten to address the fundamental question, 
How might private enterprise improve the service to the public? 
As Berger (1970) stated: 
" ••• Will private radio stimulate a better flow of adrenalin 
in the N.Z.B.C., will it in itself provide better, more 
extensive news coverage, interpretive news analysis, even 
editorials?" 
(Berger, 1970, p.74). 
In June 1970 the corporation made its bid for the secai.d channel. 
They reasooed that the N.Z.B.C. already had the facilities for 
duplicating channels at minimum expense. It claimed that within 
12 months it could provide a second channel service for Auckland 
and Wellington viewers (ATL. R.O. Douglas papers Box 6 of 
28 October 1971). 
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The new Director General, L.R. Sceatl stated that the N.Z.B.C. would 
be the most appropriate means of control: 
"The board of the Broadcasting Corporation is really the 
trustee of the viewers of New Zealand and my particular 
viewpoint is that the viewers can be best served by two 
channels under the one control" 
(Sceats, 1970, 1) 
He also attacked. the private enterprise contenders: 
"The private operator mu.st operate at a profit - there's 
nothing wrong in operating at a profit; similarly the 
N.Z.B.C. if it is to fulfil its function as trustee of 
the licence holders of New Zealand, must operate funda-
mentally what I would call a surplus. It is what the 
money is used for is the distincticn" 
{Sceats, 1970, 4) 
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The Broadcasting Authority reported back in 1971• It 
recommended that the existing television service operated 
by the N.Z.B.C. be converted to colour transmission by October 1973 
and that the authority be empowered to call for applications to 
operate the second channel in colrur. The National Government 
accepted the proposals. (ATL. R.O. Douglas papers M.s. Box 7). 
Two applications were received in 1972, ooe from the N.Z.B.C. which 
proposed a complementary channel, and the other was from the 
Independent Television Corporation. (ibid.) The leader of the 
Opposition, N. I:irk, warned that a Labour Government wouH block 
private enterprise television if it was granted the warrant. 
With the change of Government, there was still no finding by the 
Aut-hori V• The Prime Ministe:ri- elect declared again that the N .z.a.c. 
would get the second channel regardless of the hearing's outcome. 
(ATL. R.O. Douglas papers, Box 3). 
Political Bias 
There was another issue of the moment which created some cootroversy. 
It was labelled the • M::Leod Affair' when the editor of the Listener 
was fired by the Board of the Corporation. Although the issues were 
in the main, internal ooes, the resulting debate and public enquiry 
looked closely at allegations that members of the board had been 
politically appointed. While the commission found no evidence of 
any overt 'political influence• it was clear that many members of 
the board had political leanings that favoured the National Party. 
As Bassett (1976) put it: 
"While the subsequent enquiry concluder! that there was no 
political influence behind the sacking, the public was 
rather disgusted to find that from the Chairman of the 
N.Z.B.C. right thrrugh the Board of the Corporation, 
political appointments abounded". 
(Bassett, 1976, 12-13). 
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The matter was one of concem to the Board. In their 1972 Report 
to Parliament, they clearly established their position: 
"The Corporation is conscious of its position in matters 
of public debate. It is established by Parliament, and is 
responsible to it to act in the public interest. It 
propounds no editorial views of its own but pursues the 
aim of enabling listeners and viewers to acquaint them-
selves with various aspects of issues, which it believes 
it does fairly and impartially, and with considerable 
success. The Corporation strenously denies assertions 
of bias and partiali tY''. 
(A.J.H.R. F.3 1972 p.6) 
Major General w.s. McKinnoo., then Chairman of the N.Z.B.C. recalled 
that whilst members of the board didhave particular political 
persuasions, they were not closed to other viewpoints. McKinnon. 
was concerned at the time about how the board appeared in a 
political light. He placed stress upon the ideas of Lord Normanbrook 
( 1965 ) 3 : 
" ••• care has usually been taken to ensure that the differing 
values and points of view, which in active politics are 
reflected by membership of political parties, are fairly 
reflected in membership en the board" 
(Normanbrook, 1965, 8-9). 
Such was his concern, that en two occasions he approached the 
Government to appoint well known Labour Party members to the board. 
McKinncn saw this as a positive action in an election year to 
alleviate allegatiens of political bias (Pers. Com.). His suggestions 
were not accepted. The incident provides insight into the informal 
controls a Government might wish to develop with a corporation. 
The relaticnship between the corporaticn and the Minister of 
Broadcasting is also worth exploring. While the corporaticn 
remained respcnsible to Parliament for its activities, Parliament 
did not have the power to question day to day functioning of the 
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corporaticn. But the taxpayers saw Parliament as their 
representatives, and if the Government 0"1ned the service, then 
they should direct their complaints and demands to them, who in 
turn looked to the Minister. (Gregory, 1979. 236). 
Yet corporatim cmtrol had removed the day to day activities of 
broadcasting away from Parliament. Indeed the very reason for 
establishing such a control was to remove radio and televisbn 
from direct political control. This placed the Minister in a 
strange posi ticn. He was accountable to Parliament for broad-
casting, yet could have no influence on the domestic policies of 
the board. Public confusicn, and indeed Parliamentary confusion 
on the nature of the Minister's role was considerable. This 
unresolved issue would be the source of considerable tensioo. 
A New Structure 
In March,1973 the Broadcasting Authority announced its decision 
on the second television channel. They granted the warrant to 
the Independent Television Corporaticn. Four days later the 
Government jointly announced with the propcnents of the scheme, 
an agreement which in return for $50,000 in compensatiai., the 
Independent Televisicn Corporation would not uplift its warrant. 
The Minister had,two mcnths earlier, announced the Government 
plans for broadcasting. The Labour Government was going to split 
the N.Z.B.C. into three separate and independent corporaticns, two 
for televisicn and one for radio. The Minister, R.O. Douglas 
set up a committee of four to prepare a white paper to bring about 
the proposed structure. (McGill, 1973, 6). 
The Chairmanship of the committee was given to Kenneth Adam -
ex Director of B.B.C. Television. The committee's report saw 
the primary principle of the new structure would be the operational 
independence: 
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"The structure seeks first to give frldependence to the 
corporations so they can present a real choice to the 
public in programme style and content. The structure 
aims next to guarantee independence in resources to 
all01,1 the two television services and radio to set their 
own priorities and pursue their own improvement and 
development. By its design the structure is planned 
to extend independence from ministerial control and 
from indirect pressure exercised through close capital 
works supervision. In the mdividual corporations the 
structures outlined are shaped to promote creative 
mdependence by focussing the organisation on those who 
produce the programmes in the studios and on the stations. 
Fmally the station pursues IDdependence from the unitary 
centralising tendency, "1nich gathers as mu.ch as it can 
IDto one place and cne pyramid of power and resources, 
thus overriding or neglecting the country's spread of 
talent and its regional variety''. 
(N.Z.C.B. 1973, 15) 
In additicn to the three corporations the report recommended a 
fourth cne called the Broadcasting Council of Ne"1 Zealand, to 
provide commcn services such as programme purchasIDg, The 
scheme also sought to decentralise broadcasting; TV1 production 
was to be based ID Wellington and Dunedin, TV2 ID Auckland, 
Christchurch and Hamilton, and Radio New Zealand focused en 
Wellingtcn. The committee saw that decentralisaticn was compatible 
with the •national community• broadcasting had built up: 
11 It is important here to distinguish between centralism 
and IDternaticnalism. We believe that local attachments 
can and should be strengthened and we welcome the oppor-
tunities provided for greater diversity under the Government's 
present plan. There is in our view no inevitable 
IDCOmpatability between the regional view and the world 
view". (N.z.c.B. 1973, 7) 
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Vhen announcing the new plan the Minister of Broadcasting had 
proclaimed two guiding principles - decentralisation and 
competitive enterprise. The demise of the N.Z.B.C. was more 
than that. It had been suffering under a cloud of despair 
since the McLeod affair.:ndtheorganisation seemed no longer 
appropriate. The change had been brought about to institute 
change. As Gregory (1975) commented: 
"The Labour Government's broadcasting policy turns out 
to be enigmaticl At worst it is a grossly extravagant 
piece of Ministerial monument building, at best a 
somewhat confused choice of means towards an achievement 
of noble ends •• •" 
(Gregory, 1975, 147). 
Gregory (1982) suggests that once again it was a matter of 
redefining the organisational mission. He argues that the 
N.Z.B.C. was unable to institutionalise itself, as a permanent 
organisation. The key values of the N.Z.B.C. had been growth, 
financial independence, l01J cost to the consumer, and the fostering 
of a national identity • These were almost irrelevant to those 
which shaped the expectations of programme, and particularly 
journalistic staff. As the capital development eased off around 
1968-70, the corporatioo was forced to re-articulate the social 
responsibilities to redefine itself in terms of basic consumer 
utility and value. (Gregory, 1982, 57). This was reflected in 
the 1973 report: 
"It has been argued that more of these moneys should have 
been spent en programming. It is quite true that more 
could have been articulated in this way, but to the 
detriment of both the extent and sta"ldard of coverage. 
Faced with demands from every part of the country for a 
television signal, and remembering that many parts of 
New Zealand are isolated and that television could provide 
social and cultural benefits to these areas, the corporation 
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has made its major priorities first channel coverage 
of the country, often at great cost because of the 
nature of the terrain. It could have spent less on 
coverage and not provided a service so soon to so 
many". 
(AJHR. F.3 1973, p.5) 
The N.Z.B.C. stood proudly beside its impressive record of 
growth: 
"The corporation has undertaken to make every effort 
to assist the committee the Minister is to establish. 
Govem~ent has the power to change the structure, and 
while the corporation would not claim to be without 
fault, it nevertheless takes pride that it has achieved 
the present high standards of programmes and wide 
coverage in both radio and television. It is worth 
re..-stating that the development has been financed 
entirely by its own revenue, including a licence fee 
that remained unaltered for ten years, and in the case 
of radio, a fee (now abolished) first established in 
1925". 
(AJHR. F.3 1973, 5). 
The new Act was to take effect from 1 April 1975, with the 
Council being established earlier to see the old out and the 
new in. But the new organisations had their critics, some saying 
it had been conceived in haste, some staff were disenchanted, and 
even a former Director-General of the N.Z.B.C. expressed doubts 
about the financial implications. (Thorley, 1975, 11). 
With the new structures barely in place there was another change 
of Government. Many were unsure of what the new Government would 
do. TV2 9 s 1976 report to Parliament expressed the growing concern 
of the broadcasters: 
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"At the time of writing this report the future of 
broadcasting is being reconsidered for the second time 
inside thnee years. Signatories to this report are not 
primarily concerned with their ovn skins. We believe 
we have taken on the somewhat thankless responsibilities 
of a public service in the true sense of that term. 
If we are no longer required we can say most sincerely that 
despite an almost permanent state of crisis we have all 
enjoyed our association with broadcasting. We do not 
believe that the functicn of this report should be to 
attempt to influence the Government as to what should or 
should not be done. But we do appeal to the Government 
to recall that the lives and careers of real people are 
in its hands and it is barely two years since they were 
wrenched from the old N .z.B.C." 
(AJHR, F.12, 1976, p.9) 
What essentially was being questioned was whether the new three 
corporation system was providing the best service. The two 
television channels were behaving like ice cream vendors on the 
beach. Ian Cross (Pers. Com.) explains: 
"When you looked at their schedules you found we spent 
millions of dollars in overseas funds to bring the 
programmes into the country0 :lne competitive televisicn 
programmers then set about using this investment to 
prevent, to reduce the audience for these programmes. If 
you had a good programme on at eight o'clock of a light 
entertainment variety, a popular sit com I would put 
one dead against it, to halve the audience because I 
couldn • t afford to allow you that audience. That means 
only half the people would be· able to see that programme ••• " 
(Pers. Com.) 
In June 1976, the Minister, now H. Templetcn, announced that 1he 
broadcasting services would be amalgamated back into a single 
corporation, but the 1.mits (TV1, TV2, and Radio N.Z.) would 'retain 
their individuality and operaticnal independence': 
... / 
"Closer control and better co-ordination by a single 
board will allo., better management, particularly in 
financial, regulations, administration, and staffing 
matters. It will also permit more effective planning 
of the future development of the broadcasting services 
in a period of rapid change" 
(N.Z. Min. Br. P.S. 22 June 1976) 
As grounds for the re-organisation, the National Government 
cited the need to 'rescue' the corporations from a financial 
chaos: 
"The present parlous state of broadcasting's finances -
a direct result of the curious and impractical structure 
created by the previous Labour Government - simply underlines 
the necessity for the broadcasting system to be directly 
accountable to the Government. Taxpayers cannot be expected 
to go on pouring money into broadcasting without having a 
voice, through their elected representatives in Parliament, 
in how that money is spent" 
(N.z. Min. Br. P.S. 22 November 1976). 
But on the one side of the coin, the order had created a good 
environment for radio. For too long it had been the poor cousin 
to television which had absorbed revenue and captured the public 
imagination. 
The National Government also reinstated the Broadcasting Authority 
(removed by Labour) now called Broadcasting Tri,bunal. It was 
efz 
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charged with adjudicating warrant applications, receive and determine ft, ~ 
complaints and advise the Minister. 
f, 
The field of communications was widening, especially telecommunications. 
Broadcasting could no .longer be considered in a separate light. The 
Government established in response to this trend a 'Communications 
Commission', to advise Government, 'on developments in telecommunications 
... / 
including broadcasting and other technical fields involved in 
modern communications." (Comm. Cornn, foreward) 
The Commission's function was to attempt to alleviate planning 
problems which went across Government departments in the tele-
communications area. One recent example of such a conflict 
was found in the microwave links developed solely for television 
networking. The Post Office, which has control over all the 
point to point communications sought control of the broadcasting 
system. However, the corporation retained this control. 
The Cornnunications Commissions report concluded: 
" ••• there is a need in New Zealand for some continuing 
arrangement which includes functions of co-ordination 
and national tele-comrnunication planning, and which 
ensures that••••• care (is taken) , ••• for the benefit 
of the public, the Government and all those employed 
in tele-communications" 
(Comm Cornn, 1977, 263) 
Revenue 
Another continuing problem of the last ten years of broadcasting 
has been the static licence fee. Despite increasing demands from 
the public, and cost increases, the licence fee has remained 
unaltered. The 1978 report of the B.C.N.Z. despairingly noted: 
"Successive Governments have required broadcasting to 
convert television to colour, to expand two channels at 
a rapid pace, and to maintain and improve radio and other 
broadcasting services. In fulfilling its duties as a 
servant of Parliament and the people by meeting an increased 
demand further extensions to broadcasting (especially to 
televisicn) the corporation mu.st remind the country that 
it can provide no more than it can afford, by the efficient 
management and dispositicn of resources available to it. 
Beyond that, public expectations can be met only by 
increased commercialisaticn of broadcasting, or an 
increased licence fee". 
(AJHR. F • 3 1 978, p • 4) 
. .. / 
The result was increased commercialism. Sponsorhsip of 
programmes was allowed for television. But the change was 
not without its critics: 
"Before our very eyes we watch the most brazen 
commercial practices on our public service channels. 
The money changers have almost taken over the temple" 
(Stirling, 1981, A. 14) 
Ian Cross, Chairman of the B.C.N.Z. for the period comments 
that this increased commercialism was essential to meet the 
demands of development (Pers. Com.). Cross brought about a 
further reorganisation in 1980. The two televisbn networks 
1~7 
were collapsed back into one unit, becoming Television New Zealand. 
The reorganisatiai sought to bring greater complementarity to 
New Zealand televisiai. The corporation had seven objectives for 
the television reorganisation, and is provides a useful insight 
into the present concept of television. The seven objectives 
sought to: 
"1) provide the kind of complementary programming which 
a two channel public broadcasting system can offer 
the public, 
2) offer scope for regional televisiai, 
3) eliminate those competitive practices which annoy viewers, 
4) give better service to advertisers, 
5) rationalise the use of existing production resources 
and avoid duplication of effort with television, 
6) cater for the minority and cultural audiences at more 
suitable times than is usually possible at present, 
7) fulfill the social, cultural and educational potential 
of television," 
(AJHR, F.3 1979, 4) 
... / 
Clearly televisioo was firmly set in the public service mould, 
attempting to service groups which would not receive much 
attentioo by a strictly commercial service. Yet it still 
utilised advertising for revenue. But what of radio? 
Public radio had suffered with the expansioo of televisicn. 
'From 1967, the objectives of the N.Z.B.C. were totally bound 
up with television, establishing a national network, then a 
seccnd, followed by the introductioo of colour. Radio's 
priorities were largely ignored and its gradual extensicn of 
services ground to a halt, as the resources of the corporation 
were diverted to the high capital costs of its new glamorous 
sister' (Russell, 1982, B 21). Staff were creamed off for 
televisioo, the radio licence fee was amalgamated into a 
televisioo ,licence, and there was little capital expansion. 
But once again that operatiooal independence of a corporation, 
then a separate division, radio has fought back. New ideas, 
programmes and equipment were able to be deployed. If the 
reorganisation of Roger Douglas achieved anything, it certainly 
emphasised the need for radio to be administered separately from 
television. 
Private enterprise broadcasting has also made an impact in recent 
years. Since the first warrants issued to Radio Hauraki and 
Radio i in Auckland, there are now fifteen private commercial 
staticns competing in ten centres about the country. 4 In 1984 
private television has ooce again been discussed. In the last 
mooths of the National Government, plans were announced by 
Minister Ian Shearer for regionally based private enterprise 
televisicn. The new Labour Government reiterated those plans. 
Private enterprise has reclaimed a sizeable share of the broad-
casting sector. 
. .. / 
Review 
During the last two decades the public broadcasting sector has 
faced tremendous constraints - of technology, finances and 
public demands. These have necessitated considerable committment 
by the State, just to maintain its control on the sector. Other 
changes too, have brought new demands and ideals to the service: 
Private enterprise also made its mark, once it had forced its 
way back into broadcasting. All these moves have combined to 
alter broadcasting. They have necessitated tremendous renovations 
of the organisations that have administered broadcasting. 
This chapter has attempted both to look at the events of 
the last tvlenty odd years, and the forces that have helped 
shape them. Broadcasting is as ever to the fore of social 
debate, emphasising its importance. 
The final chapter brings this thesis to a close. It seeks to 
draw together the threads, the themes that are strongly evident 
throughrut broadcasting's development. 
Footnotes 
1. The movie company Kerridge Odeon unsuccessfully requested 
permission in 1960 to establish seven radio stations in 
various cities. The first application for operating private 
televisicn was made by G. Dryden in 1963. He wanted a 
station in the Auckland region. The application was 
unsuccessful (Ross, 1971, 34-5). 
2J See the 'News Media Ownership Act 1965'. 
3. w.s. McKinnon was influenced in his role as Chairman of 
the N.Z.B.C. by the article of Lord Norman.brook, Chairman 
of the B.B.c. Many of the ideas expressed by Norman.brook 
(1965) were utilised by M::Kinnon (P•«s• Com.) 
Radio Hauraki, Auckland 
Radio i, Auckland 
Radio Pacific, Auckland 
Radio Magic 9tFM 
89 FM, Auckland 
898 FM, Hamil ton 
Radio Waikato, Hamilton 
One Double-X, Whakatane 
93FM, Hawkes Bay 
Radio 2XS PalmerstonNorth 
Radio Windy 89 Wellington 
Radio Avon Christchurch 
4XO, Dunedin 
Radio Central, Alexandra 
Foveaux Radio, Invercargill 
1XA 
1X1 
1XP 
MJK 
ROQ 
1JJJ 
1xw 
,xx 
2XS 
2XW 
3XA 
4XO 
4XA 
4XF 
170 
CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This thesis has articlulated a comprehensive account of the 
developme~t of Broadcasting in New Zealand. It has chronicled 
the emergenc<-of Radio and Television from the very early days of 
Wireless Telegraphy. It has looked at the various forces which 
have shaped the activity into its prese~t form. Particular 
individuals, groups and specific structures have channelled the 
activity in distinct ways. Chapters three to seven follow the 
developme~t of broadcasting; yet each chapter adopts a different 
emphasis, cutting into the subject matter in its own way, and is 
in tended to emphasise. changing and different conditions. Such an 
approach enables a capturing of both the sense of the development, 
the progression of an activity, and allows some exploration of the 
wide variety of forces which have shaped that activity. 
This research has placed considerable stress upon the articulation 
171 
of an account of broadcasting which accommodates both social structure 
and human agency. Many examinations of broadcasting, and indeed 
much social science research, has failed to develop social theory 
which reconciles both individuals and structures. People's ideas 
emotions, aspirations and failL~gs are often as determining on the 
nature of broadcasting as the structures inherent in our society. 
Consider for example the contribution of Scrimgeour. At various 
points of time and space his conceptions and actions were crucial 
to the development of broadcasting. Yet also important were the 
setiof relations which confronted him, offering him the opporttu1ity 
to make such actions and reinforcing many of his decisions. 
The dichotomy encountered in social theory between structure and 
agency can be resolved by reference to process. Many social 
theorists up to now have largely ignored the development of 
... / 
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activities through time a>1d space. The study of social change has 
remained largely the preserve of historians. An examination of 
process can provide social theorists with a unique insight which 
incorporates structures a>1d agencies together. This enables 
activities to be studied in a marmer which better reflects their 
involvement as a dynamic mixture of structure and agency. 
, 
This analysis followed the advice ·of Abrams (1982). By 
exploring the nature of events we can gain illustrative comment 
on the nature of the activity. Abrams sees ev~nts as 
'decisive conjunctions of structuring at which huma"l agency 
encounters social possibility'. The first Labour Government's 
actioD of nationalising private radio stations and establishing 
the Commercial Broadcasting Service is a good example of agency 
a"ld structure meeting each other. Reformations in the State-Economy 
and State-Civil Society relationships were to bring about a 
questioning of private enterprise in general. The new Labour 
Government, with an overwhelming mandate for reform, saw the 
private stations as a potential threat. Yet the conceptions of 
Prime Minister Savage were also influential in this development. His 
ideas and influence led to the establishme>1t of a State-owed 
commercial radio service. 
To adequately explore the development of broadcasting, it was 
necessary to look in detail at organisations. People and resources 
are grouped together, in time and space, by organisations to achieve 
courses of action. By their very nature, organisations cross the 
analytical boundaries of State, Economy and Civil society spheres. 
The actions taken by organisations may directly contradict the 
conceptions of one or more of these spheres. 
10rganisations such as the ll'.Z.B.C. embody a number of contradictions. 
The actions to gain advertising for television for instance, may 
run directly against the goal of a 'neutral' public service • 
.. . / 
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For example, ,ni,1ori ty interest programmes during peak r.ours may 
be accorded a low priority u1 view of reve-:ue crisis. Recognition 
of this requires ttinking about organisations in terms of the 
demands of commodity production, (eg., in broadcasting advertising) 
ffi1d non-corrmodity uses (eg., in the public service principles 
of catering for needs). These two compoYJ.ents are ofte.YJ. 
incompatible providing a source of ta1sion in the operations 
'.)f the organisation. 
The conceptions inhere.~t in the organisations, provide a focal 
point for the operation of the activity. Often individuals will 
seek to renegotiate the dominant conceptions of an org~1isation. 
Shelfy, for instance, successfully outlined concepts which sought 
to improve New Zealand's cultural tastes. Others have been less 
successf\.1.l. Some have been expelled for their actions. 
Organisations then must face considerable tensions, especially 
those developing from commodity - non-commodity production. 
This incompatability is often the basis for reorganisation and 
change. The demise of organisations such as R.B.C.N.Z. or the 
N .Z.B.C., ca.."l in part be associated with an inability to resolve 
such dichotomies. The N.Z.B.C.'s overriding commitment bo 
growth, and not to the development of social and programme ideals, 
was very influential in its demise as an organisation. 
During this thesis, three particular aspects of the development were 
probed u1 detail. The first was centred on the development of 
technology. Radio and television are twentieth century products. 
The development and further refinement of that technology that 
granted their very existence, has been well documented. Any 
history of broadcasting must recognise the primary importance of 
that tecb1ology, but it must not also dominate that account. The 
tecrnical ability to achieve something does not explain its 
impleme.~tatim, impact, ffi1d further development. The introduction 
of television, for instffi1ce, was achieved decades after the 
technical achievement. 
. .. / 
F • .M. radio is a similar example. This thesis has acknowledged 
technology and explored its ramifications. Yet it has not centred 
the ~~tire account upon it. Technology grants the possibilities; 
people, in particular, relationships, determL~e application. 
The seccnd major aspect explored by this thesis has been what might 
be labelled 'new conceptions of broadcastL~g•. The way broad-
casting is conceived by people, and the meanings different sections 
of society attach to radio and television reveal much about the 
way it has developed. The exploration of new views put forward 
by prominent individuals and influential groups has been a 
major component of this thesis. The contributions of Shelly, 
for instance, were reinforced by his position of authority, and 
many of his ideas were assimilated into the broadcasting sector. 
The Radio Hauraki pirates showed that "unsanctioned" influences 
can also impart their meaning upon broadcasting. Their public 
defiance of a long standing policy on the exclusion of private 
enterprise captured the public's imagination and gained widespread 
popular support. This helped bring about a change in direction 
for broadcasting. The conceptions held by individuals as· they 
confront possibilities are important. General conceptions such 
as the great New Zealand egalitarian ethos and the acceptability 
of producing for profit, have been influential. 
The third aspect probed in detail by this thesis has been the 
changing nature of organisations. The processes involved in such 
change often involve tensions between those advocating commodity 
and non-commodity production. The tensions also reflect the 
reformations of the State, Economy and Civil Society relationships. 
The attached responsibility assumed by the State in the Economy 
and Civil society during the Second World War required a 
reorganisation in broadcasting. The amalgamation of two services 
was undertaken to accommodate new priorities. 
Taken together these three avenues of inquiry reveal a number of 
very decisive 'breaks'. These are events of significance which 
make particular phases in the development of broadcasting. Some 
were in response to tec~~ological development, for example, the 
... / 
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introduction of television. The implementation of this technology 
required a new organisation to handle it. The first broadcasts 
of sound were a similar break., changing the nature of radio from 
a point to point communicator to a broadcaster from one site to 
multiple receivers. 
Other breaks were more in response to changes in conceptions of 
broadcasting. The establishment of a multi-corporation broadcasting 
system under the third Labour Government is one example. The 
nationalisation of the 'B' stations by the predecessors is a 
similar instance. 
Breaks also occurred in response to changing State Economy, Civil 
Society relationships. The reforms of the Second World War, for 
example were an important development. Many of these controls 
implemented during the state of emergency were retained for the 
'planned' post war society. 
New Zealand broadcasting has really been a product of the State. 
The State has overwhelmed the nature and development of the 
activity since its first inception. Private enterprise has to 
a large extent operated on the periphery, in a service sense. Their 
physical contribution has been dwarfed by the actions of the State. 
On the other hand, their contribution has been far frlllJ!l minor. They 
have stimulated the State Service with calls for, and demonstrations 
of innovative and lively broadcasting. 
The State became dominant in broadcasting for two reasons. Firstly, 
at a very early stage the State recognised the potential power 
inherent in broadcasting and sought to restrain it. The actions 
taken by the 1903 Wireless Telegraphy Act completely pre-empted 
any radio service. The other cause of its dominance was that 
the State really was the only body which could develop radio, 
and later, television, along the lines demanded by the corrununity. 
In a small nation, seemingly dedicated to the ideals of 
egalitarianism, the State was the only body which could develop 
a widespread, high quality, public broadcasting system • 
... / 
Broadcasting has also developed a sense of unity, an idea of 
community amongst New Zealanders, and this has proved attractive 
to the State. Broadcasting has an ability to draw together, to 
unite. This ability has been well exploited at different times. 
It has been used to raise money (eg, Telethon), keep up morale, 
(eg, the War effort), and distribute information to widespread 
areas (eg, Civil Defence). 
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The operation of radio and television on different scales have 
als1' been important. After the development of a national microwave 
network, television has moved to a national scale, only rarely 
reverting to decentralised broadcasting. Radio operates on a 
variety of levels, but centres on the regional level. Radio's 
use of the local scale has enabled it to develop close links 
to people (eg, talkbacks). Private enterprise radio has sought 
to concentrate on the local regional frame, a framework which 
allows them to operate profitably alone in different areas. 
The question of funding sits directly astride the major tensions 
discussed earlier. The license funded system reflects the principles 
of egalitarianism. Yet the public broadcasting system in recent 
years has faced increased costs with a static license fee. Advertising 
has had to provide the much needed revenue. But increased 
commercialism rests uneasily alongside the public service promoted 
device of the license fee system. Television, for instance, 
regularly schedules 'regional' advertising spots, utilising a 
previously untapped advertising market. Yet there is little 
programming of regional interest items on television apart from 
a short regional news segment. 
Advertising,once scorned and rejected time and time again by 
critics and administrators alike, has now become a dominant and crucial 
part of the service. Funding has been an area where principles 
are tested. Adherence to non-commercial goals such as universal 
coverage and minority Lnterest programmes cause higher costs. 
On the other hand a strictly commercial service under-utilises 
... / 
the great potential of broadcasting. The balancing of 
these, commodity and non-commodity concerns, is critical 
to the acceptable provision of broadcasting. 
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In conclusion this thesis has endeavoured to forge a framework 
that reveals the nature of the development of broadcasting. It 
has attempted to incorporate both structure and agency into a 
meaningful explanation of the particular. By its very nature, 
broadcasting has had a complex and chequered development. Its 
influence has been brought to bear on many sectors of our society. 
This has necessitated an extended ingUiry.. The task was to examine 
the entire development of broadcasting in New Zealand. Many of 
the events popularly identified with broadcasting, have become 
more understandable through the approach taken in this 
investigation. The thesis has explored the progression 
through time and space, of some of the important forces 
which have shaped and channelled the provision of broadcasting 
in New Zealand. 
Appendix I Members of New Zealand Cabinet Responsible 
for Broadcasting. 
1893-1896 J.G. Ward (Liberal) 
1896-1899 R.J. Seddoo (Liberal) 
1899-1912 J.G. Ward (Liberal) 
1912 H.G. Ell (Liberal) 
1912-1915 R.H. Rhodes (Reform) 
1915-1919 Sir J.G. Ward (National Coalitiai.) 
1919-1925 J.G. Coates (Reform) 
1925-1926 Sir J. Parr (Reform) 
1926-1928 w. Nosworthy (Reform) 
1928-1929 J.B. Dooald (Liberal-thited) 
1929-1930 Sir J.G. Vard (Liberal-thited) 
1930-1931 J.B. Donald (Liberal-thited) 
1931-1935 A, Hamilton (Coaliticn) 
1935-1936 F. Jones (Labour) 
1936-1940 M.J. Savage (Labour) 
1940-1944 D. Wilson (Labour) 
1944-1949 F. Jones (Labour) 
1949-1951 F.W. Doidge (Natiooal) 
1951-1957 R.M. Algie (National) 
1957-1960 R. Boord (Labour) 
1960-1963 A.E.I:insella (National) 
1963-1967 W.J. Scott (National) 
1967-1969 L.R. Adams~Schneider (National) 
1969-1972 H.J. Walker (National) 
1972-1975 R.o. Douglas (Labour) 
1975 F.M. Colman (Labour) 
1975-1981 H.C. Templeton (National) 
1981-1984 Dr. I. Shearer (National) 
1984- J. Hunt (Labour) 
*Minister 0£ Broadcasting 
+Minister in Charge 0£ Broadcasting 
xPostmaster-General respai.sible. 
~Official N.z. Yearbooks 1936-1960) 
Schole£ield, 1950) 
(Wilson, 1969) 
(Lambert and Palenski, 1982) 
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Appendix II 
A CHRONOLOGY OF NEW ZEALAND BROADCASTillG 
1894 
1895 
1903, Jan. 
1 903, Winter 
1903 
1906 
1908 
1914 
1919 
1921 
1921, Nov 17. 
1922, Feb. 
1922, Mid. 
1922, Aug. 
Rutherford experiments successfully at 
Canterbury. 
Wireless telegraph invented by Marconi. 
Passmore sends signals 200 yards 
Passmore sends signals 6 miles 
THE WIRELESS TELEGRAPHY ACT 
Otago Boys High School experiments 
Wireless transmission of speech and ITD.lsic in 
USA (Fessenden). This established the 
feasibility of radio telephony and radio 
broadcasting. 
POST AND TELEGRAPH ACT 
Prof. of Physics at Otago, Dr. Robert Jack 
becomes involved in broadcasting. Labelled 
'prophet of broadcasting' and is its first 
practi tiooer. 
Prof. Jack resumes experiments after war. 
A number of visiting ships in New Zealand made 
broadcasts in New Zealand waters, e.g., the 
EASTERN PLANET in Lyttleton, 20 August. 
First a series of long ranging concerts broad-
cast in Dunedin. This really planted 
broadcasting in New Zealand. 
First broadcasting station takes to the air in 
Wellington non commercial and private and was 
owned by the International Electric Co. 
Auckland followed with a radio station. 
Parliament proposed to divide the country into 
a number of administrative areas (8,6 or 4 of 
them) to then issue licences. 
Mr D.G. Sullivan, MP questioned the Government's 
intention to operate a national radio service. 
Mr Coates replied that the Government preferred 
to follow whatever policy was decided in 
Great Britain. 
. .. / 
1922, End 
1923, Jan 18 
1923 
1923, May 21 
1923, Nov 
1923 
1924, Oct 
1925, March 
1925, April 
1925, Winter 
Six New Zealand associations were engaged in 
broadcasting of a somewhat sporadic nature 
for the entertainment of 572 holders of 
listeners permits. 
"RADIO TELEGRAPH REGULATIONS FOR AMATEUR 
EXPERIMENTAL AND BROADCASTING STATIONS" 
gazetted. These contained a series of four 
radio districts a plan of future distribution 
of radio stations etc. 
The N.Z. Dairy Co., sought permission to 
establish a radio station to broadcast to 
130 
its farmers in the Waikato. This was the 
first concrete proposal that the Government 
had received and was liked by the Postmaster-
General but not by Cabinet who did not want to 
develop broadcasting regionally. 
First Broadcasting Licence issued under the 
Regulations to Radio Service Ltd of Auckland. 
Eighteen other staticns would be licenced 
this year. 
Government expressed a desire for a dominion 
wide scheme of broadcasting and controlled by 
an organisation under semi-Government control. 
By the end of 1923, 2,000 receiving licences 
had been issued. 
POST AND TELEGRAPH AMENDMENT ACT. 
This provided that part of the licence revenue 
could be paid in assistance of persons or 
companies who in consideration of payment 
under this secticn agree to undertake a 
broadcasting service. 
New Radio Regulations were gazetted. 
These regulations most notably increased the 
annual listeners fee from 5/- to 30/-
A Government subsidy of £15 per week was 
instituted for one station in each of the 
four main centres. 
Coates became Prime Minister, he was previously 
Postmaster-General. 
Goodfellow announced that he was prepared to 
establish a radio staticn in Auckland if it 
could broadcast to all the suppliers in the 
Waikato. 
. .. / 
1925, Aug 22 
1925, Nov 25 
1926 Feb 
1926, Aug 
1926, Sept 
1926, End 
1928 
1928, Oct 
1928, End 
The Government (The Reform Party) 
contracted with the newly formed Radio 
Broadcasting Company Ltd. (Goodfellow 
and Harris were Trustees). A five year 
contract to purchase 4 stations, one each 
in Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and 
Dunedin. The Company was to be funded with 
Private shareholdings, licence fees for 
operating costs, and Government loans for 
capital expansion. 
The company was given 6 months to commence 
broadcasting. 
1YA passed into company control. 
Delays in the manufacturing end of the 
station plant meant that the company would 
be unable to meet the 6 month deadline so 
an extension was granted to the end of June. 
1YA in service. 
3YA in service. 
The Government accepted the company proposal 
that the new Wellingtcn station should be 
increased in power ten fold. (5,000 watts 
instead of 500). 
The Government secured a first mortgage over 
the plant and £15000. 
The lhited Party came to power but depended en 
the small Labour Party for support. 
At this time the company was looking forward 
to theopening of the last metropolitan statioo 
they had u.~dertaken to build. 
THE COPYRIGHT (TEMPORARY) AMENDMENT ACT set up 
acne man commission (Mr A.D. Thompson of 
Lower Hutt) to determine the percentage of 
licence fees to be paid to the Australasian 
Performing Rights Association from 1 October 1927 
to 31 August 1929. 
Three Dunedin stations (4ZL, 4ZM & 4ZO) 
circularised the remaining 5 stations owned 
and operated by various business firms (1ZB, 
1ZQ, 2ZM and 2ZK and 3ZC) suggesting that they 
form an associaticn in order to make some 
effort to get some monetary return for trouble 
incurred in the running of the station. 
During this year 10 private radio stations were 
functioning, two of those were operated by 
radio societies. 
. .. / 
1929, Ja11. 
1930 
1930, Sept 11 
1930, Oct 
1931, April 14 
1931, June 
1931, Sept 
A conference of radio dealers in Wellington 
debated various schemes for the 'B' stations 
service. 
Ward succeeded by Forbes. Before the 1931 
election Forbes enticed the Reform Party 
into a coalition, with him remaining as 
Prime Minister, and Coates as Minister of 
lhernployment and another Reform Leader, 
Downie Stewart as Minister of Finance. 
The Empire SW service proposal gained the 
approval of the delegates to the Imperial 
Conference but when the scheme was placed 
before the Governments of the Dominions, they 
appreciated its value but felt unable to 
give financial support. 
Meeting held in the 'B' statioo strooghold 
of Dunedin discussed the proposed Copyright 
demands of the Performing Rights Association, 
more than 1,000 people attended and the first 
branch of the New Zealand Listeners League 
was formed at the meeting. 
lhexpectantly the Postmaster-General, 
J.B. Donald told Parliament that his Department 
would take control of the Broadcasting Service 
when the contract expired in 1931. The 
intentioo to nationalise was warmly received 
by the Labour Party and attacked by the 
Opposition (Reform) and generally ill received 
by the radio-audience. 
Broadcasting to schools was inaugurated from 2YA. 
The P.G. was searching for a suitable successor 
to the Company and he invited its suggestions. 
They proposed a public company, which was 
considered but no part was accepted. A Bill 
to make broadcasting a State enterprise was 
introduced by P.G. Donald. 
A tNITED-REFORM Coalition came to be Government 
and they lengthened the life of Parliament to 
four years. 
The new P.G. Adam Hamilton, although from the 
Reform and Private-enterprise wing of the Coalition 
he freely accepted the principles of State 
control. 
. .. / 
1931, Nov. 
1932, Jan 1 
1932 
1932, Sept 
The Bill was f?SSed - a public corporation 
was established with a board to carry on 
public broadcasting services to develop and 
improve these, and in part to be .funded by 
licence fees. The board was given power to 
take over existing stations on Ministerial 
authority and did take over four stations (1YA 
2YA, 3YA and 4YA) of the broadcasting company, 
established four new stations in the main centres 
and provided progrannne services to private 
provincial 'B' stations. One of the first acts 
of the new board was the appointment of a 
coverage commission. Another one of the board's 
early acts was the issuing of a questionnaire 
which was smt out to all listeners. It was 
answered by 24,000 people, 40% of those sent 
out. 
A New Zealand Alliance of 'B' Stations was 
formed under the leadership of 1ZR, Auckland' 
and 2ZW Wellington. The Alliance kept the 
interests of members continually before the 
notice of members of Parliament and of the 
public. 
The Act~ changes took effect but neither the 
members of the board not its employees were 
members of the Public Service. AA advisory 
council was established consisting of 8 
members for the purpose of advising the 
board in respect to its £'unctions. 
Auckland 'B' staticns interests, organised 
by the 1ZR club at the instance of Rev, 
C.G. Scrimgeour petitioned Parliament for 
a share of the radio licence revenue or 
alternatively that they be allowed to indicate 
in their announcements of a limited number of 
programmes addresses, and products of their 
sponsors. 
In Wellington a deputation introduced by 
Peter Fraser MP weighted on the PG to protest 
against a reported intention to limit 
spoosorship on 'B' stations. 
Television was demcnstrated by Zuorykin overseas. 
The BBC SW service to the Empire was officially 
opened. 
An agreement is reached between the Post and 
Telegraph department and provision is made for 
payment to the board of S/6 0£ the licence 
fees received from the listeners. 
. .. / 
1933, Sept 
1934 
1934, March 31 
1935, March 
1935, April 
1935, Aug 
1935, Sept 
Mr J.K. Woods, Secretary of the NZ Federation 
of 'B' stations made it public that he had 
been advised by the PG that after 31 March 1934 
no 'B' station would be permitted to broadcast 
sponsored programmes. 
Meanwhile during the course of the year, the 
Government bought out the leading 'B' class 
stations 1ZR Auckland and 2ZW Wellington. 
Parliament decided on the retention of 
broadcasting as a public utility. 
After this date no sponsored programmes were 
permitted on private radio stations. 
The Regulation against the broadcast of 
controversial material was revoked and the 
board was given the reponsibility of 
deciding what should be broadcast. 
THE BROADCASTING AMENDMENT ACT 1934-35 
This restored a prohibition on advertising and 
the board was given the task of supervising 
all stations programme output with the power 
to recommend to the Minister that licences 
be cancelled for non compliance with its 
standards. It also placed a ceiling on the 
number of private stations that might be 
licenced, the total not to exceed those 
licenced on the 31 March 1935. The licence 
fee was reduced from 30s to 25s from 1 April. 
The board was given a new composition as 
two members were to be nominated by organis-
ations which were representative of the 
holders of receiving licences. 
The plight of the 'B' stations was further 
aggravated by claims for compensation for 
the use of copyright discs of Gramophone 
manufacturers. The national stations and 8 
private stations subsidised by the broadcasting 
board were not affected as they were covered 
by an agreement with the Gramophone Companies. 
A conference of 'B' stations in Wellington 
passes resolutions in favour of complete 
freedom of the air, the removal of the ban on 
controversial matter, and for the obtaining 
of revenue by unrestricted advertising. These 
resolutions were put before the Prime Minister 
by a deputation from the conference who 
replied that the Government's policy was 
against advertising. 
. .. / 
1935, Nov 
1935, Nov 27 
1931-1936 
1936, May 
1936, July 1 
1936, July 6 
1936, Sept. 
1936, Oct. 30 
1936, Oct 
1936, Nov. 
1937, April 
Shortly before the Ge~eral Election, the 
transmissions of 1ZR Auckland were jammed, 
allegedly by the Government who feared the 
influe~ce of the broadcast against them in 
the General Election. 
GENERAL ELECTION 
Labour gains 28 seats and won office. 
Many amateur stations are forced to close due 
to funding restrictions. 
The Postmaster-General announced that the 
Government had yet not decided whether the 
broadcasting board would be abolished, 
reconstituted or altered in some way. 
BROADCASTlNG ACT 
This abolished the board and established a 
Government Department. THE NEW ZEALAND 
BROADCASTlNG SERVICE with a Director 
answerable to the Minister of Broadcasting. 
Labour continued a policy of no new private 
warrants to be issued and the remaining 
private stations accountable to the Minister. 
The Act also empowered the Minister to 
establish commercial stations and prohibited 
advertising from other stations public 
and private. 
The Prime Minister, M.J. Savage became the 
first Minister of Broadcasting. 
Director of Broadcasting appointed -
Prof. J. Shelley 
M. Savage announced that Parliament would be 
broadcast. 
1ZB opens commercial transmission. 
Scrimgeour appointed Director of the Commercial 
Broadcasting Service. 
With the commercial service underway, the 
Government turned somewhat impatiently to 
the private stations. All stations had to be 
valued by November 1936. 
Firm offers were made by the Government for the 
purchase of private stations. Replies 
requested by 30 April. 
. .. / 
1937, Dec. 
1938, March 
1938, Aug 
1939 
1939, Feb 17 
1939, Sept 3 
1939, Sept 5 
1939, Sept. 
1940, Feb, 7 
1940, March 
1940, July 
1941, Jan. 
By Christmas, 15 stations were purchased. 
In the course of 20 months the Govemmen t 
had bought 20 stations for a shade more than 
£20,000 
Controversy surrounds the Director of the 
Commercial Service accused of misusing 
broadcasting as a Public Servant. 
N.z. Listener founded. 
A special meeting is held between the Combined 
Control of Navigational Aids Committee and 
representatives of the Censorship and Publicity 
Committee to discuss what to do about the 
control of broadcasting stations in an 
emergency. They were concerned that broad-
casting stations constitute excellent 
navigaticnal aids to shipping and aircraft. 
War against Germany is declared in New Zealand. 
A comprehensive memorandum was issued by the 
Controller regarding the Censorship of 
Advertising Copy. 
The NBS mounted a 24 hour listening watch on 
BBC transmissions. {It was through the 2YA 
control rooms that news often first reached 
New Zealand). The declaration of war by 
Britain against Germany was one such case. 
Preliminary plans for a mobile broadcasting 
and recording unit to accompany New Zealand 
troops to Africa were placed before the 
Minister of Broadcasting. 
Prime Minister Savage dies and is succeeded 
by Peter Fraser. 
A War Cabinet is announced. 
The War Cabinet initiates enquiry into steps 
which might be taken to reduce or rationalise 
the broadcasting service, the desired aim 
being the freeing up of manpower and 
expertise. 
. .. / 
1941, March 
1941, July, 23 
1942, Aug 21 
1942, Nov 
1943, Feb 
1943, May 3 
1943, June 
1943 
1945, June 20 
1945 
1946 , April 1 
1946, Oct, 24 
1946, Nov, 2 
A committee of ~quiry is set up to look 
at wartime rationalisation as directed by 
the War Cabinet. They travelled widely in 
the following months. 
The committee of inquiry reported to the 
Minister ways in which there might be 
wartime rationalisation of the broadcasting 
service. They recommended considerable 
amalgamation of the NBS and the NCBS. 
The War Cabinet passed the recommendation that 
the technical staffs of both the broadcasting 
services to be amalgamated under the control 
of the Chief Engineer of the NBS. 
Scrimgeour was balloted for service in the 
Armed Services no normal request from 
Government for the exemption of a Government H.O.D. 
Scrimgeour suspended from duties, suspension 
lifted after he signed an agreement. 
A radio service was arranged for daily 
broadcasts of NZ news to troops in the Pacific. 
Scrimgeour about to enter camp and was 
dismissed as a controller. 
The amalgamatiat of the two broadcasting 
services by the STATUI'ES AMENDMENT ACT 1943, 
produced a unified NZBS under a single 
Director of Broadcasting. 
Ban an weather forecasts lifted. 
After the war broadcasting was able to go 
back to its put aside plans. But they were 
subject to many post-war restrictions. 
The departmental name changed from Naticnal 
Broadcasting Service to New Zealand Broadcasting 
Service. 
The New Zealand Broadcasting Service Orchestra 
was established. 
The North Island Travelling Recording thit 
established. 
. .. / 
1948, Sept, 27 
1949 
1949, Nov. 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1957, April 
1957, Nov. 
1958, Aug 
1959, Feb, 23 
1960, Jan, 28 
1960, Jan 
Short-wave division NZBS commences 
regular transmissions. 
.., no 
' v 
Television made the subject of investigation 
by an inter-departmental committee 
The Labour Government is defeated and the 
National Government takes over in December, 
pledged to fewer controls and more 
competition. 
Mr N.R. Palmer (Supervising Engineer) and 
Mr s.w. MacDonald (Developing Engineer) both 
of the NZBS sent overseas to study TV 
developments and to represent the NZBS at 
the 6th Plenary Assembly of International 
Radio Consultative Committee in Geneva. 
UHF Television developed greatly expanding 
the number of potential channels. 
Colour television developed. 
Cabinet considers the need to establish a 
Royal Commission to look at the introduction 
of television. 
National Government is defeated and a Labour 
Government assumes office in December. 
Government announced that a 625 line system 
would be adopted as the standard for 
televisicn and certain VHF channels would 
be reserved for TV use. 
Experimental TV station established in 
Auckland by the NZBS. 
Government announced that a television system 
incorporating both commercial and non-commercial 
services would be established and operated 
by the NZBS 
BRO.i1.DCASTING AMENDMENT ACT 1960 
This provided for the establishment of a 
television service to be operated by the 
Minister in charge of broadcasting in 
associatioo with the existing Broadcasting 
Service. 
. .. / 
1960, June 1 
1960, Nov 
1961 
1961, June 1 
1961, July 
1962, April 1 
1962 
1963, March 
1964 
1965 
1966, Dec, 6 
Auckland Channel 2 opens. 
The Labour Government is defeated 
THE BROADCASTING CORPORATION ACT 1961 
repealed all previous legislation and 
established a corporation of three members 
to take over and operate existing services 
from 1 April 1962. The Act provides that 
the corporation may after considering the 
services already available in a locality call 
for applications or make recommendations to 
the Minister of Broadcasting on the granting 
of warrants for the establishment and 
operation of private broadcasting and TV 
stations. The corporation continued to 
supervise and control programmes broadcast 
by any stations so licenced. In this year 
Pye, Woller and :rerridge sought to operate 
private rv stations. :rerridge tendered to 
operate 7 stations in the four main centres 
and 3 provincial areas. 
Stereo FM discovered, providing a new 
dimension to radio broadcasting. 
Advertising on TV commences in New Zealand 
at Auckland. 
Christchurch begins TV transmission 
Wellington begins TV transmission. 
THE NEW ZEALAND BROADCASTING CORPORATION 
comes into operation. 
The NZBC establishes its own independent 
and comprehensive news service. 
Dunedin begins TV transmissioo. 
50% of the population were receiving 
a satisfactory standard of television service. 
A $15 million development scheme announced by 
the Government to improve television service 
by increased pover and additional relay 
stations. 
The NZBC's board was increased from three to 
seven. 
1 Oo 
IY 
Radio Hauraki commenced broadcasting outside 
New Zealand territorial waters in the Hauraki 
Gulf and outside the law. Televised political 
broadcasts begin as did regular coverage of 
the parties aYJ.nual conferences. 
. .. / 
1967, April 3 
1967 
1968, Nov 
1969, July 
1969, Nov 
1969 
1970 
The television broadcasting hours of the 
four regional services was extended to 
65 hours per week. 
An amendment to the Broadcasting Corporation 
Act allowed the Director General of the 
corporation to be appointed by the corporation 
itself rather than by the Governor-General 
in council on the recommendation of the 
corporation, but the Amendment specified that 
the Director-GPneral's salary was to be paid 
out of the consolidated revenue account. 
It was to be "such salary as may be from time 
to time appropriated by Parliament". 
THE BROADCASTING AUTHORITY ACT 1968 established. 
an independent authority (Tribunal) to 
consider and adjudicate upon the applications 
for warrants, to ensure the holders comply 
with the conditions of the warrants and the 
rules of the Authority, and to advise the 
Minister on broadcasting matters. This Act 
blocked attempts by newspaper companies to 
enter radio by limiting their possible 
shareholding to 35%. It also stipulated 
that no one person or company could run more 
than one radio station. 
An announcement is made by a consortium of 
companies, (UEB Industries Ltd, Kerridge 
Odeon Corporation Ltd., Wright Stephenson 
and J. Watties Canneries Ltd.) that they 
intend to apply for warrants to operate a 
national television network and radio stations 
in the four main centres. 
A national micro-wave network for television 
which enabled the four regional services to 
be brought together for the up to the minute 
presentation of news and current affairs 
material. 
The Minister of Broadcasting asks the New 
Zealand Broadcasting Authority to conduct an 
inquiry into the need for a second channel, 
and into the best way to introduce 'private 
enterprise• competition as well as into the 
possibility of public share-participation and 
the protection of New Zeala~d Ownership and 
independence. 
The public private control debate began to 
once more gain some heat. 
. .. / 
1 C?C 
1970, June 
1971 
1972 
1972, Nov 
1973, Jan 
1973, July 31 
1973 
1974 
1975, March, 31 
1 975, April, 1 
1975, Nov. 
1 976, April 1 • 
The NZBC announces that it will seek approval 
to operate the second channel itself on the 
grounds that it already had the facilities 
for duplicating channels at minimum expense. 
Inquiry by the NZ Broadcasting Authority into 
television services (the Peacock report) 
It considered: 
- the need for a second channel 
- the best way for introducing private 
competition. 
- the consequences of any action or non action. 
The recommendations to introduceea second 
channel were taken up with the Government. 
The radio licence fee was abolished. 
Labour Govemmen t elected. 
The Labour Government announces that the NZBC 
would be abolished and replaced by three 
separate corporations (2 television and 1 
radio) and a Broadcasting Council to provide 
common services. 
A general review of broadcasting vJas undertaken 
by the New Zealand committee on broadcasting 
(the Adam Committee) 
Labour introduces its Broadcasting Act in which 
it established three separate corporations for 
Radio; TV One and TV Two. It eliminated the 
post of Minister of Broadcasting and made the 
Postmaster-General responsible for warrant 
renewals. It excluded the granting of warrants 
for additional private stations and charged 
Radio New Zealand with the rask of from time to 
time to develop extend and improve a radio 
broadcasting system for the whole of New Zealand. 
Colour transmission was introduced into 
New Zealand. 
The NZBC is abolished 
The three corporations and council becomes 
operational. The Minister of Broadcasting 
is abolished. 
National Government elected. 
The post of Minister of Broadcasting is 
reinstated by the National Government • 
. . . / 
1976, June 
1976 
1977, April 
1980 
1980, Oct 
1981 
1982, May 
1982, June 21 
1983 
1983, Oct 
The Communications Commission is established 
by Government to advise it on developments in 
Telecommunications including broadcasting. 
They repealed the 1973 Act with their 
BROADCASTJNG ACT 1976 which took effect from 
April 1977. 
The Broadcasting Tribunal powers were 
re-strengthened and the system was made 
accountable to the Minister. The Tribunal 
was responsible to issue warrants, transfer 
revoke, change, conditions and so forth~ 
The Communications Commission presents its 
report entitled "Telecommunications in 
New Zeal and" • 
A Broadcasting Amendment Act unified the two 
TV corporations in to a two channel one 
corporation affair. 
The warrant for RNZ station 2YB is amended 
to provide for 120 hours per month 0£ 
''access programmes". 
The BCNZ calls for tenders to supply programmes 
for unused television times. 
The Government withdraws its financial support 
for the S~ transmissions to the Pacific. The 
corporation decides to continue the service 
in the meantime. 
Northern Television begins broadcasting 
"GOOD IDRN JNG". 
Satellite dishes "eavesdropping" on satellite 
cause some problems for the Post Office. 
Postmaster-General Talbot announces that TV 
satellite reception systems could be used 
privately without fear of prosecution 
provided they are not distributed beyond 
the immediate confines of premises in which 
the Satellite reception equipment is housed • 
. . . ;· 
1984, June 
1984, June 14 
1984, July 14 
1984, Aug. 
A third television system is announced which 
is to be privately owned on a regional base 
with a national news network. The network 
is to be based on four regions~ 
1) Auckland/Northla~d 
2) Waikato/Bay of Plenty 
3) Wellington/Manawatu/Hawkes Bay/wairarapa. 
4) Christchurch/Dunedin/Invercargill 
Snap election called Labour Party pledge to 
establish a Royal Commission on future 
of broadcasting. 
Fourth Labour Government elected in a landslide 
result. Minister of Broadcasting, 
Dr. Ian Shearer loses his seat. 
Decision on third channels to be reassessed 
by the new Government. Royal Commission 
confirmed by new Minister of Broadcasting, 
J. Hunt. 
A.J.H.R. 
A.P.R.A. 
A.T.L. 
A.VJ.A. 
B.B.C. 
B.C. 
B.C.N .z. 
C.A.C. 
Comm Cornn 
C.R.R. (1941) 
d. 
D.C.T.V. 
Gazette 
Hansard 
1. 
M.S. 
Appendix Ill 
ABBREVIATIONS 
Appendicies to the Journals of the House 
of Representatives of New Zealand. 
Austral~sian Performing Rights Association. 
Alexander Tun:bull Library, Wellington. 
Amalgamated Wireless (Australasia) Ltd. 
British Broadcasting Corporation. 
Broadcasting - abbreviation in catalogue 
at National Archives. 
Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand. 
Communications Advisory Council 
Communications Commission. 
Committee Rationalisation of Radio. 
Being the report to the Committee appointed 
by the Honourable Minister in Charge of 
Broadcasting on 24 March 1941, to examine 
the possibility of Rationalisation of the 
two radio broadcasting services and to 
submit proposals for the release of radio 
technicians for service in connection 
with the War effort. 
Dated 
Departmental Committee to advise the 
Government on the pnoblems associated with 
the establishment of television services 
in New Zealand. 
est. 18 July 1949. 
The New Zealand Gazette 
Government Printer, Wellington. 
New Zealand Parliamentary Debates. 
Letter 
Manuscript Section 
Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington 
... / 
N.B.S. 
N.C.B.S. 
Nat. Ar. 
N.Z.B.A. 
N.Z.B.C. 
N.Z.B.S. 
N.z.c.a. 
N.Z. Min. Br. 
p .s. 
Pers. Comm. 
R.B.C.N.Z. 
S.A. 
Statutes. 
National Broadcasting Service 
National Commercial Broadcasting Service 
National Archives 
New Zealand Broadcasting Authority 
New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation 
1961-1975 
New Zealand Broadcasting Service 
predecessor ; National Broadcasting Service 
name established 1 April 1946 
changed to N.Z.B.C. 1961 
The Broadcasting Future for New Zealand 
Report of the New Zealand Committee 
on Broadcasting 1973 
New Zealand Minister of Broadcasting 
Press Statement 
Personal Communication 
Radio Broadcasting Company of 
New Zealand Ltd. 
Sound Archives. 
New Zealand Statutes. 
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